

JPRS 77458

25 February 1981

Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2273

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NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

REAGAN'S POSITION ON CAMP DAVID DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 19 Jan 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Fu'ad Matar: "From the Ocean to the Gulf: Will Reagan Remove the Effects of the Camp David Deal?"]

[Text] In a few days Ronald Reagan will take over the position of president of the United States of America. On this occasion the following may be said.

First, the Arabs are attaching great importance to Ronald Reagan's administration based on the fact that they would be facing a U.S. president who is sure of himself and who is not a minion of the Zionist forces in his country. In addition, he is courageous, and he is not inclined to authorize a policy of indecision. It is assumed that he is quite aware of the unfortunate consequences that grew out of the method used by his predecessor, President Jimmy Carter, to solve the Middle East crisis. It may even be said that Arab wariness of U.S. policy reached its highest level after the deal that President Carter concluded with President Anwar al-Sadat and Israel's Prime Minister Menahem Begin. We are referring to the Camp David deal.

Second, the statement that the Arabs are attaching great importance to Reagan's administration is linked to their desire that this administration remove the effects of the Camp David deal and begin devising a just and an acceptable solution to the Arab-Israeli struggle.

Third, it is self-evident to assume that the Reagan administration is well aware of the fact that there is an Arab boycott of the United States that includes even those parties that have ties of friendship and old relations with the United States. The United States is also aware that these parties cannot possibly retract their rejection of Camp David. Despite all the pressures that were exerted on them by the Carter administration and despite all the conspiracies that were devised by that administration, [the Reagan administration must be aware] that the minimum that the Arab countries would accept to restore the spirit of consultation to relations with the United States is that the Camp David deal be aborted and that its effects be removed.

Fourth, the fact that Dr Henry Kissinger suddenly sneaked into the Arab region a few days before Ronald Reagan officially assumed his position seemed quite curious. Although Kissinger suggested that he was an envoy of the future U.S. administration to some of the countries of the area, these countries had numerous doubts about the matter and dealt with him accordingly. In doing so, these countries were serving that administration. If Kissinger had in fact been the envoy of that administration, the reaction on the part of the Arab countries would have been sterner because [dispatching Kissinger] would have appeared to be [an attempt on the part of] the future U.S. administration to provoke these countries.

Fifth, if we concede that the Reagan administration is not fully cognizant of the facts of the Arab situation and that it is natural for it to inquire into these facts before it officially takes over the government, the selection of Dr Kissinger for this task is not a proper one for several reasons. Kissinger is the author of the Camp David agreement that all the Arabs have rejected. He is biased, and the task of making a thorough examination of the facts calls for a person who does not favor [one side over the other]. Kissinger is partial to the parties of the Camp David deal who are Carter, al-Sadat and Begin. He expressed his total bias when he began his recent tour by visiting President al-Sadat and exchanged statements with him in which each one of them praised the other.

Hence, Kissinger's announcement in Cairo that he would visit Israel, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the Sultanate of Oman and Somalia after his visit to Egypt had the appearance of a conspiracy which he had planned with President al-Sadat and whose purpose was to suggest that Saudi Arabia and Jordan were not opposed to the Camp David deal and that there would be a new dialogue on this matter that Kissinger will conduct. It is known that Saudi Arabia and Jordan have gone beyond the stage of rejecting that deal and washing their hands of it. They set conditions for the future U.S. administration on stimulating future mutual relations; these would be tied to abandoning the Camp David deal altogether and devising an alternative formula that would take into consideration the fact that the Arabs are not only Anwar al-Sadat. Such a stipulation was neither announced nor slightly or forcefully referred to. However, many people in Reagan's expected administration know this. It may even be said that some of them heard [such] statements from some Arabs and that these statements were relayed to President-elect Reagan.

What is noteworthy is that Kissinger's sudden action, about which scores of questions have been raised, came while preparations for the Islamic summit were underway. The opening session of the Islamic summit will be held in Mecca on 26 January 1981, and [subsequent] sessions will be held in al-Ta'if. This is the summit that will crystallize in a firm manner the Arab-Islamic resolve to confront the status quo that President Carter's administration tried to impose.

In the light of Kissinger's partiality to the Camp David deal, his

aforementioned sudden action seems to be an attempt to throw the course of the Islamic summit into disarray.

Sixth, a person like Henry Kissinger cannot possibly convey the truth to the new U.S. administration because he is partial to a deal that has been rejected by the Arabs. It is natural for a person of this kind who cannot bear to live in the shadows to make an eleventh hour effort to return to the limelight by emphasizing that the spirit of this deal continues to live. In doing so he is relying on the fact that he has some favor with the U.S. administration that will officially be in office in a few days.

But this administration, whose staff views the Camp David deal with considerable wariness, realizes that President Reagan's success in his first term of office depends primarily on the method he will adopt in dealing with the Arabs. Reagan's administration does not seem to be prepared to let the favor Kissinger enjoys get the upperhand of [the effort to] understand the Middle East problem and the attempt to devise a new formula for a solution that has become more than essential.

Perhaps one of the most notable of the aforementioned [members of Reagan's administration] is Republican Senator Charles Percy who seems to be convinced that the avenue to the ideal solution lies in the United States' support for the idea of establishing a Palestinian state headed by Mr Yasir 'Arafat. When Reagan insists on Percy becoming the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee despite the fact that THE NEW YORK TIMES stated last 6 December that he notified Soviet leaders when he met them during his visit to Moscow that month of his support for the creation of a Palestinian state headed by 'Arafat, this means that Reagan will not fall prey to the remaining shrewd schemers of the Camp David deal and that he is capable, through the convictions of Percy and many others whose just voices the Carter administration had tried to stifle, of laying the proper foundation for a balanced and a just step.

It remains to be said that as a new administration comes in office the Arab parties--those that have traditional and historical relations with the United States or the Arab revolutionary parties which prevented the Soviet Union from achieving gains at the expense of the U.S. position--will not be able to maintain the position they had assumed on the U.S. administration after the Camp David deal. These parties had chosen to boycott the Carter administration; at the same time they did not register any extremist [action] against the United States. They did so on the basis of the fact that Carter had committed a fatal error and that he would inevitably pay for that error. Carter has in fact paid [for his mistake].

On that basis Reagan now has the final word. The Arabs have expressed many wishes that he correct a situation created by his predecessor. It is a situation that has to come to an end with the expiration of his predecessor's term.

It is hoped that Reagan will not only do that, but that he will also propose the foundation for a solution that would not force a majority of Arabs to take resolutions that in any case would not serve Arab-American relations.

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CSO: 4802

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

FRG OFFICIAL DISCUSSES STAND ON PLO, CAMP DAVID

JN120807 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0600 GMT 12 Feb 81

[Text] Doha, 11 Feb (GNA)--(Guenter Van Vill), FRG foreign ministry under secretary, has stressed the need for achieving the Palestinians' legitimate rights and the participation of the Palestinians and the PLO in the peace process in the Middle East in order to reach a final and comprehensive solution to the problem.

In an interview he granted to Qatari television yesterday evening, the FRG official stated that comprehensive peace cannot be achieved without the participation of all the sides in the region, the Palestinians' participation in the negotiations, guaranteeing a secure and recognized border for all the parties concerned--including Israel--and the determination of the Palestinians' fate.

The FRG official affirmed his country's stand, which stresses the need to achieve the Palestinians' legitimate rights, for the Palestinians and the PLO to participate in the peace process and to reach a final and comprehensive solution to the problem.

On Europe's stand on the PLO as the Palestinian people's legitimate representative, the FRG official said: The Palestinian people themselves must decide this. However, we would like to stress the need for the participation and representation of Palestinians in the peace process. The PLO represents an important political factor.

On the need for the PLO's participation in the peace process at a time when some European states do not recognize it, the FRG official said that the word recognition has its technical and legal meanings, adding that in accordance with these meanings, we only officially recognize states and international bodies. He pointed out, however, that contacts are held and viewpoints exchanged between his country and the PLO.

On the continuation of the Camp David process and whether it has reached a stalemate, the FRG official said that this depends on the three Camp David partners and whether they want to continue working on these accords. He pointed out that these accords are made up of two parts: the first pertains to a peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. This has achieved the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai and the return of Egyptian territories, with the withdrawal to be completed next year.

The second comprises the special agreement on solving the Palestinian problem and provides for Palestinian self-rule.

He pointed out that the nine European states in the Common Market were not partners to the Camp David accords. This is why in their recent statement in Venice, they stressed the need to reach a peaceful and comprehensive settlement that would achieve stability in the region. Part of this comprehensive settlement would include the Palestinian people using their right to determine their [words indistinct] Europe and its participation in the peace process.

The official said that the policy of detente was afflicted with a crisis as a result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. He stressed the need for states to solve their internal difficulties away from foreign interference.

The FRG official stated that his visit to Qatar is part of his tour of several of the region's states for the purpose of strengthening his country's relations with these states in the various fields, particularly the political and economic fields.

He pointed out that his country is concerned over bolstering cooperation and relations in several fields and expressed his country's readiness to grant various kinds of aid to Qatar, particularly in the economic fields.

The official stressed his country's concern over achieving stability in the region and increasing its relations with the region's states.

He stated that his talks with the Qatari officials dealt with several important issues pertaining to current international events and exchanging viewpoints on these events.

The talks also dealt with the Islamic summit conference recently held in at-Ta'if, the formation of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which was recently approved in Riyadh, and the nonaligned states' conference currently being held in New Delhi.

The FRG official left Doha for Muscat this evening at the end of a 2-day visit to Qatar, which is part of his tour of several of the region's states.

CSO: 4802

UK LIBERAL PARTY OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON NEAR EAST SITUATION

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 2 Jan 81 pp 25, 27

[Report on Interview with Roger Sibley by Muhammad Sa'id al-Junaydi; Date and Place not Given: "International Events: British Liberal Party Calls for National Identity for Palestinians"]

[Text] Roger Sibley tells AL-HAWADITH, "Deputy Cohen, one of the members of the Knesset who is closest to Begin and the only one who expresses his ideas, is the author of the plan to annex Jerusalem and the Golan."

About 2 years ago Roger Sibley went to Riyadh on a private visit where he met with Prince Muhammad Qasawi ibn Sa'ud. The prince was pleased with his British guest, and he offered him an Arabic coffee pot as a gift. That Arabic coffee pot is the first object that catches one's attention when one visits Roger Sibley's humble office in downtown London. Roger Sibley says he likes Arabic coffee and that he prefers it to other kinds of coffee. However, Arabic coffee has a special nature in its own country where it is a basic part of the social traditions or even the cultural heritage. It is ironical that the "bitter" Arabic coffee played a prominent and even a decisive role in a well-known incident.

On 5 June 1968 Sirhan shot one bullet at Robert Kennedy, a presidential candidate; he died a few minutes later. Sirhan said later that he had shot Robert Kennedy because he had insulted the Arab nation to which he belongs. At an elections rally for American Jews Kennedy had expressed his disgust for the "hateful" taste of Arabic coffee.

It seems that from 1968 to 1980 the taste of the coffee had changed or people's tastes had differed. Roger Sibley announced this month that the Liberal Party had formed a special committee called the Middle East Committee or the Middle East Board to specialize in the aspects of the problem and to make suggestions about the policy that the party must adopt to preserve British interests in the area. [He announced that] he, Roger Sibley, had been chosen to chair this committee.

Roger Sibley is not one of the 12 liberal party members of parliament, but he is one of the most active party officials. He is an author, an active member and a theoretician; his works deal with various military questions, and he was therefore chosen to chair the party's defense committee. On this basis he is now chairing

two important committees. The Middle East problem has a special place in the programme of parties because of its effect on British interests, and the problem of defense is now setting off a controversy in Britain [the likes of which] was not set off before throughout the period that followed the aborted Suez campaign in 1956.

With the establishment of this committee the three principal parties would have placed the Middle East problem at the center of their concerns, [indicating] that it was no longer a secondary subject or one that would be approached with a single point of view, as Roger Sibley himself says. There is a Middle East Board in the Labor Party; it is the oldest and the most effective. The Conservative Party formed its Middle East Board after the Conservative Party came to power. Now, there is a Middle East Board in the Liberal Party. Roger Sibley says that he prefers to call it a committee rather than a board, "because a committee is more capable of taking action than a bureaucratic board." David Watkins the chairman of the Middle East Board of the Labor Party comments, "If people conducted themselves according to their stature, it would be difficult for them to stumble. [This observation] is based on the fact that the Liberal Party is a small party compared to the two principal parties: the Labor Party and the Conservative Party. Despite the fact that Liberal Party officials state that they always obtain 6 million votes of all the votes cast in the general elections, the role of the Liberal Party will be governed by its stature. The Liberal Party has a popular base and an ancient history. It did rule Britain one day before Britain came to know what is now called the exchange of roles between the two principal parties."

It was not a coincidence that the Liberal Party established a Middle East Committee. The establishment of the committee followed an official working visit to the Middle East that party president David Steel and a party delegation made. The visit that lasted 2 full weeks began on the 21st of last September and ended on 4 October. The delegation consisted of four representatives, an adviser who is Roger Sibley and Stuart Mull, the assistant to the party president. The parliamentary delegation visited Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Israel and met with Yasir 'Arafat. The delegation [also] visited the UN forces in South Lebanon. It seems that the Israelis resented the fact that the delegation met with Yasir 'Arafat; it was the first time that a public meeting between the president of a British party and Yasir 'Arafat had taken place. It was for this reason that the chairman of the delegation did not meet Menahem Begin who offered the excuse of being preoccupied with private business even though the reason why they did not meet is known and obvious. Roger Sibley told AL-HAWADITH that he met with Israeli Knesset member Cohen through a special arrangement with the Israeli ambassador in London. According to Sibley Mrs Cohen is Menahem Begin's colleague who is a staunch proponent of his views. Therefore, she has a special position in the party. Cohen's role in the context of the Middle East problem and the Camp David accords is well-known. She is the one who proposed the law to annex Jerusalem in the Knesset; later she proposed the law to annex the Golan. When Sibley asked her why she continued to place obstacles in front of al-Sadat by proposing such programs, she replied, "Why should I help al-Sadat? I am only concerned with Zionist goals. They are my guide in all the actions I take." It seems that this working trip that was arranged by the Arab League office in London was a turning point in the party's policy towards the Middle East problem. After the party's [delegation] returned from this trip, the party published a voluminous and an important report

explaining the meetings that took place between the delegation and the leaders of the confrontation countries and the ideas that were exchanged in those meetings. The honesty with which these facts were presented was at odds with the party's known historical and traditional support for Israel and its defense of its interests. After publication of the report Stephen Roger, the vice president of the party resigned his position in protest. He has been known for his enduring support for Israel.

The fact is that Israel has a firm foundation [of support] in the party's parliamentary body, in its administration and in the committees that direct its policy. That continued to be the case until David Steel became the president of the party. This was when this favorable disposition [towards the Middle East problem] took place, especially after the parliamentary delegation's visit to the Middle East that was led by the president of the party. It is known that the former president of the party, whose political career was brought to an end by the well-known homosexual scandal, was one of Israel's strongest supporters inside and outside the British parliament. He is the one who said, "I would be surprised if Israel gave up the Golan and exposed its flank to the threats of the aggressive Syrians." Although the party has a number of Jewish officials among its leaders--among which there are Clement Freud, the grandson of the well-known psychiatrist Sigmund Freud and a number of enthusiastic supporters of Israel such as Bardu who failed in his attempt to become president of the party--the young members of the Liberal Party were in a continuous confrontation with the leadership of the party over the problem of the Middle East. It is known that the former president of the young liberals, (X), used to work at one time as editor-in-chief of the English language magazine, FREE PALESTINE which is published in London and financed by the PLO or the agencies that are sympathetic with that organization, if one may say so. The feud between the party's ruling committee and the youth groups reached the point of almost coming to blows on one occasion. At one of the party conferences a few years ago, the leaders of the young liberals invited the late Sa'id Hamami, the representative of the PLO in London to deliver a speech. The leadership of the party interfered to prevent having the lecture in one of the halls, and Sa'id Hamami was forced to give his speech in front of a large gathering of young party members outside the building where the party held its debates and its conferences. It is on this basis that the establishment of the Middle East committee and the report that the party published after [its delegation's] visit to the Middle East--that is, the political document of the party's understanding of the problem--are considered fundamental changes in this policy.

There are those who say that Christopher Mayhew, who is now vice president of the committee, and Lord Hooson, the overall chief as well as Lord Emery and Lord McNeill--whose positions against the plan to scuttle the Arab boycott that was presented to the House of Lords by the Jews and their friends more than 3 years ago are well-known--did play an important role in altering the party's political inclinations towards positions that are more positive on the Palestinian question and the Middle East problem in general. However, Roger Sibley states that it is the change in British public opinion that is actually responsible for the political change on the Middle East problem which is reflected by all the parties. There is a new understanding of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. This understanding is not confined to Britain, but it goes beyond Britain to all the

European countries, even the Netherlands, which until a few years ago was considered a stronghold of Zionism. Sibley says, "This situation is not related to the economic and commercial capabilities of the Arab oil exporting countries even though it is difficult to ignore this relationship. This situation is rather due to the Arab people's awareness of a new fact. That fact is that something must be done to give the Palestinian people their legitimate rights. Who can ignore legitimate rights if such rights are a part of the democratic life in European societies?" Roger Sibley says that "the policy of his committee will be that of encouraging and supporting a just settlement in the Middle East through the party and that this policy will be consistent with the resolutions of the United Nations and the European community, that is, the Common Market countries and their well-known initiative." To achieve these goals the committee will try to coordinate [its efforts] with specific agencies to establish serious communications with the United States and with the specialized committees of the U.S. Senate. If such coordination does take place, especially within the British parliament, the Arab lobby would have stood firmly and effectively against the Zionist lobby that for many decades was the only authority for devising the foreign policy of both parties which worked almost [exclusively] within one framework: that of tying Britain's foreign policy, and especially its policy towards the Middle East problem, to the U.S. policy. Under the leadership of the Conservative Party Britain is now finding it difficult to get out of this situation even though British interests have thrust themselves recently on this policy.

[The following] are selections from the report that was written by the Liberal Party as well as a summary of that report:

"The parliamentary delegation is in unanimous agreement that there is a unique opportunity now to reach a comprehensive and a permanent settlement to the Middle East problem and that the time available for this opportunity is limited. [The parliamentary delegation believes] that one of the functions of the Liberal Party and of the European Community is to make every effort to encourage progress towards peace and the achievement of an international agreement that would guarantee peace and individual freedom for everyone in the Middle East."

The members of the delegation were in unanimous agreement over the following:

First, Israel:

"Israel's right to exist within secure boundaries as an independent, internationally recognized state is an absolute right. The justification of this right is non-debatable. Any agreement that does not recognize this fundamental fact is ineffective."

The Rights of Palestinians

"It would not be possible to reach an international, permanent solution that does not include recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people. At the heart of this recognition is the creation of a national Palestinian identity that would be free to determine the future of its relations with its neighbors."

"Bilateral agreements with Jordan regarding the West Bank are incapable of meeting these aspirations."

The West Bank

"Any agreement on autonomy must permit the residents of the West Bank and Gaza to select through free elections, not merely a federal union, but also full independence. The national Palestinian identity is at the heart of the refugee problem."

"As long as the Liberals continue to deny the Palestinians their right to self-determination, we believe that the PLO will continue to resort to guerilla warfare and terror against Israel and that the Palestinian problem will continue to be a decisive factor in the instability of the area."

"The West Bank and Gaza must become the homeland for the Palestinians."

"The construction of more Jewish settlements on the West Bank must cease so that a comprehensive peace can be achieved."

"Any settlement must encompass an international guarantee within these borders for a limited period."

"In the context of this agreement certain areas must be disarmed, especially those areas that are militarily sensitive on the West Bank and are overseen by units of the UN forces."

Jerusalem

"It is not possible for Jerusalem to be subject to Israel. The Jerusalem Law that was issued by Israel must not be internationally validated."

"World religions must be allowed free access to the holy places that would be managed and controlled by representatives of those religions."

"Arab Jerusalem is part of the West Bank. The rights of its residents must be respected, and Arab authority must be restored."

"Redividing the city would be unacceptable. It would be desirable to allow Israel to establish its capital in West Jerusalem and to have East Jerusalem become the capital of the Palestinian state."

"The city must be jointly managed by the authority of two municipalities so that the freedom to travel between the two parts of the city would be allowed."

Syria

"The Golan area must be disarmed, and this should be subject to an international agreement and to international guarantees that would be supervised either by joint forces or by UN forces."

Lebanon

"It is the duty of the international community to offer Lebanon full recognition of the sovereignty of the Lebanese state."

"The international community must also contribute towards rebuilding this peaceful democratic state."

"Immediate steps must also be taken to bring together the leaders of the feuding parties in a coalition government."

"The presence of large numbers of armed Palestinians in Lebanon has created a state of instability and has led to the presence of a state within a state. Such a situation must not be allowed to continue."

"The Lebanese army must also be strengthened gradually, and it must be allowed to take its positions throughout the country as a recognized power."

"Negotiations must be held for the step-by-step withdrawal of the Syrian army."

"All the fighters in South Lebanon are to respect the authority of the United Nations, and they are to stop using violence against these troops."

Israel has to withdraw its observation post in South Lebanon and to stop offering financial and military aid to Maj Sa'd Haddad. It has to respect the unity of Lebanon's soil and borders and the presence of the United Nations organization there."

"Both Sa'd Haddad and the PLO have to stop their acts of violence, and they are to allow the UN forces to work without any harassment within the area prepared for that."

The Camp David Accords

"The Camp David accords have made considerable contributions towards the achievement of peace between Egypt and Israel and the gradual restoration of Sinai to Egypt."

"The Camp David accords by themselves will not be enough as a foundation for future agreements on a West Bank formula and the Arab-Israeli struggle in general."

"It is not possible to solve the Palestinian problem through bilateral agreements without bringing in the Palestinians."

"The liberation organization is obviously supported by the majority of Palestinian public opinion and must be included in the peace talks."

"The liberation organization has to prepare [itself] to renounce previous statements it had made that call for the destruction of Israel as a state. Instead, the liberation organization must offer to Israel its recognition of Israel [as a state]."

"The United States and the Soviet Union must be parties to any new initiative. Similarly, all the feuding parties must be parties to such an initiative."

"Immediate steps must be taken to reach an agreement in Lebanon on reconsidering the future model for the peace-keeping forces and to make preparations for convening a Geneva Conference."

"All countries have to work immediately to bring about a cease-fire between Iraq and Iran; and they must stop their support to either one of the feuding parties."

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

TALKS TO DETERMINE BORDER BEGIN--Kuwait, 10 Feb (KUNA)--Iraqi Interior Minister Sa'dun Shakir today began talks with Kuwaiti officials in an effort to determine the border between the two Arab Gulf countries. Shakir met with the amir of Kuwait, Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad as-Sabah, and with the crown prince and prime minister, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah as-Sabah. Before this he met with Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad as-Sabah. On his arrival here yesterday, the Iraqi minister expressed the hope that the problem of the common border, which has been outstanding for a long time, will be settled. The two ministers head a joint committee formed during a visit by Shaykh Sa'd to Baghdad last year which is entrusted with the task of the demarcation of the border. [Text] [LD101020 Kuwait KUNA in Arabic 0907 GMT 10 Feb 81]

CSO: 4802

STATUS OF AHMADIYAH SECT IN ISRAEL VIEWED

Tel Aviv, 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 15 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Qasim Zayd: "'Al Ahmadiyah', A Reform Islamic Sect"]

[Text] The Al Ahmadiyah faithful in the country are centered in the Khvavir Quarter of Haifa, and believe in the coming of the Messiah. Who among us has not heard of the Khvavir Quarter on the Mount Carmel in Haifa? I am sure that many don't know the way of the faith of the residents of this Arab quarter, and perhaps all that we know is that this is a Moslem Arab quarter and nothing more.

Recently, within the framework of the informational activity that is being carried out by the leaders of the quarter and its intellectuals, a book was published with the title "'Al Khvavir Belzi" meaning the 'Al Khavavir Villager, from the pen of Abdallah 'Uda, one of the young persons of the quarter who found it necessary to explain to the citizenry of the country including the Arabs, the history of his sect and the way of its faith.

As a gesture of appreciation for the effort of Abdallah 'Uda the leaders of the sect decided to afford him a favor and he is leaving shortly as a member of a delegation sponsored by the sect for India, the spiritual center of the sect. We decided to investigate this small sect. We met with Abdallah 'Uda and heard directly from him the following story about the history of the Ahmadiyah sect.

"The Ahmadiyah sect is a reform Islamic movement which was founded in the year 1889 by Al Mirza 'Ulam Ahmad al-Khadiani, who was born in India and who was sent by the Lord as a reformist with the promise that he would be the last of the messengers at the end of days, and that he was to come to fulfill the prophecy of all other prophets. He announced to his flock that he would be the final prophet to come after the Prophet Muhammad by being a shadow prophet to the Prophet Muhammad and whose mission would be a sort of renaissance for the true Islam. The founder of the sect instructed his companions in the institution of the regime of succession, and from the time of his mission 30 Caliphs have rotated in this function."

Advisory Council

Assisting the caliph in administering the sect is an advisory council which gathers once a year to approve the activity program of the sect and to approve

its budget, while the authority for conveying the advisory council remain in the hands of the caliph.

The number of faithful of the sect in the world today approaches 14 million, scattered in all reaches of the globe, in the lands of the west and of the east, and they have mosques, schools, charitable institutions and preaching centers and hospitals in many countries.

The center of the Ahmadiyah sect in this country was founded in the Khvavir Quarter in 1929, by Sheikh Jalal al-Din Shamas. The number of sect members in this country today comes to some 1,500 souls, virtually all of whom are centered in the Al Khvavir Quarter. From the time of the founding of the sect in this country, some ten sermonizers have arrived here. Activities of the sect are funded by dues and permanent levies which the faithful pay.

The Difference From Islam

Faithful of the Ahmadiyah sect fulfill all 5 principles of Islam, yet there is a great qualitative difference between it and other sects in Islam.

Abdallah 'Uda who attempted to clarify the between his sect and other sects of Islam, says, "The founder of the sect was dispatched as the perceived Messiah who came to arbitrate the differing views prevailing among the Islam sects, and he came to unify under his authority all of the various concepts in Islam, including those differing from it.

The fundamental difference between the Ahmadiyah sect and Islam is this: While Moslems, according to the claim of Abdallah 'Uda, believe that Jesus the Savior was crucified and went up to heaven whence he will be returned at the end of days, the Ahmadiyah sect believes that Jesus died as did the other prophets, when the founder of the sect discovered his grave in the Indian city of Serringer and that he did not come down from heaven, inasmuch as he never went up there.

"The second difference between the Ahmadiyah sect and the Moslems is: Whereas Moslems believe that the Prophet Muhammad was the last of the prophets and they rely on the adage that the Prophet Muhammad is 'hath'am alanbein,' that is, the last of the prophets who came to seal the missions of all of the prophets, the Ahmadiyah sect interprets this adage in another way. In their view the concept 'hath'am' means a ring with which the hand is adorned, and the Prophet Muhammad is likened to it as a symbol of preference over all his other associates inasmuch as he resembles the ring which decorates the finger of the hand. Whence comes the interpretation that al-Mahadi will come after the Prophet Muhammad in order to complete the mission and the prophecy.

"The Ahmadiyah sect believes in sermonizing as a way of disseminating Islam, and that is why their activity is characterized by widespread sermonizing by sermonizers as well as in writing. The Ahmadiyah sect in this country maintains its worship in full freedom with no interference, while it is banned in Arab countries."

Opinion of Muslim People

Since the founding of the sect in this country 51 years ago, and despite the sermonizing activities, it has not scored many successes and has not managed to draw to it a large number of faithful.

Despite the large difference between the sect and other Moslems in Israel, neighborly and respectful mutual relations have been observed between the sides, all this because members of the Moslem religion in this country did not perceive from this sect which opposes typical Islam a danger to Islam and has for all of this time remained limited and closed and did not expand and did not exert influences upon Moslems in the Galilee and in the Triangle, except for a marginal number not exceeding the number of fingers on one hand.

To complete the picture and bring readers up to date, we went to a Moslem religious person in one of the villages of the Triangle to hear his opinion of the Islam of the Ahmadiyah sect. Our interviewee decided to lighten his task and said, in an unequivocal and decisive manner: "Anyone believing in the coming of a prophet after the Prophet Muhammad is viewed by Islam as a person who denies the prophency of the Prophet Muhammad, inasmuch as Islam specifically determines that there is no prophet after the Prophet." That same Moslem religious personage sought to make it clear as well, that in the statements of Abdallah 'Uda there was an additional abuse of the position of Islam with regard to Jesus. "Islam, according to the Koran, doesn't believe in any way whatsoever that Jesus was crucified, but rather that he went up to heaven and that he is still living and he will be sent anew at the end of days."

In the opinion of our informant, this is a distortion of the quality of Islam which the mind cannot tolerate.

8090

CSO: 4805

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOVIET POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN, POLAND

Paris ESPRIT in French Jan 81, pp 91-95

[Article by Aleksander Smolar: "Afghanistan and Poland"]

[Text] Afghanistan and Poland have shocked public opinion in the entire world. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is not finished, any more than the limits of the independent social movements in Poland are known. Without being able to judge the impact of these events on the future of the two countries, nor on the future of the world, we feel that what is involved this time is no longer distant incidents, but an historic change.

Three immediately perceptible threads connect what is happening today in the two countries. First of all, they both have a common border with the Soviet Union. In addition, they belong to that part of the globe that the USSR considers its sphere of direct control.

The second thread that unites Afghanistan with Poland--very much connected with the first--is the nature of the sociopolitical system imposed on Poland after the war, and the one that for 2 years they have been trying to impose on the Afghan people, employing variable methods.

The third common denominator that is evident in Poland and Afghanistan is the desire for freedom manifested by both nations. There are of course fundamental differences between the Afghan and the Polish chain of events, but both may have major importance not only for the history of both countries, but also for the Soviet world in its entirety and just for the world.

What strikes me most about the recent history of Afghanistan is not the armed resistance. Given the country's history, its culture and its geography, one can understand that. What is more important--it seems to me--and in a sense crucial for the history of these last two years, is the local communist government's inability, aided by the Soviet Union, to create for itself in Afghanistan a social base ever so slightly extended. This special characteristic of the Afghan situation stands out when one thinks about the situation in the other countries that have been conquered and pacified in the course of the more than 60 years of the history of the USSR, since Georgia was brought to heel in 1920.

The social foundation of the communist parties--which seized the power with the help of support from the USSR or as a result of its direct intervention--was restricted

everywhere. The communists were minority parties in all the countries in which they seized the power. They constituted either an important minority, as in the case of Czechoslovakia, or a virtually nonexistent minority, as was the case in several countries of Central Europe: for example in Poland, in Romania or in Hungary. But starting with that minority, the communist government knew how to provide a rather important support by diverse means: by terror--the physical liquidation of the most intransigent opponents--, by fear, by corruption, but also by satisfying certain real needs of the population. The coming to power of the communists in Eastern Europe ~~does not mean~~ just terror and dictatorship, but also industrial development, a significant social mobility, at least in the beginning, development of school and medical care systems. To understand the relative putting down of roots by the governments imposed by the USSR, it is also necessary to see the impressive cleverness of the communist movement in taking advantage of demands, aspirations and interests that are the most diverse and very often contradictory to Leninist ideology. The movement is presented as the defender of the national interest, of peace, of equality, of justice, of democracy, of the small peasant property, of secularism, or even of religion (as today in Iran). This is why, in all the countries occupied and communized by the Soviet Union, a large part of the population, which was profoundly anti-communist, nevertheless agreed to collaborate with the government, hoping that the system would be democratized afterwards, or even without that hope--for the good of the nation. The social base formed in this way was obviously very fragile. All of the revolts and mass movements experienced in that part of Europe, beginning with Berlin in 1953, have shown this fragility, the status quo being assured chiefly by the vigilant presence of the Soviet army.

The Afghan system functions conversely to the popular democracy system that has just been overthrown. In the beginning, in 1978, the reaction against the communist coup d'etat seemed very weak. Perhaps because the old system--corrupt and immobilized--was not very seductive. But then, despite promising beginnings for the communists, the classic evolution of a Sovietized system was not seen at all; on the contrary, an increasingly strong opposition was organized against the system and against the USSR. Since the intervention a year ago, we have virtually been faced with a national war against the occupant. The Soviet Union is seen to be sinking into a classic war of the imperialistic type, into a "dirty war." The Soviet system in Afghanistan is going from the run-of-the-mill communist seizure of power to the colonial war.

The Polish chain of events is of a different kind. To understand it, it is necessary to speak quickly of the image of the Soviet world that is dominant in the West and to recall what is specific to Poland.

We are used to thinking of the Soviet countries in terms of the particular experience of the Soviet Union; it is the Soviet Union that has served as a model for discourse on totalitarianism. This totalitarian representation--in which the state is substituted for the society, in which horizontal ties replace vertical ties, in which untruth reigns--, although just in many respects, deprives these countries of a future. Dynamics and changes are ruled out. This static vision was reinforced in the case of the countries of East Central Europe by the memory of the Soviet interventions in 1956 in Hungary and 1968 in Czechoslovakia. It has become a commonplace to say that the Soviet Union would accept neither significant changes in the interior of those countries, nor changes in their relations with the USSR. This line of reasoning was to be found, even a few weeks ago, in the newspapers and the statements of Western politicians. The Polish workers are certainly courageous, their maturity is surprising, but there must be no illusions: either the workers withdraw and stop

demanding impossible things like free labor unions, or we will have a tragedy--such was almost the tone of the commentaries. The Soviet system--they were saying--cannot accept, for ideologic as well as pragmatic reasons, the existence of an institution as foreign to its spirit as a free union. To understand the attitude of the Poles who do not share this pessimism, and to understand what I call the Soviet chain of events, it is necessary to look at the whole process that preceded the Polish summer, it is necessary to go back at least 24 years.

It was in the shadow of the Hungarian tragedy of 1956 that the Poles forced the first concessions out of the Soviet Union, it was at that moment that they won a certain autonomy in relation to the communist government in place. The latter learned to restrain itself in order to be able to survive in the face of the society that was hostile to dictatorship. Since then the Catholic Church has been tacitly recognized as an essential and immutable element of the Polish scene. It was in 1956 that the authorities abandoned the idea of forced collectivization. They tried from time to time to undermine the foundations of the peasant agriculture, with harmful consequences for agricultural production, but were not really able to endanger its existence. Since 1956 the government, despite its efforts, has not stamped out an intellectual opposition, which has had a great influence on the way of thinking and the behavior of the other social groups. The spectacular development of this opposition has been visible since 1976 and the founding of the KOR [expansion unknown]. This development, which is symbiotic with the nascent labor movement, reached its summit during the recent events. The forming of a new workers' class is a decisive factor in this process of pluralizing the Polish society. Its majority made up of the sons and daughters of peasants, this new class is replacing the old class that was decimated by the war, but also by great possibilities for social advancement after the war (which, by the way, rapidly disappeared). In the space of one generation, these peasants were transformed into a workers' class sure of itself, aware of its potential, politically mature.

So we already had, on the threshold of that Polish summer, under the outward show of the decadent traditional totalitarian system with its component elements--single party, censorship, secret police, wooden language--a very rich independent social life. Now a great historic step has been taken with the creation of independent organizations, chiefly of workers but also of intellectuals, and probably tomorrow of students and peasants. It is a major change, but it is obvious that it was not only preceded, but in large measure was made possible by this gradual pluralization of the Polish society.

In short, for 24 years the Soviet Union has anxiously observed the progressive limitations of communist power and has been powerless to oppose them.

Why was it led to tolerate these changes? It finds itself confronted with a choice--no doubt a difficult one--every time; up to now it has always decided in favor of Poland. Must it tolerate the changes in the system or intervene? The country's demographic potential (37 million inhabitants), its political culture, the limited extent of the changes and their apparently reversible character--the fundamental pillars of the system (party, police, censorship) being still preserved--all this was acting against the decision to intervene. But changes create conditions for other partial changes. There is the Polish chain of events, the chain of events in which the dictatorship finds itself caught up. The only possible response to the nation's democratic and national demands as a whole is war, but how does one make war against changes that are always limited?

All the changes since 1956, the institutionalization of the free labor unions included, have radically restricted the government's arbitrary powers, its area of freedom. Therefore it is a process of gradual liberalization that is taking place, and not a democratization. Inside the official political space, within the party, in the government in the broad sense--everything happens as it does in the other Soviet countries. This situation, obviously, cannot go on any longer. The Communist leaders, impotent and deprived of authority in the eyes of the society, has to understand that there is only one solution that can cure Poland and at the same time allow them to preserve the basic essentials of their power. They must not only tolerate--lacking the means to destroy them--the free unions and other independent social movements that are in the process of being born, but they must even request their aid, their active collaboration in the search for necessary and realistic solutions to the country's problems. Only these movements can carry the authority and prestige necessary for getting the Poles to agree to the sacrifices that are inevitable as much because of the dramatic economic situation as for bringing about the structural changes of a certain scale.

These are the two chains of events in which the Soviet Union is caught up: the chain of events of the war in Afghanistan and the chain of events of the autonomization of the Polish society in relation to the communist government. Both chains are dramatic for the Soviet Union. The Afghan chain reveals its imperialist face; the Polish chain shows that Sovietism is not eternal, that it can and must be surpassed.

Afghanistan as well as Poland are showing that the principal danger to this system comes from hope and resistance.

Sovietism was formerly supported by the blind faith of a small minority and a feeling of terrified fatalism in the majority. Today it cannot count on apathy and resignation, on lack of hope on the part of the enslaved nations.

8946
CSO: 4900

SPLIT REPORTED AMONG RESISTANCE GROUPS

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Dec 80 p 4

[Article: "Split and Attempts To Recombine Among Resistance Groups"]

[Text] There have been indications from refugee circles, cited by AFP in Islamabad on 22 December, that the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, which includes five resistance groups jointly represented in Peshawar (Pakistan), has split into two factions. The three groups considered to be "moderate"--Sayed Ahmed Gilani's National Liberation Front, Mujaddedi's Front for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and Mohammedi's Islamic Revolution Movement--have left the alliance in order to form a "military entente" open to other resistance groups. The two fundamentalist groups, the Jamiat-e Islami [Islamic Rally] and Yunes Khaless' Hezb-e Islami [Islamic Party], have broken off from the alliance and started talks aimed at joining up with Hezb-e Islami's other wing, led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar which is firmly established underground and is not part of the Islamic Liberation Alliance.

This development makes the balance of power among the resistance groups set up in Pakistan somewhat clearer. The more moderate groups undoubtedly feel that by separating themselves from the fundamentalists they will get support from the Afghans who are put off by the presence of religious extremists in the alliance.

However, this change should not make one lose sight of the fact that part of the Afghan resistance fighters do not have "contacts" at their disposal in Peshawar, where the Western press agencies report the activities of only the groups represented there and for circumstantial reasons tend to underestimate resistance based only inside Afghanistan. Within Afghanistan the major factions are the Militant Front of Afghanistan Fighters, which is made up of Islamic and socialist groups; the National United Front, which is made up of ultraleft organizations and is formed around the Afghan People's Organization (SAMA), whose founder died in February in captivity; and the Hazara and Nuristan Fronts, which rely on the support of solid regional and ethnic bases.*

* Cf. issue No. 2 of LES NOUVELLES D'AFGHANISTAN [AFGHANISTAN NEWS], November 1980, a report put out by AFRANE, which is located at 1 Avenue Racine, 78600 Maisons-Laffitte.

Sheik Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, the representative of a delegation of Afghan resistance fighters visiting Cairo for the last few days, told the daily paper AL-AZHAR that "the resistance is going through a serious crisis because of a shortage of food supplies. We ask for weapons and ammunition but also for food aid." He added that Muslim countries "had only made promises." In addition, the spokesman of the Hezb-e Islami of Yunes Khales stated in Peshawar on 22 December that "several groups which up to now have been fighting in rural areas have decided to bring warfare into the cities." He asked foreign governments to close their embassies in Kabul and withdraw their personnel because of the risk they could be running.

The Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in its latest issue reported that "bands" made up of several thousand guerrillas tried during the last few months to take Kabul and the main Afghan cities but were defeated by the regular army. The Soviet weekly went on to say that since being defeated they have changed their tactics and dispersed into "minidetachments" which avoid any contact with the army, carrying on a skirmishing type of warfare, and managing to mix in with the population at large during offensives carried out by the regular armed forces. By mixing with the people "the counterrevolutionary bandits want to give the illusion of a people's war, knowing that the government will not use troops against peasants and shopkeepers."

On top of all this, Soltan Ali Keshtmand, second deputy chairman of the government council, arrived in Moscow on 23 December. Radio Kabul finally came out the same day with a denial that East Germans and Cubans are fighting alongside Afghan forces. Quoting Minister of Defense Mohammed Rafi the radio said: "With the exception of the limited Soviet contingent there are no soldiers of any other nationality."

9631
CSO: 4900

WAR SAID TO HAVE STRENGTHENED TRIBALISM AMONG PASHTUNS

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Jean-Christophe Victor: "One Year After The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Warfare Strengthens Tribalism"]

[Text] The Afghan Government, by exploiting traditional rivalries between tribes, has been trying for several months to gain the support or at least the neutrality of some of them. So some of the Mohmand, Nuristani and Hazara tribes in particular have sometimes lined up alongside the authorities when they hold council (jirgah) in exchange for money or light weapons. But this phenomenon does not seem to be widespread.

Jean-Christophe Victor, who is a cultural anthropologist by training and was a cultural attache in Kabul from 1975 to 1978, was sent to Afghanistan by the humanitarian organization AICF, International Action Against Hunger (address 156 Rue de Rivoli, 75001 Paris; post office account number 499716 A Paris), to escort food supplies into distressed areas. He spent 2 months among the tribes which control the border with Pakistan and explains here how, in the face of war, social and cultural tribal behavior patterns of the Pashtuns, who make up more than 30 percent of the Afghan population, have been strengthened. And he explains how the Karmal government's minister of tribal affairs, Faiz Mohammed, was assassinated in September.

For the hundreds of Pashtun tribes which live in the southeast part of the Hindu Kush, the present war has strengthened the ancestral rules of tribal organization and the idea of belonging to the same ethnic group. Social and everyday reality starts with the clans, which are descended from the "sons of the tribe" of olden times. The clans themselves are divided into geographical areas--a valley, some villages--and then by family. The families meet in assemblies (jirgah) and choose the clan's chieftain (malek). He provides leadership along with the council of elders which makes rulings at all levels of the tribal hierarchy.

"He is a Pashtun who lives by honoring the institution of the jirgah and by following the Pashtunwali" (quoted from "L'Afghanistan et Ses Populations" ["Afghanistan and Its Population Groups"] by Jean-Charles Blanc, published by Complexe). A sense of honor, solidarity, hospitality, a duty to avenge, and defense of the tribe's territory and interests--these are the main honored rules

Complexes). A sense of honor, solidarity, hospitality, a duty to avenge, and defense of the tribe's territory and interests--these are the main honored rules of the Pashtunwali, a code of behavior transmitted orally from generation to generation. Appropriate responses to situations, whether food shortage or war, are codified by him.

Since time immemorial families have been required to put a contingent of warriors at the tribe's disposal. This obligation has of course made larger inroads during the last 2 years, to a greater or lesser degree depending on how serious and close the fighting is. So this means that three brothers in the same family would alternate one after the other in going off to war. Each one stays a couple of weeks. The two waiting in the village take care of the women, children, and fields, but they can be called up immediately if the decision is made to attack a column of armored vehicles passing through their province or if villages of a neighboring tribe suddenly find themselves being shelled.

Shellings alone cannot be held responsible for the food problems in certain regions of the country. These difficulties are explained mostly by the great agricultural and family and social disruption brought about by mobilizing against the occupying forces. In more than half of the villages we passed through--which were in 5 of the country's 28 provinces--all the women, children and old people had left to take refuge in Pakistan. On the trails going toward the eastern border some smart merchants have already set up stalls made from branches where they sell tea and crackers for travellers and fodder for mules and dromedaries.

Men staying in Afghanistan have formed mujahidin groups and fight in their own region, where they know every little hiding place and trail. From time to time they go back into their village to sow one field or irrigate another. But their stay is short: the family does not live there any more and the household goods--plates, teapots, jewels, carpets--have already been buried or hidden in the mountains. Experience has taught them that it is useless to cry about pillage after the fact and better to take preventive measures. Finally, the grain stored up in the villages before winter will for the most part be sold or offered to mujahidin, since they naturally avoid going for fresh provisions into markets in towns which are well supplied by Kabul, that is to say by deliveries coming from the USSR. A reasonable estimate for the five provinces we passed through is that this year's harvest should reach 60 percent of its 1977 level.

The traditional tribal structure and its multiple hierarchies have presented the military organization of Pashtun resistance groups with a "readymade" framework.

At the top of the hierarchy in its most customary mode of operation there is a "greybeard." For the Amadzai tribe, Dagarwal is their head; his age means he is universally respected, and his nobility makes the tribe follow him unquestioningly. He has been well-known among the local people for a long time. In times past it fell to him to make sure that fruits of the harvest were fairly distributed among landowners, sharecroppers and day laborers, and to share out water for irrigation equitably, among other duties.

Nowadays he protects the tribe's interests. Two years ago he was elected by an overwhelming majority of the council of elders to the post of military commander of

the entire province of Ghazni. At the same time he maintains administrative responsibility for that same territory, which was deserted by resident officials of the central government. So he has named two officials for each of six districts according to an administrative division predating April 1978. These officials spend their time settling village disputes, providing legal punishment, having bridges rebuilt, and above all making efforts to maintain primary schooling and a minimum amount of food for the families who let themselves be convinced not to flee to Pakistan.

Along with the district chiefs Dagarwal appoints and dismisses the guerrilla chiefs who are themselves often clan heads. They lead between 1,000 and 2,000 men, grouped together and available for call-up according to geographical combat region, and they take defensive action on their own to respond to each new situation. Their independence vis-a-vis the military commander stops where strategy begins: any decision concerning offensive action is discussed and made with Dagarwal present.

Village Assemblies and the Resistance

By the end of an assembly we are attending the proposed program mounts up: destruction of gasoline storage tanks, mining a road, and attacks on garrisons. But the road-mining plan makes the villagers uneasy because they fear reprisals. One peasant says: "If a tank blows up in our area, the Soviets get as mad as hornets. You cannot ask us to keep our wives and children in our villages in Afghanistan and at the same time turn those villages into combat zones." In response to these arguments, guerrilla chiefs explain to the peasants that "any line of communication left open these days is just a way for tanks to get in. Nobody can be content to sit on the sidelines when his territory is being violated by occupying forces."

Mujahidin groups are forming up at the assembly's exit. These groups do the fighting but they have to move around in small units of 20 to 100 men. They must have enough men to be able to respond to the enemy's offensive actions--to attack an armored column or halt a truck convoy--without letting that pinpoint their movements. So everything happens at night to avoid helicopter flights and informers disguised as resistance fighters. With two or three members of the group going ahead to scout out for them, they stop and rest a few hours in safe villages.

In the dark of night groups go by each other on the paths and speak to each other after being recognized. In case there is any doubt you show an Islamic party membership card, which serves as a pass more than it signifies an ideological allegiance. Information is exchanged about the prevailing situation in the region, and then each group takes off in its own direction after having sat down in the dark and had a Steward cigarette imported from the USSR.

There does not seem to be any difficulty in recruiting mujahidin. They are farmers for the most part but also include people like a primary school teacher, a hotel waiter or a policeman who used to be stationed on the roadside to give out toll tickets. Each one wants to fight; each one wants to have a part in victory over the "kafirs" (infidels), the occupying forces. But they also fight because they enjoy it. The daily problems of war bring them closer to the harsh natural

environment they love, and they are men among men, freer than they have ever been, enjoying their brief doze against a rock, enjoying those nighttime marches when they bellow out old lovesongs at the tops of their voices. How could one fail to see the joy they take in life?

"Superpower God"

A young Afghan who joins a mujahidin group is not assured of having full membership. His chiefs take him on a trial basis and require him to know how to be silent, to show his knowledge of the terrain by acting as a guide, and to show his endurance by making do with 3 hours of sleep between two 18-hour marches and only having eight dried apricots and a bread pancake to eat. Everyone does not pass muster and those who do not will then never be able to go to the prestigious and secret resistance hideouts: the "markaz-e mujahidin."

In Dari Persian, "markaz" means both "center" and "market." These "markaz," which have already been established in several provinces in the southern and southeastern parts of the country, are apparently building up slowly, taking on other names in the rest of Afghanistan. They are simultaneously centers where resistance fights get together, supply points for flour, ammunition and sometimes medicines, fortified sites, and places to meet and exchange information.

They are villages within villages--which explains bombings carried out blindly over civilian population centers or empty villages--but they are more often lodged in hollowed-out tunnels in the mountains whose tiny manhole-sized entrances are invisible from a helicopter. One of them we visit in Paktia looks like a genuine fortified encampment. It is totally equipped with weapons captured from the enemy or supplied by deliveries from soldiers who consider themselves Afghans first and in the army in spite of themselves; you find 175-mm mobile guns, omnidirectional automatic antiaircraft weaponry concealed at the tops of mountains, and trucks and armored vehicles in working order assigned to transporting combatants.

A number of examples show the competition that groups engage in who claim ties with one or another of the resistance movement parties set up in Peshawar. The competitors are not inflexible about it any more because each one is well aware that the fate of Afghanistan will not be played out in Peshawar.

All along the tracks in whatever region we cross there are often piles of four or five stones to be seen which indicate places where "shahid" were killed, the martyrs of a holy war. "The hour of my death does not depend on me," explains Abdullah, a confirmed resistance fighter for whom Islam is more a way of life than merely a faith. "It depends on God. Only He is a superpower. He is the one who will decide to change me into a 'ghazi' (the victor over an infidel in Islam) or a 'shahid.' And as the Koran says, we must not consider martyrs of a holy war as dead men. They are alive without our being aware of it."

To die a "shahid" gives one undeniable prestige. This could explain the recklessness of commandos attacking the Soviet airbase at Bagram or going to place a bomb under the capital city's television tower. Be that as it may, recklessness is not a lack of awareness. Abdullah, whom we met in Ghazni region during an assembly of

guerrilla chiefs presided over by Dagarwal, finds himself assigned by the tribal head to the Paghman front where shelling is heavy because it's near the capital. When he learns of this decision Abdullah is visibly dismayed. All traces of confidence and boastful behavior leave his face as he says to us in a low voice: "It's really dangerous there."

For the real danger comes from the air and in Afghanistan only helicopters are really effective against the guerrillas. The Soviets are making increasing use of them and their tactics are being refined.

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CSO: 4900

DEATH OF MINISTER ACCORDING TO PASHTUNWALI DESCRIBED

Paris LE MONDE in French 25 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Jean-Christophe Victor: "'Who Betrayed the Pashtunwali?'"]

[Text] During the last year the Kabul government has made several attempts to engage in a dialogue with the Pashtun tribes which "control" nearly the whole southern part of the country. By playing on the one hand on old intertribal enmities and on the other on the allure of money, negotiators from the capital have gotten results which vary according to an individual tribe's personality: results range from active collaboration (voluntary enlistment, and giving information) to passive collaboration (no information, no food for Afghan resistance groups) to neutrality in the armed conflict (no aid to anyone).

The main architect of this policy was Faiz Mohammed, the Karmal government's minister of tribal affairs. But he found another kind of attitude among the tribes of the Zhadran region in the province of Paktia.

Faiz Mohammed, who was a Parchamite from way back, a member of the Parcham (Flag) faction of the communist party in power, really knew how to talk the language of the tribal chiefs. He was himself a Massud from the southeast part of Afghanistan and had already successfully negotiated the collaboration of other tribes in the area--The Shinwari, the Mangal, and the Jaji--during the time of President Daud whom he served as the first minister of the interior. And then already during that time Faiz Mohammed became minister of tribal affairs and was responsible for negotiating with the Pashtun tribes smuggling wood between Paktia and Palistan. He was the ambassador to Indonesia and to Baghdad at the end of Daud's rule and under Taraki, and he returned to tribal affairs when Babrak Karmal became president of the Afghan Republic in December 1979.

This time in order to make up for past brutalities he was out to get a pledge to have an important route between Pakistan and Afghanistan closed; it had been controlled up to then by indomitable resistance fights in Zhadran, the Mirzai and Dirikheil tribes. The chance to organize a meeting presented itself in February 1980 when a Mirzai village chief, who had had his truck confiscated when it was fleeing to Pakistan, made an attempt to recover his property by going to see the minister. Faiz Mohammed promised to restore the truck to him and asked in return to meet with the tribe's chiefs. The minister wanted to let them know personally

that their hostility vis-a-vis Kabul was unjustified and that Babrak Karmal was setting up a pro-Muslim regime and was keeping the upper hand over the few Soviet regiments responsible for maintaining security.

Using the truck driver Khanmir as a messenger, the Mirzai chiefs made it known that they agreed to a meeting. But, according to one of the rules of Pashtun tribes, it had to take place in Pashtun territory and be hosted by the intermediary so that each of the parties found himself on neutral ground. At 0800 on 11 September 1980, two helicopters put down near the village of Horka on a road flanked by houses made of clay, destroyed for the most part, and in any case completely deserted for a year. As was customary the meeting started off with hours of innocuous talk and dozens of cups of tea. Each party displayed his trust: Faiz Mohammed agreed to send away his armed escort with one of the helicopters, which returned to Ghazni, and to keep only one soldier and a radio set. Did not the code of the Pashtuns include "badraga," the host's protection? The Mirzai chiefs for their part offered him two sheep with dyed wool and accepted the rice and flour brought as presents by the minister.

Since the previous day some of the Mirzai chiefs had been telling the chiefs of the neighboring Dirikheil tribe, with which they share control of the Zhadran territory, that they would not commit themselves to neutrality in exchange for the box of money brought by the "infidels" from Kabul. The two tribes decided to carry out the "badal," the duty to avenge, on Faiz Mohammed. At the day's end when the minister and the three delegates from the capital who accompanied him were going to the village mosque, they were machine-gunned down at point-blank range by about 20 resistance fighters. The remaining boxes in the helicopter contained the money--bills which had been printed after 1978--and dollars. All the bills were carefully torn up to cover the four bodies in full view of everyone who had hurried over to see the outcome.

When we displayed surprise at what seemed to be a betrayal, the slightly irritated Mirzai chiefs answered us in cut-and-dried fashion: "But who was the first to betray the Pashtunwali? Was it not the Kabul regime which sent tanks last year, destroying our homes in order to destroy our ideas? Who agreed to allow the Soviet Army to be in our country? It was the Parchamites. And Faiz Mohammed was a Parchamite from way back."

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CSO: 4900

SPECIAL REPORT ON ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE 26 Dec 80-1 Jan 81 pp 27-42

[Article by G. Goutaleb--passages enclosed in slantlines printed in italics]

[Text] As we come to the end of 1980, the Central Committee will have to examine a question that is important for the future of our country: the energy question. REVOLUTION AFRIQUE, in an effort to advance the discussion of this question, published in its issue No. 877 a special section devoted to the national energy policy centered around its principal components: oil and natural gas. But hydrocarbons are exhaustible resources which must be conserved and converted into refined products necessary to our development. In order to produce heat and electricity, Algeria must therefore prepare itself in the next 20 years to make use of alternate energy sources: especially nuclear and solar energy, which have undeniable possibilities for local use.

But for them to become true alternate energy sources, these new sources must be exploited rationally without engendering growing dependence and they will require large investments. In fact, it is indispensable to promote a operational national research-development capability encompassing trained people and the necessary equipment.

Unless we make long-term preparations to generate, discover, and process substitute energies, we will be unable to effect the inevitable transition needed to assure us of our long-term energy supply. Particular attention should be paid to solar energy: the future of mankind depending, to a large extent, on the balance it can establish with the environment by utilizing renewable, nonpolluting energy sources.

As part of the preparation of the energy plan, Mr A. Brahimi, minister of planning and national development, in mid-November laid out for the party's Economic and Social Commission the projections for national energy consumption needs up to the year 2000.

This figure is presently estimated at 16 million TEP (petroleum equivalent tonnage), which represents 21 percent of national production (evaluated at 75 million TEP) and should, on the basis of projections made by units of the Ministry of Planning, rise to more than 30 percent in 1990 and to 77 percent in the year 2000 (estimates are based only on proven or probable resources).

In 1980, 90 percent of consumption needs are met by hydrocarbons (44 percent by natural gas and 48 percent by oil). By the year 2000, the hydrocarbon share remains practically unchanged, about 90 percent, but natural gas should be 60 percent while oil should go down to 25-30 percent.

Nevertheless, on that occasion Mr Brahimi put great emphasis on moving toward new alternative energy sources, by stressing the /"necessity of exploring and mobilizing new sources that should gradually alleviate the increasingly heavy demand for oil"/.

The minister said that at present there needs to be a mobilizing of human potential in research, design, and implementation in an institutional framework that permits better exploitation as well as parsimonious and efficacious utilization of the sizable financial resources that must be mobilized. Also required in short order will be adequate training and organizational programs necessitated by /a production capacity in substitute energies in the year 2000 equivalent to the total present consumption/ (estimated at 16 million TEP).

/We must resolutely commit ourselves to the mobilization of solar and nuclear energy/.

Regarding nuclear energy, the minister emphasized that, given known uranium resources and the possibilities of more aggressive exploration, the mobilization of meaningful production capacities is presently becoming a concrete prospect.

Also, utilization of solar energy on a small scale should be considered for the /small and medium-sized remote localities/ where it proves to be well-adapted and /which will become more and more numerous with advances in the administration of a territory as large as ours/.

Previously, on 29 October, Mr A. Brerhi, member of the Central Committee and minister for higher education and scientific research, had officially established the /"Inter-ministerial Committee on Nuclear Energy and Other Substitute Energies"/ at a meeting held at the Center for Nuclear Sciences and Technologies (CSTN).

The creation of this committee, as the minister himself was to underline, cannot be divorced from the work done by the party economic commission.

The mandate of the interministerial commission consists basically in laying the foundations for the elaboration of a /"sort of aide-memoire"/ on the question of nuclear and substitute energies. Its mission includes:

--To evaluate our uranium and other nuclear resources;

--To come up with proposals regarding technological options, training structures, and production centers;

--To produce an external nuclear policy taking into account the basic choices.

The nuclear energy question is, in fact, rather complex, as the minister noted: /"A nuclear materials policy must necessarily take into account several parameters, including national sovereignty and national defense, the connection with our development, geopolitics, security, and the protection of the population. To install a nuclear power plant, one must take several criteria into consideration."/

A Choice of Society

From a methodological point of view, sectorial groups have been instituted: energy conservation; nuclear raw materials; human resources and planning; the broad lines of international policy; regulation and protection of radioactive materials; and questions of technologies, of research and development of solar, wind, and geothermal energy.

The national energy policy should be conceived in terms of the social and economic objectives of the type of society one proposes to build. It is in this context that one can effectively respond to the fundamental questions: What are the energy needs? The resources capable of satisfying them? How ill they be satisfied and to what extent?

In Algeria, energy is certainly indispensable for the continued progress of big industry as manifested in big industrial projects which require great quantities of energy in a centralized form. But one must also consider the fact that energy is a basic factor in well-being (health, education, nutrition and leisure, imply energy consumption).

/"If energy isn't brought to the people, the people will go to the energy. If we create a basically centralized energy system, we will centralize the population, we will depopulate our countryside and we will be unable to claim effective occupation of the territory. Regardless of the choice we make, the question must be posed in this fashion."/ (Mr Benini, director of the CSTN).

As a matter of fact, it is going to be necessary both to satisfy the needs of industry and the needs of the people where they are living, and in terms of the predictions of rapid increase in these types of needs, to determine the resources that could satisfy them and thus increase the supply, which is still almost exclusively based on hydrocarbons.

But without losing sight of the fact that solutions already found successful in other latitudes, and notably in the industrialized countries, are not necessarily the best in a different socioeconomic context.

A certain number of possibilities are open to us:

--To undertake a more vigorous search for possible reserves of everything from coal to natural gas. But should new reserves of hydrocarbons in particular be discovered, one must ponder the question: Is it really useful to burn hydrocarbons in order to produce heat and energy? Would it not be more worthwhile to convert them into more advanced products necessary for development, indeed even to conserve them as strategic resources?

--To exploit the solar energy flow: a solution which seems thrust on Algeria which on average receives more than 2,200 kW per year per square meter of solar energy over the surface of its immense territory. This figure, moreover, puts Algeria among the most sunny regions in the world.

The dream of plugging in to a flow which goes beyond the life expectancy of mankind is slowly beginning to become a reality. But to capture this flow and make it functional, one must first develop a strong research-development capability in this domain.

/It requires a decision to try, and in the solar domain we can rise to a real challenge in a sector where we are not too far behind by comparison with others and where technologies are not very sophisticated/.

In Algeria, solar energy, which could supply inexhaustible and free energy using relatively unsophisticated technology, is in fact shown to be indispensable, particularly for the creation of a quality environment for populations which hitherto have been deprived because they were geographically very dispersed.

/Solar research and development is inevitable, indispensable. It requires an institutional, human, and financial effort on a large scale/, says Mr Benini, who moreover considers that the main decision is an institutional one: it is necessary to establish a national research-development institution which has the mission of putting research in the various sectors to work for development.

If we fail to concern ourselves actively with harnessing the solar energy flow, we risk /"making our country an easy and gigantic market for solar "gadgetry"/ presently being elaborated in the industrialized countries.

—To develop nuclear energy: the effort to look ahead in the solar field still does not absolve us from the need to pay sustained attention to nuclear energy. And Algeria's decision on this question hardly seems in doubt, as witness moreover the very name of the interministerial committee and the list of tasks which have been assigned it and the sectorial groups that have been constituted.

Nuclear energy implies a complex technology calling for a multitude of disciplines (chemistry, physics, etc). Research in this field is thus likely to have /"powerful and diversified side effects./" (Even with respect to solar energy: the photovoltaic process). Nuclear energy is also important for the diversity of its sectors of application and its interest as a strategic material.

With regard to its peaceful utilization, nuclear energy obviously offers, in addition to the possibility of supplying electricity, irreplaceable means of studying and resolving certain problems of agronomy which all countries face, and especially the underdeveloped countries.

Application of nuclear technology in this instance is being researched by two organs of the United Nations, the FAO and the IAEA, which have been working together for nearly 15 years through their joint unit devoted to the study of nuclear energy in food and agriculture. Many countries are participating in the program of research into the production and utilization of artificial mutations through radiation, in order to improve plants and develop new varieties. Thus, genetic mutation has made it possible to increase the protein content of green beans grown in South America and leguminous plants grown in Southeast Asia.

Uranium: A Major Resource

In Africa, too, irradiation for the development of vaccines against animal parasites. The energy produced by solar rays can also preserve the original quality of many food products by retarding or reducing the process of decay (solution to the problem of preserving harvests, especially in countries where the climate is warm and the facilities for preservation limited). But development of nuclear energy requires that a still greater effort be made in research and development; otherwise, as Mr Benini, director of the CSTN, says, /"this option could become an agent of dependency unparalleled in history/. And in any case, /actually, in the next 10 or even 20 years we can only hope to reduce our dependence to an acceptable level/."

After having bent all its efforts to the development of its oil and gas resources, Algeria has decided in addition to exploit its uranium resources, which are far from negligible. The existence of uranium deposits at Hoggar was found in 1974 and 1975 by geologists and drillers of SONARIM [National Mine Prospecting and Exploitation Company] and confirmed by Romanian experts: there would be five of them, situated in the Timgaouine and Abankor region. In 1977 a French consortium was given the job of performing the necessary studies for exploiting these deposits. This first phase has in fact the aim of determining the conditions for working these deposits, the means of exploitation, the transport of the ore, installation of the equipment needed for exploiting the deposits, as well as creation of a city of 5,000 people. The problems to be resolved are numerous, in particular involving the remoteness of the deposits and supplying them with the water necessary to conduct the process of concentrating the ore.

In its crude state uranium is absolutely unusable, and the low uranium content of the crude ore (about 0.2 percent) explains why the first operation, concentration, is always carried out on the extraction site. Concentration usually includes chemical operations (subjecting it to sulfuric acid, then an ion exchange over resin, attacking it with nitric agents...) which yield 50-70 percent uranium content in the concentrates (uranate de magnesie or uranyl nitrate). The latter have then acquired sufficient commercial value that their exploitation becomes almost independent of transport costs.

According to a study made jointly by the OECD and the IEA, Algeria's uranium resources may be on the order of 28,000 tons, at an extraction cost of less than \$15 per pound.

Additional resources could certainly be found at higher extraction costs and could easily be marketed due to the predictable increase in demand in the years to come.

It must, however, be emphasized that the uranium concentrates produced at the extraction sites must next go through the successive phases of a complex refining process: purification by separating the uranium trioxide from all the other elements, then fluoridation, a necessary step in obtaining the pure metal, and finally separation of the uranium metal by calcium, or more often magnesium, reduction.

The uranium thus obtained is the same as one finds in nature, that is, it is about 99.3 percent U-238 (atomic weight of the substance), which is stable and nonfissile, and only 0.7 percent radioactive U-235, the only important element for atomic reactors.

This refining is at present performed only in the industrialized countries.

Last 18 April a framework agreement in the field of French-Algerian nuclear cooperation was signed between the National Office of Scientific Research (ONRS) and the French Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) which envisages /"a la carte"/ cooperation and lasts for 6 years.

In France, the addition of nine 900-mW reactors divided into three groups at three sites (Dampierre, Tricastin, Gravelines), plus the groups already in operation, brought nuclear energy up to 23 percent of total electric production by the end of 1980, compared to 16.7 percent in 1979. With a 6-percent increase each year, the nuclear share of France's total electricity production should therefore reach 55 percent by 1985. The cracks discovered in October 1979 on certain parts in power plants under construction and presently in operation do not present a threat, according to the experts, during the normal 40-year lifetime of the power plants. These defects nevertheless delayed for several months in 1979 and 1980 the inauguration of service of several of the reactors. A technique for making repairs in an irradiated environment should be perfected by the end of 1981. Numerous voices are being raised at present urging that the hazards of possible seismic activity be taken into account.

According to the French press, beyond the training of Algerian personnel, France could at the start get the order for two test reactors and auxiliary installations. And by the year 1990, Algeria could hope to have a nuclear power plant with a power of 600 mW for the supplying of domestic and industrial electricity. A decision of this kind could be made within the next year, and France would certainly seem to be well positioned to win such a contract, inasmuch as it would also supply the enriched uranium necessary for the reactor's operation. Also, as Algeria is considering exploitation of the uranium resources in Hoggar (estimated in this case at 33,000 tons of ore), COGEMA, a subsidiary of the AEC, could perhaps participate in the exploitation of this wealth. Finally, the creation of a Center for Nuclear Studies at Ain Oussera, 200 km south of Algiers, is said to be under consideration.

Before Cooperating, Get Operating

Asked about this idea, Mr Benini, director of CSTN, told us that a megawatt corresponds roughly to 1 billion centimes and that in the Algerian context a 600-mW nuclear power plant would cost about 1 trillion centimes. Given the enormity of this figure, it is more necessary than ever to avoid the mistakes made in the past regarding energy investments and the systematic resort to "turnkey" contracts. /"We have behaved like rich, impatient people who believed anything could be bought"/, becoming thereby the sport of those who want to maintain the country in a state of dependence on external interests.

Mr Benini added that it is impossible to turn one's back on cooperation, all countries could benefit from cooperation, but it is a question of putting things into their proper perspective. To cooperate is to work together for a common aim of mutual interest.

/But, before cooperating, one must be capable of operating/ so that this cooperation is but an addition, defined quantitatively and qualitatively ahead of time and planned in advance. At CSTN, we are working to /put cooperation back in its place/.

Now what is happening in fact? On the pretext that it is not their province, the CSTN researchers are kept out of the decisionmaking process by bureaucrats who often do not understand the very nature and extent of their activities and jeopardize the very development of the center just at the moment when the political authorities of the country are showing more interest in substitute energies.

Established in 1976 with a staff of 190 people (including 74 administrative personnel) the CSTN has always used all of its budget, and even overspent at the start, thanks to a small annual extension which permitted it to maintain unbroken momentum in the activities of the center, whose personnel are estimated at 516 (including 132 administrative) in 1980.

But when at the end of 1979, 2 billion had actually been spent, the CSTN budget was brutally and significantly reduced in 1980.

The CSTN came out of the Institute for Nuclear Research (IEN) created in 1958 and strongly handicapped by the turnover of personnel and the absence of a definite plan in the nuclear field. The activity of this institute, which was endowed with three particle accelerators and an isotope separator, was principally focused on nuclear physics and was expanded later to solid state physics and to certain nuclear applications.

After the creation of the National Office for Scientific Research (ONRS), the IEN was attached to that body. The definition of a nuclear program, which the IEN had lacked, resulted in a new delineation of objectives and its reconversion to the CSTN.

By virtue of the decree of 24 January 1976 by which it was established, the CSTN as a center for training and research has as its principal missions: the provision of postgraduate training in nuclear engineering, the training of technicians in nuclear technology, and the development of applied nuclear research. The center's activity covers a vast field: from prospecting ores and essential raw materials to the management of radioactive waste, and is organized around several broad categories: the training of researchers and technicians, mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and the technologies of fission and fusion, the promotion of nuclear applications, the development of support techniques, and the protection of workers, the populace, and the environment.

One of CSTN's basic concerns is to provide for training in the nuclear field in order to have available the scientific potential needed to help in the launching of a national nuclear program. In September 1976 Nuclear Engineering was created, covering the whole nuclear fuel cycle, and especially the design, study, operation, and installation of nuclear reactors.

/"We are in our fifth class studying for a master's degree in nuclear engineering"/. The teaching is in large part Algerianized except in certain cases when for brief periods lecturers are brought in within the framework of cooperative agreements.

New lines have been opened up in nuclear engineering, including: metallurgy, reactor physics, nuclear safety, nuclear medicine, nuclear law, and regulation.

Numbers in Training in Nuclear Engineering 80/81

Undergraduate:	43
Graduate:	34
Postgraduate:	95
Advanced post graduate:	21

Numbers in training in nuclear engineering 80/81:

Undergraduate:	17
Master's	45

With the number of full-time instructors at CSTN being drastically cut and university instructors being burdened with very heavy schedules, the assignment of teachers to CSTN is obviously indispensable. Moreover, in a request to the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, the CSTN has suggested it be given a special budget for training which would make it possible to solve the problems of documentation, teaching equipment, consumable products, and special training courses. /Up to the present, the CSTN has provided training utilizing the budget funds intended for research/.

CSTN Activities

In light of elaboration of the research plan and in the context of the national conference on advanced training, a report was put together and published in June 1980: /"Balancesheet and Prospects, 1976-1980"/, which among other things includes a succinct summary of CSTN's overall scientific activity, with the accent on training and on certain salient aspects relative to the mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle. This activity is compartmentalized into several broad divisions and laboratories which, though often not lavishly provided with equipment and especially with personnel, provide very useful support activity.

This report shows, in particular, that since its creation the CSTN has carried out a fairly sustained level of activity, even though it has been restricted in its functioning by equipment problems and the departure of researchers training at CSTN (master's level) for the national service.

Mineralogy: Long handicapped by the absence of basic installations, this division has succeeded in equipping a chemical laboratory with all the equipment necessary for research on uraniferous ore.

Principal results: introduction of perfusion technology, which seems particularly well adapted to arid environments, in ore processing. This division also concerns itself with processing of phosphates to extract the uranium and with the pozzuolana volcanic rock of Hoggar, with a view to making a building material that could at least be used locally.

Contracts have been established with SONAREM to better coordinate efforts in the field of uraniferous ore processing. And in context of the ONRS-CNRS [National Center for Scientific Research] convention, a collaboration agreement has been made between the mineral chemistry laboratory of ENSC of Strasbourg and the division, including exchange of researchers.

Nuclear materials: The lion's share of the division's activities is still devoted to improvement of facilities, the construction and equipping of laboratories. In general, the big equipment items have already come in, but the indispensable small accessory items (grinding machine, granulator, compacting press, and various small glassware items, etc.) have not yet been acquired. The division has also made efforts to acquire a facility for the direct elaboration of uranium dioxide, but they have been frustrated by the absence of flexibility in criteria in the public market. It is thus seen to be essential to make room in the 5-year plan for the means necessary to permit the division to fulfill the objectives assigned it when it was created: mastery and development, at the laboratory level, of the technologies involved in the transformation cycle going from uraniferous concentrates to nuclear fuel and natural uranium (U₂ pellets and U-metal), but also gaining deeper knowledge of the processes set in motion.

Reactors: The ambitious objective given to this division is centered on mastery of nuclear technology. Several months ago it was made responsible for research and development of a training and research reactor in collaboration with Technicatome, a subsidiary of the AEC. The division is also involved in the study and development of models making it possible to follow the functioning and monitoring of nuclear electric power plants. A large part of the equipment ordered for 1979 has not been received.

All the researchers contribute to the teaching mission; which translates (especially for the newcomers) into unavailability for research. Also, departures for national service have significantly disrupted the operation of this division: since September 1979 the staff has been limited to four researchers, of whom two belong to the research and development division of MESRS.

Nuclear electronics and simulation: the division is involved in the simulation and electronic monitoring of physical processes, more particularly (but not exclusively) processes taking place in a nuclear power plant. Some equipment modules to be used in simulation and monitoring have already been developed.

Experimental nuclear physics: the division is supposed to handle basic research (nuclear structure). But the high-level equipment in existence--three particle accelerators--is not utilized as intensely as it should be because of deficiencies in the provisioning of spare parts (orders placed in some instances 3 years ago and still on request).

Moreover, the scientific work is done by physicists who have a very heavy teaching schedule, which makes them less available for activities of a specifically research nature.

Thermonuclear fusion: the division has received some fairly major equipment (lasers), but unresolved problems of installation (climate control) impeded putting them into operation. The division's activity is thus concentrated for the moment on training and acquisition of experimental techniques.

Theoretical physics and quantitative methods: the objectives established for the division in 1976 for the medium-term concern: the physics of nuclear fission by different theoretical models, theory of nuclear structure and specific quantitative methods. Four years later it can be seen that delays in the arrival and distribution of scientific documents (reviews, books, reports) have been a serious handicap to the researchers. Also, the implementation of programs requires computer facilities that are much larger and more advanced than those of which CSTN disposes. It is thus indispensable to divert part of the funds spent for computer services into a fund for the acquisition of a big computer. And the division would even like to have a...photocopier(!) so as not to overburden the documentation service of the CSTN!

Radiation safety and regulation: the division plays an important role not only in CSTN but also on the national level, to the extent of providing, through its external radiation laboratory, monitoring and dosimetric follow-up for all persons exposed to radiation (1,100 in all, of whom 900 are outside the CSTN), which means 1,100 dosimetric films per month. The laboratory's capacity is estimated at 2,500 films per month and its capacity could be increased if additional personnel could be made available to the laboratory.

A provider of services, this division was entrusted with exclusive jurisdiction over nuclear materials and radiation sources (decision No 1313 of 9 May 1978 of the Ministry of Commerce). It has also developed, in collaboration with the national bodies concerned, a major body of regulation.

Proposals of the Ad Hoc Commission

At the invitation of the CSTN, a national ad hoc commission which met regularly two or three times per month for more than 6 months (November 1978-May 1979) has elaborated proposed legislative language and regulations relative to radiation safety. Participating in this work were representatives of the following bodies: the ministries (higher education and scientific research; interior; public health; labor; energy and petrochemical industries; light industry; heavy industry; defense; hydraulics; land development, and environmental protection), SERTAL, SNS [National Steel Company], SONACOME [National Mechanical Engineering Company], and SONELGAZ [National Electricity and Gas Company].

The utilization of radioactive substances is so widespread that it has become familiar to the point that sometimes the risks are forgotten. Among the most common uses one might cite: medical applications (radiodiagnostic, radiotherapy, X-rays), industrial applications (X-rays, gammagraphie, neutronography, measurements of thickness, gauging of standards...), agricultural applications (tracers), and teaching and research applications. These applications are in need of still more development in terms of scientific and industrial progress as well as the eventual utilization of energy of nuclear origin. Now the dangers presented by ion radiation (not directly identifiable) are all the more serious because the consequences are incalculable. It is thus indispensable to take precautions to protect the beneficiaries and the users of radioactive substances, as well as outside parties.

At present, however, one sees in the nation's laws a veritable lacuna in the field of radiation safety. All laws and regulations prior to 31 December 1962--which, moreover, were not adapted to the new norms accepted internationally--were abrogated on 5 July 1975. Now since independence no special language in the field of radiation safety has been introduced, whereas ion radiation poses problems of a technical, practical, and legal nature which have a certain uniqueness. In the present phase of utilization of radioactive substances in Algeria, it is therefore urgent to spell out the basic principles of nuclear legislation as well as the technical elements of a body of regulation that could neutralize the dangers of radiation and protect against its effect, particularly /by defining the conditions of acquisition, utilization, storage, and disposal of ion sources/.

If one looks at the experiences of other countries, one sees generally the existence of a specific body: the radiological protection service responsible for the elaboration and implementation of radiation safety measures. At present the utilization of radioactive substances nationally is so extensive that the ad hoc commission stated that, regarding developments in the utilization of radioactive substances, the existence of a special service should be considered at a future stage.

Meanwhile, it concluded that it is appropriate to /use existing bodies/, such as those of civilian protection, health, labor inspection, the CSTN, SERTAL, etc.

It would suffice, to this end, to /perfect the jurisdiction/ of each of these bodies. Nevertheless, in order to assure coordination between all these services whose jurisdictions stand in close proximity to each other, the commission has called for the creation of consulting bodies at the national level and coordinating bodies at the local level.

A /National Committee for Radiological Protection/ is thus anticipated to be put in the service of the minister responsible for radiological protection, with the special mission of following the development of radiation safety problems, on both the national and international levels, in their scientific, technical, and juridical aspects, and with a mandate to inform and sensitize.

And at the level of the governorates, the /Committees for Radiological Protection/ would have the task of providing coordination among all the interested services with respect to all measures to implement regulations concerning prevention and protection against ion radiation or any activities to that end.

This set of proposed laws constitutes an important starting point for any subsequent provisions, taking into account progress in utilization of radioactive substances and unique aspects of the various sectors of application.

Also, Mr Benini, director of CSTN, is surprised at the silence which has followed this work, and calls on the bodies which participated in it to answer the question /"what have you done with our work"/ and observes: /"At present, we (the CSTN) are providing oversight in total absence of a legal framework/.

Indispensable Laboratories

The activity of the different divisions of the CSTN is complemented by that of several laboratories whose contribution is far from negligible, despite the still more striking constraints which weigh on them.

The applied mathematics laboratory is devoted to the creation of a library of computer programs utilized in reactor research and performs special research on mathematical methods encountered in the development of computer standards for reactors.

The laboratory of /crystals and thin strata/ has acquired considerable experience in /the study and development of solar panels and photocells/ and also works in the field of research on semiconductors.

The research that has been undertaken since 1977 concerning analysis of panel and photoceil groupings is aimed at finding the correlation existing between the problems of construction and the conditions for optimal utilization of solar modules.

As part of a 50-watt photovoltaic array, including storage of electricity, an electronic battery-panel coupling device has been developed. Its role: to provide for good adaptation of the electrical characteristics of the panels to those of the batteries. At present, work has just started on a bigger project with power on the order of 500 watts which could be used to pump water.

The advance of research is naturally conditioned by the consolidation of equipemnt and by the arrival of products and materials. The laboratory's goal in /teledetection/ is to develop and install the scientific and technical means of using space tele-detection to gain knowledge of the natural environment and for research and exploitation of terrestrial resources (mineral, hydraulic, agricultural, etc...). Theoretically, the signals sen provide information on the surface layer (several micrometers in the case of infrared, and in certain cases several meters for microwaves); nevertheless, subsoil anomalies are often an external manifestation which, if correctly interpreted, make it possible to determine the possible origin of the anomaly (presence of a deposit, for example).

Since the siege of Richmond during the War of Secession, when aerial photography was used for the first time for topographical purposes, the usefulness--civilian and military--of seeing the earth from high altitude has been well understood. In this manner civilian teledetection makes it possible to predict harvests, study the marine currents, locate fishing shoals, identify mineral reserves, etc....

Since 1972, teledetection has shown the full range of its potentialities. Today, with the simple viewing of plates photo-interpreters are able to discern the entire fault system of a region, its water resources, to distinguish grass from forest, the rising of fresh water in the sea, algae fields, diseased trees from healthy trees, etc....

From an a posteriori comparative study of Landsat (civilian satellites for the observation of earth resources from an orbit some 900 km above the earth, identifying objects first of 80, then of 40, and next of close to 25 meters) photos have come the revelation of the scope of the damage to Brazilian coffee from "black frost", the identification which companies claim to have been able to make of reserves of minerals and hydrocarbons thanks to these pictures, and a demonstration by the United States of the capability in at least two or three countries to predict the harvest in advance: all this considerably reinforcing the interest in teledetection. But there is no point in making a geologic survey if one is incapable of reading....

Despite the problems encountered, important tasks have been accomplished by the CSTN since its recent creation (in 1976): getting a training structure in place, the almost complete Algerianization of research teams, diversified cooperation with foreign laboratories and high-technology centers, creation and equipping of several units indispensable for the assimilation of nuclear technology, the opening up of bright prospects regarding nuclear energy through the proposal of an investment plan substantially in excess of the 5-year plan.

CSTN: Constraints on Plans

But, as Mr Benini, director of CSTN, stresses: /How can one embark on a line of action for the national development of our research when the most elementary components are absent from the CSTN inventory (solder, fuses, standard male and female components, extra wire, etc...)? How can one speak of technological mastery? The biggest part of our work consists in solving bureaucratic problems and resolving nonproblems/ (procurement from the AGI, etc....).

The simple operation of purchasing a small piece of equipment turns into an odyssey. Orders for spare parts, for example, repeated again and again, still remain pending in expectation of being filled at some point in...the 5-year plan.

After a stoppage of more than 10 years, a particle accelerator has been put back into operation and construction of two channels for beam utilization has started. A significant drop in hydrogen pressure in the generating apparatus necessitated stopping the machine. For precisely 3 years, at the beginning of each year, the head of the liquefaction service has been recording the annual estimates of needs for gas.

In these estimates, /we do not forget to include hydrogen on a regular basis. We are still waiting for it.../.

The control system for the central cooling needed for the climate control of the laboratory for Carbon-14 dating is not operating in satisfactory fashion; it is practically impossible to obtain reliable measurements. /Changes in humidity and temperature cause us problems, as do water cut-offs/.

Two examples, among others...

In such a context, the results obtained are surprising, and Mr Benini also notes /the amazement/ of the university authorities /at seeking the number of postgraduates trained under our auspices or under those of other universities/ (in the fields of nuclear materials, electronics, thermal physics, the resources are found at CSTN but the administrative formalities, the testing, depends on the university).

There was even an /armed revolt/ against CSTN dabbling in training, especially in advanced postgraduate training.

/We learned not to hold our breath when the governing regulations were not yet published (postgraduate training in civil engineering began in September 1976 and the regulations were only approved in October). People do not work and yet demand exclusivity. When one takes on a monopoly, one must assume it. We have not taken on a monopoly, but we have done our share.... Fear breeds mandarins at all levels.

/The CSTN program for the years to come proceeds along two main directions. First of all, strengthening training capabilities by equipping the laboratories/ (electronics, chemistry, etc...) especially intended for the training of technicians, engineers, and postgraduates. In this connection, consideration is being given to opening up other disciplines to higher level technicians, particularly: electronics and the maintenance indispensable for any research activity. And second, /strengthening the infrastructure of the recently created divisions/ (mineralogy, nuclear materials, isotopic enrichment, reactors, radiation safety).

These objectives should be attained during the 5-year plan, but after 4 years of existence the center is at a saturation point: it has thus become /urgent to begin the construction of a nuclear center on the scale of our objectives/ (Balancesheet and Prospects, 1976-1980).

The Directorate of Research and Development (DER) of MESRS was given the task of following and coordinating the studies on the plan for the future nuclear center which is divided into three main phases.

The first phase (rough draft) brings together researchers from various horizons: theoreticians, physicists, geologists, hydrologists, geochemists, geophysicists, economists, etc....

The second phase, devoted to /detailed studies, could be considered as an interface between the rough draft and the final product, or between the design stage and the configuring of the results. Finally, in the third phase, we must inventory our national capabilities in order to be able to maximize the orders received by to our nation's industries and to make of this plan /an integrating agent for our resources and a crystallization of our efforts: this will be a considerable reservoir of technological understanding and a system of diffusion for the benefit of numerous users/.

Relations with the socioeconomic sectors will moreover assume a scale proportionate to the flourishing of the center, in particular in the field of mines, geology, nuclear materials, nuclear energy, and new energies (notably, solar), nonenergy nuclear applications (radiation safety, agriculture, medicine, etc), and teledetection applications.

Solar: Primordial Advantages

Life on earth has been able to continue for billions of years thanks to a constantly renewed energy source: solar energy. This radiant energy is transformed into chemical potential energy constituting a permanent reservoir of energy for all terrestrial life, and this is done by a biological process: photosynthesis.

/The future of mankind depends to a great extent on the balance he will be able to establish in a natural environment that contains renewable nonpolluting energy resources/.

Despite periodic variations--the alternation of day and night, the cycle of the seasons, and other random obstacles, such as clouds, smoke, dust...--solar energy offers primordial advantages: it is free, produced continually, transmitted independently of distance and obstacles (which facilitates distribution and considerably cuts down on the need for the traditional networks of energy distribution), nonpolluting, storable (what one actually stores is one of the products of the conversion, not the radiation itself), which alleviates its variations.

Algeria receives on average more than 2,000 kW-hours of solar energy per year for every square meter of ground. This figure puts it among the most sunny regions in the world. The Sahara gets 3,500-4,300 hours of sun per year, and Annaba region about 3,200 per year. The extent of solar exposure often gives an adequate idea for deciding on construction of solar equipment.

The exploitation of solar energy also requires a technology different from that which has prevailed in industrial society and has a decentralized aspect which is of particular utility in the case of dispersed habitations. Besides, the basic unit, the captor, is best designed individually or for small groups. This explains why its utilization is envisaged by Algeria (/ "on a small scale"/, said Mr Brahimi in his speech before the party Economic and Social Commission) for small and medium-sized localities in remote areas or where it proves well-adapted.

Nevertheless, it is the industrialized countries (the United States, the USSR, Japan, the FRG, France...) that have prepared vast programs of research and industrial development involving solar energy. In the FRG, the minister of research and technology while disclosing the results of a colloquium on utilization of solar energy 3 years ago indicated that the utilization of this energy holds out promise in the meteorological conditions prevailing in his country. Experimental research shows, in fact, that in Germany a 3-square-meter solar heat conductor supplying a 160-liter reservoir could replace 70 to 75 percent of the fuel oil needed between March and October.

To reduce the percentage of hydrocarbons in the total consumption of energy, the FRG has encouraged many experiments in the heating of buildings and sanitized water. A Stuttgart electric company has thus developed a solar house in Wangen in the Abgau: a costly experiment which required a total of DM450,000 of investment.

Another experimental installation built at Wiehl also benefitted recently from a subsidy handed out by the Federal Ministry of Research and Technology. The solar energy is captured by 1,100 collectors, arranged on the roof of a multipurpose living room next to a swimming pool, which heat the water in reservoirs (total collection surface: 1,500 square meters).

In order to correctly utilize solar energy for domestic heating purposes in the FRG, it is not enough to install captors on the roof--these captors which West German industry already produces in great numbers and in several different models. It is also necessary to provide a good system of storage to be able to use in winter the excess heat of summer which has been preserved and utilize not only solar radiation but also ambient heat.

And in Canada, in 1977 the minister of environment made public a report which said that the federal government would join with private enterprise to create, in Canada, experimental towns utilizing solar energy and electricity produced by windmills. Wind energy itself derives from solar energy, it results from the continual movement of the atmosphere coming from the warm zone--the sunlit hemisphere--toward the cold zone, or the unlit hemisphere. The report deals particularly with the establishment of one of these experimental towns in each of the 10 Canadian provinces (construction would be paid for in part by a special tax on oil and natural gas). Another report prepared in the United States by the Federal Energy Administration [name as published] also indicates that in the United States solar energy could provide for all the electrical needs of a municipality for streetlights, airports, parking-lots....

In order to be exploited continuously and with reasonable yield, solar energy must be /"concentrated, converted, and stored"/; in terms of the application being considered, it must also utilize an adequate system of concentration and appropriate conversion and storage processes.

Low-Temperature Uses

Particularly with respect to conversion, this can be conceived in several ways /in thermal (heat), mechanical, electrical, or chemical form/.

In thermal form and in the housing field one can already envisage several low-temperature applications: heating of sanitized water, heating or cooling rooms in buildings, and also use of dryers and cooking ovens useful for the preservation of foods or the preparation of building materials. The heating of sanitized water by solar energy could be considered already developed, even if the process could be further improved. But the installation of a climate control system is more complex and assumes understanding of a multitude of factors: quantification of the needs and evaluation in terms of the temperature insulation coefficient of the building in order to determine the [heat] losses, the difference between the interior and exterior temperature that is desired during a certain period of the day, etc....

Buildings could be heated and cooled with solar energy by utilizing a variety of /collectors/ in which is circulating a fluid such as water, air.... The systems proposed (designed in the industrialized countries) generally include a thermally insulated storage reservoir and a source of auxiliary heat that could function to supplement or substitute for solar energy when the latter is insufficient (from which comes the importance of the idea of the amount of sunshine in order to adapt the necessary technology). The solar collector is one of the most important and most

costly items of the system. It consists of a blackened metal plate (blackening has the effect of augmenting the absorptive power) in contact with tubes in which water, for example, is circulated. Temperatures of 70 to 90 degrees centigrade are easily reached. Losses of heat are minimized by a double-glass cover and insulation behind and on the sides. The problem of popularizing this system is economic rather than technical, and it appears that the solution lies in intensive production of collectors.

Usable directly, solar radiation can also be transformed into chemical, mechanical, or electric energy. Up to now, the electricity being supplied has generally been produced by thermal machines from which comes the idea of converting the cold source and a warm source: the greater the difference of temperature, the higher the yield.

Seventy percent of the solar energy reaching the earth is absorbed by the world's oceans. Between the tropics of Cancer and Capricorn the surface is heated up to 25 degrees, while at a depth of 1,000 meters the temperature stays at 5 degrees. Thermodynamics asserts that this difference is entirely sufficient to put into operation a thermal machine that will produce electricity. The total energy potential deriving from the upper and lower temperatures in the equatorial regions of the ocean would, according to calculations, produce a quantity of energy several times greater than the needs of mankind.

Mr Girardier, director of the French Society of Thermal Studies and Solar Energy, even says that one could draw solar energy...from the arctic regions by utilizing the 4-degree water found under ice floes as a warm element for the thermal motor, and the ambient air which is -30 to -40 degrees as the cold element.

Photovoltaic and Thermodynamic Processes

At present, the production of electricity apart from solar energy is obtained in particular by means of photovoltaic systems. This mode of producing electricity is based on utilization of the photovoltaic effect in semiconducting materials: the absorption of light releases electrical charges which can be collected by means of conducting contacts applied on the surfaces.

The application of photovoltaic panels to habitats, for example, locates the generator at the site of the charge and thus reduces the necessity for transmission and distribution systems. The photovoltaic panels can be mounted on the roofs of houses or incorporated into the thermal collectors previously described, which serves the double purpose of heating (warm water, climate control) and electricity (electric lighting, operation of electric appliances) for a house, in which the needs are moreover to be evaluated in terms of the geographic and socioeconomic context.

In the field of solar energy utilization through photovoltaic processes, in September France produced a world first: a solar pump, the most powerful in the world, 26 kW, manufactured by the Guimard company, has gotten under way, at the experimental level, at the National Institute of Agronomical Research near Montpellier. This solar pump operates on 192 panels of photovoltaic cells which directly convert sunlight into electricity.

At a price which is constantly getting lower: it was Fr150 per watt 10 years ago; it is Fr40 today, and will be less than Fr10 in 5 years. The pump, which begins working only 1 and 1/2 hours after sunrise and stops automatically at sunset, is lightweight (850 kg) and can supply water to an African village without requiring maintenance.

Guimard has already installed 100 of them in isolated villages which have been functioning perfectly for several years. Their output is from 600 to 9,400 watts: that of Montpellier reaches 26,000 watts and confirms the possibility of higher output with this technique of photocells, which consists in storing the solar energy in batteries (silicon cells, cadmium sulfide cells, or gallium arsenide cells) making possible the direct conversion of solar radiation into electricity.

An international conference on the manufacture and utilization of solar cells to produce electricity is held each year, incidentally, alternately in the United States and in Europe. A U.S. report prepared by the Federal Energy Administration calls for widespread diffusion of solar cells to replace conventional electric generators without, however, constructing vast power plants to supply the extensive sectors.

The other important method of producing electricity apart from solar energy: the thermodynamic technique, which consists basically in developing power plants operating through the capture of solar rays, but supplying the network like a traditional power plant (an example is the Themis plant at Targassone). A certain number of schemes have been suggested for the utilization of solar radiation in electric power plants, particularly by France whose objective is to utilize some 10 million TEP of solar energy by the year 1990. The budget put at the disposal of the French Solar Energy Commissariat for 1981 is indeed 50 percent higher than the one for 1980.

It is, moreover, under the aegis of SOFRETES (French Society of Thermal Studies and Solar Energy)--the emblem of which is a cogged wheel being turned by a cogged sun--that the biggest solar power plant in the world was built in France and then went into service in 1978 in Mali (at Dire, on the banks of the Niger, 200 km south of Timbuktu).

The cost of installation, estimated at about Fr5 million, was financed by the French Government as part of the program called /"Operation Sahel and New Energies"/. With a power of 80 kW (1 kW = 1,000 watts): a trifle, however, in comparison with the thousands of megawatts produced by conventional power plants running on coal, oil, or uranium (1 megawatt = 1 million watts).

It had four purposes: to pump 8,500 cubic meters of water per day from the Niger for irrigation; to extract potable water from an 18-meter-deep well to supply some 10,000 consumers in Dire; to refrigerate the cold storage room of an agricultural cooperative; to produce 5 kW of electric current for evening lighting of the cooperative and a 40-room tourist hotel.

More ambitious projects are presently in the experimental stage, such as the /"Sirocco"/ project.

The National Center for Scientific Research [CNRS] is proposing, in fact, to develop in the years to come a solar power plant operating at very high temperatures and /utilizing a gas turbine for the conversion of solar energy into mechanical energy or electric energy/.

The first prototype components (receptor panels) for this project should be delivered in the near future by the manufacturers. The temperatures at which the power plant should function may be higher than 800 degrees, whereas only a few hundred degrees are necessary for solar plants of more modest yield such as Thek or Themis. But

these higher temperatures require peak technologies and refractory materials, which alone are able to resist the temperatures sustained, in order to produce a high-quality receptor, the keystone of the process, since that is where the fluid is heated, air in this case, which is destined to turn the turbine. A prototype module of refractory steel was tested between July 1979 and March 1980. A new experiment is proposed by CNRS at the end of September 1981.

If the first results to be obtained were encouraging, perhaps one might see the appearance on the market of solar power plants of an output between 50 and 1,000 kW derived from the "Sirocco" program, for which CNRS expects to commit some Fr5 million. The French are not the only ones to be interested in this line: the Germans, in contact moreover with CNRS, have their sights set even higher and plan to build a 20-mW power plant.

The Market is Hungry

The industrialized countries, France in particular, are presently making big efforts to promote cooperation with the developed countries on new energy sources. It is in this context that we find the colloquium held 27-30 October 1980 in Tunis, the aim of which was to bring together the heads of French enterprises and high officials of 20 member countries of the Arab League to enable them to exchange information on the possibilities of exploitation of various energy sources, to become acquainted with their respective national policies in this domain, the resources needed to exploit these sources of energy and the technologies to be adopted for their exploitation, and finally to examine in the French-Arab context the cooperation in existence in this field and the most appropriate ways to improve it.

Saudi Arabia has just signed with the French company SOFRANSI a cooperation agreement providing in particular for the construction of the first Saudi solar energy power plant. This plant will be utilized for electrification projects and water pumping. Its output will be 240 kW/h. Following the signing ceremony, the Saudi minister of industry and electricity stressed that realization of this first project will facilitate Saudi research in improving the utilization of this energy source.

In 1977 Saudi Arabia also signed a cooperation agreement with the United States in the field of solar energy utilization involving a total of \$100 million, payable in equal shares by the two sides.

The development of solar energy has also been strongly encouraged in the United States during recent years: the energy program presented by President Carter provided tax incentives in the form of tax credits of a maximum of \$2,000 for individuals using this energy in their home and tax reductions of 10 percent on investments devoted by industry to utilization of this energy. Also, sizable public appropriations were made to develop solar energy. But an investigation was launched on 14 November by a subcommittee of the U.S. Senate responsible for antitrust policy to find out whether the /"majors"/ of the oil industry were about to monopolize solar energy. The big companies (Exxon, Mobil, Shell, Amoco, and Arco) have in fact bought up half the small enterprises specializing in solar energy, encouraged in this, according to the /"solar lobby"/, by the government, which gave the oil companies more than 75 percent of the appropriations earmarked for solar development. According to the "solar lobby", the oil companies are taking control of the sector to discourage development.

The potential market for solar energy, however, is considered "extremely large" and it appears to be quite tempting. In fact, if the prospects solar energy presents to the industrialized countries are limited, the future of solar energy is by contrast extremely promising in the rural areas of Third World countries where needs are dispersed, for example in Africa, particularly in the Sahel. Also, the industrialized countries are presently turning their efforts toward applications of solar energy such as water pumping, refrigeration, the grinding of millet, the treatment of brackish water, etc....

The Elf-Aquitaine advertising published regularly in LE MONDE devoted to "Energies 80" ("Mr Sun is already living in the house of the year 2000 at 100 percent energy savings") is among the most explicit in this regard. It says that solarization is not a panacea. /("Nor could it supply more than a small percentage of France's energy needs.") But at the same time, "we/ (900 researchers working on new energies in the Elf-Aquitaine Research Center at Solaize, near Lyon) /are working on supplying electricity to remote African villages. Schools, dispensaries, radio-telephone, Hertzian relays, water pumping, etc...functioning with photovoltaic generators which transform light into electricity"/.

In another advertisement, also published in LE MONDE, the Hoescht firm, under the title "The Sun Tamed" and with a photograph of a solar eruption ("the fusion of hydrogen atoms liberates prodigious energy"), tells us that in order to capture solar energy at the least cost, Hoescht researchers are in particular studying the new special materials of this technology such as polypopylene, a plastic substance entering into the manufacture of solar captors.

/In the field of solar energy, as in many others, the 14,000 researchers of Hoescht, spread out over the entire world, are joining forces to improve man's future/.

One may thus fear, and experience confirms it, that in such circumstances the engineers and technicians of the industrialized countries may quite naturally be brought to elaborate plans and build prototypes based on their own technological and socio-economic environment. One observes, too, in the industrialized countries a certain tendency to give special consideration to the solar supertechnology which could have as its principal objective the supply on a "turnkey" basis of solar power plants to Third World countries (a new battlement of sophisticated technology transfer and thus of domination).

It is thus indispensable that in matters of solar technology the underdeveloped countries make research efforts to promote applications appropriate to their own respective development: habitat climate control, water supply in arid zones, desalinization of seawater, production of nonpolluting energy at a low price. These new technological paths, not overly sophisticated, constitute ideal terrain on which they can express their creative capabilities and their own unique genius. The countries of the Third World must not forget that it is necessary above all to /count on their own capacity to conceive and develop and thus to be the driving force in their own energy future/. This would permit them to avoid poorly adapted solutions imposed elsewhere, for lack of themselves having conceived and proposed solutions.

Algeria: A Solar Village

Algeria has only recently begun to be interested in solar energy, and even now it is almost exclusively considered as an auxiliary energy for use in the extreme case of widely dispersed habitats.

The photovoltaic process which permits direct production of electricity from solar radiation by utilizing semiconductors is at present being tested, as we have already seen, in a CSTN laboratory, but also at the University of Annaba, which in 1976 began a huge program of scientific research on unconventional energy sources. Also, numerous applications of low-temperature solar energy--water heaters, desalinization of water, cooling and air-conditioning, pump-generators, preserving and drying, cooking...--are presently under study and being tested at Annaba.

Plans for water heaters for domestic use have been given to the Societe Real Sider (SNS) (name as published) to put it into general installation in the construction of new housing.

A solar water heater using 2 square meters of surface, completely installed by technicians from the University of Annaba, has been functioning "very nicely" since October 1976.

A solar pump-generator of the SOPRETES MS-5 type was also developed in 1977-1978 (captor temperature: 75 degrees and the cold water 15 or 30 degrees) producing an output of 150 watts for pumping, which permits the supply of 6 to 10 cubic meters per hour and the furnishing of 600 to 850 wat. of electricity. The next step is the construction of a storage reservoir (thermal reflector) of a capacity of about 20 cubic meters of water averaging 70 degrees, supplied by captors flat on the ground covering 100 square meters of surface and intended to permit the functioning of the pump-generator for 5 extra hours beyond the hours of sunlight with a higher yield since the night provides a better cold source.

The proposed desalinization system (2 square meters) was developed 2 years ago with an average yield of 5 liters per square meter per day. In practice, the distilled water can be cut with brackish water to be distilled, and in certain cases the yield can be considerably increased.

Inside the machine, the temperature has reached 70 degrees; where 1 cubic meter of saturated water at 60 degrees contains 130 grams of water vapor, if the temperature falls to 30 degrees it can only contain 30 grams, and thus 100 grams of water would be condensed.

The most important development, nevertheless, concerns a study for the creation of a solar pastoral village at Sidi Brahîm (Saida), comprised of, in particular, the solar water pump, hot water for domestic use, cooling for buildings, etc.... Another similar plan has been submitted in Ouargla Governorate. At present, throughout the world, about 30 villages are using solar pumps and power plants on the thermodynamic systems. All the needs of a pastoral village can in fact be satisfied from this system, which involves little expense beyond the installation itself.

The great steppe extending over thousands of kilometers south of Saida is destined for livestock raising and the production of esparto grass, but the area also presents problems of the management of water locations and of the sedentarization of men and animals. The solution to these problems is the establishment of pastoral villages generally composed of four ordinary hamlets and a main hamlet in the middle. At Sidi-Brahîm, two hamlets of 26 families each are anticipated.

/For Algeria, the primary interest in development of this solar technique is to permit the agricultural and pastoral development of the isolated regions of southern Algeria/.

The proposal stressed that the introduction of these techniques should be accomplished in close collaboration with the national bodies at first, in order to /familiarize the technicians with these new developments/, but above all /in order to design together equipment that is well adapted to the Algerian market/, particularly in the field of capture and thermal storage.

An exploratory mission composed of representative of ONRS and Mr M. Levy, adviser with the University of Tokyo, went last September to Ouargla, chosen as the site of experimentation and research on solar energy. Algeria envisages, in fact, with the help of the United Nations University in Tokyo, the construction of an agricultural village, utilizing solar energy for its domestic needs and production, in the Ouargla region within 2 years.

This village would serve not only to demonstrate the new possibilities offered by solar energy, but also to evaluate the implications of this energy source in an integrated setting. The technical installations necessitated by this project would be financed by the United Nations University, the construction of the village being Algeria's responsibility.

Also, studies are at present being carried out with the help of French, German, and U.S. enterprises to desalinate the subterranean water-pools of the Sahara by using solar energy.

Chart A

1. ENERGIE SOLAIRE




6. Le soleil est un corps chaud (600 ° K) qui émet un rayonnement sous forme d'ondes électro-magnétiques. Ce rayonnement peut se décomposer en :
- Infra-rouge transportant la plus grande partie de l'énergie rayonnée par un corps incandescent.
 - Bande visible éclairant la terre, donnant la couleur aux objets.
 - Ultra-violet qui ne transportant qu'une faible partie de l'énergie rayonnée par un corps incandescent.

Key:

1. Solar energy
2. Infrared
3. Red
4. Violet
5. Ultraviolet
6. The sun is a hot body (600 degrees kelvin) which emits radiation in the form of electromagnetic waves. This radiation can be analyzed into:
 - Infrared, carrying the largest part of the radiant energy of an incandescent body.
 - Visible band giving light to earth and color to objects.
 - Ultraviolet, which only carries a small portion of the radiant energy from an incandescent body.

Chart B



Ce dispositif utilise le plus couramment les deux principes physiques suivants :

- L'effet serre qui consiste à emprisonner une partie de l'énergie apportée par le rayonnement solaire.
- La focalisation qui consiste à concentrer l'énergie transportée par des rayons dits parallèles en un seul point : le foyer.


Key:

1. Solar Captor
2. Support (wood for example)
3. Material transparent to radiation
4. Transparent
5. Thermal insulating material
6. Opaque
7. Black body
8. This apparatus utilizes in the most common way the two following principles of physics:

--The hothouse effect, which consists in imprisoning a portion of the energy brought in by solar radiation.

--Focalization, which consists in concentrating the energy brought by the practically parallel rays into a single point: the focus.

1. DISPOSITIF DE SECHAGE UTILISANT UNE «CHEMINEE SOLAIRE»




Ce dispositif utilisant le principe de cheminée solaire est utilisé pour le séchage des fruits. Ce système comprend en général une possibilité de régler le débit d'air.

Key:

1. Drying Apparatus Using a "Solar Chimney"
2. Products to be dried
3. Blackened sheet-iron
4. Wire gauze
5. Insulation
6. Glass
7. Cold air
8. This apparatus using the "solar chimney" principle is used to dry fruits. The system generally includes the possibility of regulating air supply.

Chart D

1 DISPOSITIF POUR DISTILLATION ET CULTURES EN REGIONS ARIDES





5 Les plantes reçoivent la partie du rayonnement qui ne tombe pas dans les bassins. La température de la serre ou niveau des cultures est très fortement limitée dans la journée (ombre et distillation).

Key:

1. Apparatus for Distillation and Cultivation in Arid Regions
2. Brackish water
3. Transparent partition
4. Channel for distilled water
5. The plants receive the portion of the radiation which does not fall into the basins. The temperature of the hothouse with respect to the plants is drastically limited during the day time (shade and distillation).

1 EVOLUTION DES EFFECTIFS (CSTN) 7

2 ANNEES	3 PERSONNEL DE RECHERCHE 4 Chercheurs confirmés	5 Chercheurs débutants	6 TOTAL	Personnel technique	Personnel Administratif	9 TOTAL 1975-1979
76	45	15	60	96	74	190
77	66	27	93	117	113	321
78	91	58	150	102	106	357
79	100	72	172	135	126	427
80	113 (x 2.5)	100 (x 6.8)	213	171 (x 3)	122	604 (x 7.9)


10 EVOLUTION DES EFFECTIFS
presque x 3 (2.7) entre 76 et 80.
entre 79 et 80 : ~ 22%11 EVOLUTION DU BUDGET FICTION
(x 3.6) entre 76 et 80 3.2 %

Key:

1. Changes in Personnel Complement (CSTN) Years
2. Research personnel
3. Veteran researchers
4. New researchers
5. Total
6. Technical personnel
7. Administrative personnel
8. Total
9. Changes in personnel complement. Up by almost a factor of 3 (2.7) between 1976 and 1980. Between 1979 and 1980: up 22 percent.
10. Change in hypothetical budget. Up by a factor of 3.6 [between 1976 and 1980], up 3.2 percent between 1979 and 1980.
11. Hypothetical
12. Actual
- 13.

Chart F

1 SECHAGE PROGRESSIF




7 Cet autre système de séchage dit progressif utilise un produit intermédiaire déshydratant, susceptible d'être régénéré dans son état primitif par action directe du rayonnement solaire.

Key:

1. Gradual Drying
2. Distilled water
3. Glass
4. Dehydrator
5. Substance to be dried
6. Partition serving as a thermal reflector
7. The other drying systems, termed gradual, utilizes an intermediary dehydrating agent that can be restored to its original state by the direct action of solar radiation.


Chart G



Key:

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| 1. Solar Distiller | 5. Distilled water |
| 2. Glass | 6. Insulation |
| 3. Absorbant | 7. Numerous studies have been made and continue to be made of evaporation and condensation in solar distillers. |
| 4. (Condensation) | |


Chart H



Key:

- | | |
|------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Solar Cell-Semiconducting Metal | 6. The apparatus involves the direct conversion of solar into electric energy. The recovery of solar radiation in the form of electricity can be done either by means of mechanical transformation of the heat energy of the sun, or directly by means of solar batteries. |
| 2. Light | |
| 3. Semiconductor | |
| 4. Metal | |
| 5. Base | |

Chart I



7 Les batteries solaires à jonction PN comportent une plaquette de semi-conducteur de type N (pastille de 5 cm de diamètre et 300 microns d'épaisseur). Le matériau semi-conducteur le plus couramment utilisé est le silicium.

Key:

1. Component of Solar Battery
2. Light
3. P-N [positive-negative] junction
4. Negative semiconductor
5. Positive semiconductor
6. Charge
7. The solar batteries at the P-N junction containing a thin semiconducting plate of N-type (5 cm in diameter and 300 microns in thickness). The semiconducting substance most commonly used is silicon.

CSO: 4400



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CSO: 4400

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ALGERIA

ALGERIAN ENERGY POLICY DISCUSSED

Misconceptions Clarified

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 29 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Ali Boukrami: "The Gas Problem Under the Information Prism"]

[Text] Information is an essential element in any dossier of an international nature. It is also considered a fundamental negotiating instrument, because of the influence exercised on the direct participants and its effect on the environment of the negotiators.

Moreover, this "weapon" is widely used by international firms and Western governments when their interests are "at stake."

The problem of international gas trade, moreover, has furnished the mass media an additional opportunity to make their immense means and organization--which is marked by exceptional fluidity--available to the powerful multinational firms. This exorbitant power to inform is all the more effective because even the intellectual or political elite of the Third World countries refer to these information organizations, which benefit from an uncommon credibility. Thus, many Western newspapers are considered, rightly or wrongly, to be the official spokesmen for certain governments.

"Interviews" solicited by some journalists of repute with representatives of Third World governments, have no other goal but to pin down the position of the government concerned on a precise problem, and thus to enable the Westerners involved to adopt the most appropriate strategy.

Such a mission may justify the fact that a famous American journalist receives an income ten times higher than that of a secretary of state of the same country.

In an economy where income reflects social usefulness, one must believe that the recognized position of the journalists is otherwise more important than that of the politician, in the United States of America.

It seems to us useful, for the purpose of benefiting from the experiences of our country, to present an analysis of the gas problem, to measure the harmful effects of the international press and to furnish the public the elements of information that will enable it to understand and analyze the record.

This is all the more useful because in the recent past questions about energy were reserved for a limited public of initiates who rejected any criticism or discussion of the decisions taken, with the excuse that the problem under study was too technical or complicated. The maturity of our political elite and their desire to broaden the debate within a democratic framework by favoring constructive criticism, implies a sufficient knowledge of the problems and a gradual apprenticeship for establishing a "spirit of tolerance," according to the expression sanctioned by the chief of state, Chadli Bendjedid.

The energy policy is articulated around the following main lines:

1. Financing economic and social development;
2. Regularly supplying the national economy with energy while ensuring that the growing needs of future generation are satisfied;
3. Participating in an integrated development of the national economy by guaranteeing progressive mastery of the installed apparatus of production and promoting inter-sectoral relations between the various branches of the national economy.

Moreover, the capacity of the national economy to absorb investment is going to constitute a fundamental criterion of choice, for every economy has maximum absorption limits for investment beyond which the level of internal organization no longer makes it possible to benefit from the positive effects of the acquisition of new equipment.

This limit pinpoints the investment level at which efficiency is nonexistent. It is important to point out here that it is not enough to affirm that hydrocarbons exports are \$20 billion, for example, for the economy to be able to convert these sums into plants. The pace of development is of course limited by financial capacities, but once this constraint is lifted, organizational capacities constitute the objective limit to absorption of released credits.

Exceeding this limit is expressed by the sacrifice of other objectives like the weakness of the economic integration of the development model, or recourse to continuously growing foreign assistance. In other cases, other economic sectors also find themselves at a disadvantage, or see their growth slowed down. Thus, exports of hydrocarbons must not only finance stockpiling, but also the importing, constantly on the increase, of food goods.

Once the basic givens of the energy policy have been defined, let us refer to the realities of the Western countries in the energy field.

Actually, parallel to the special interest in the slowdown of our gas exports, which would deprive us of substantial revenue and thus would diminish the outlets for Western firms dealing in diverse equipment, the Western governments are raising problems concerning energy in terms of national sovereignty.

To the five classical objectives of an economic policy (full employment, foreign balances, price stability, acceptable distribution of income and growth), the Western policymakers add:

The quality of life and the anti-pollution policy;

Security and the search for independence in supplying energy.

And the latter objective is organized into a hierarchy in the first place, and is linked to national sovereignty.

This strategy would risk, 30 years in the future, profoundly changing the givens of the world energy market, by exhausting the hydrocarbons resources of certain Third World countries and by the growing development of alternative forms of energy (nuclear, geothermic, solar, etc.), in the industrialized economies.

The conservation policy adopted in those countries and the poor capability of Third World countries to achieve the use of new kinds of energy, are sources of worry that have encouraged the Algerian government to mark a pause, which can only be useful to future generations, before adopting a consistent energy policy. This thorough reflection on energy decisions has not, moreover, been prejudicial to the pace of our economy's growth, since our hydrocarbon revenues in 1980 were more than 40 percent above those of 1979. Our country has not had at its disposal significant energy resources from the point of view of the growing needs of the national economy (in 1990 the national consumption will be on the order of the equivalent of 40 million tons of oil). This objective situation, and a global investment program for the development of gas at a cost of \$34 billion (1979), have led Algerian policymakers to conduct a detailed study of this record before taking any irreversible decisions.

Any exportation of hydrocarbons constitutes a deduction from our energy potential and an exacerbation of the energy problem of future generations, and any quantity of oil or gas saved is a guarantee for our children. Every sale of hydrocarbons on the international market must see its product converted into reproducible assets capable of taking over from the hydrocarbons.

Every exportation is a withdrawal from our own flesh, done to finance our growth. This sacrifice, however, must be compensated for by a remunerative price on the one hand, and by the installation of an efficient production apparatus.

Abuses in Interpretation of the Algerian Position

In reality the actual situation is very far from this objective, since the poor operation or closing down of our fertilizer plants necessitates /two days of hydrocarbon importation/ [in italics].

The installed capacity for fertilizer production should have made it possible to satisfy all the fertilizer needs of the economy and release an exportable surplus. In reality, our country continues to import fertilizer, because its complexes are operating only at reduced levels.

Wheat imports have reached the equivalent of /two months of hydrocarbon exports/ [in italics]. The whole 365 days of hydrocarbon exportation can be broken down by identifying the needs financed. In the majority of cases, these will be needs connected with the poor operation of our production potential.

Moreover, this role of soporific is promoted by an international press which tends to have it acknowledged that our country has considerable energy resources at its disposal. This affirmation is all the more false because hydrocarbons are the only

reliable source of energy for our economy. This is the fundamental principle on which are positioned the analyses presented by the powerful foreign press organs in order to reorient our energy policy and guarantee a sure supply for the industrialized economies.

Once that principle was adopted, the powerful information industry strove to define its corollaries by changing the direction of and modifying all the positions affirmed by our country in the domain of gas, in order to weaken us.

The government and the officers of SONATRACH had simply established that the LNG [liquefied natural gas] sales operations were allowing significant losses to appear and were not responsive to the criterion of financial profitability on which any energy export operation must be exclusively based. Conditions of sale of LNG therefore had to be necessarily revised on the basis of objective elements, in conformance with the interest of the parties concerned.

In the continuation of this diagnosis, the Algerian authorities are using a progressive readjustment in the price of gas over that of oil to obtain a parity whose practical modalities and periods of adjustment remained to be negotiated. This clear position, which by the way was affirmed by President Chadli Bendjedid at the OPEC meeting in Algiers during June 1980, was aimed at obtaining a fair and remunerative price.

The foreign journalists hastened to fix a price of \$6.11 per million BTU's [British thermal units] to be the price asked by Algeria, whereas the Algerian leaders had not yet officially quoted any price, but were positioning the debate on principles.

This distortion of the words of the Algerian leaders was aimed at weakening our country's position by attempting to show that this step was unacceptable.

This abusive interpretation of the Algerian position was obviously intended to apply pressure to the SONATRACH negotiators.

During the same period, the international press renewed this kind of manipulation of the facts on the occasion of the negotiations between SONATRACH and its American partners. The latter had actually refused to pay its Algerian supplier in advance until an agreement on price should be reached, and asked SONATRACH to interrupt its deliveries. One part of the international press seized the facts to try to change the content and discredit our country. This press, which by the way has a large audience among the elite of the Third World countries, essentially set itself the objective of weakening the negotiators in their own country, for the Western business men, managers and bankers know the real facts of the records and have their own specialized and selective sources of information.

The Corollaries of the Alignment Principle

Without expanding on this problem, which aroused varied reactions and promoted the development of contradictory theories, it seems to us useful to list the essential elements that make analysis possible:

1. The price of natural gas must be determined by the evolution of the price of oil. Assessment of this principle involves discussion of the following elements:

Which crude? Saharan bind or Arabian Light?

Price FOB [free on board], CAF [cost and freight] or Wellhead.

For discussion of the first point it would be necessary to adopt the price of the oil involved. Although one may eventually end up with a basket of "crudes" on a spot market.

The second question is more delicate insofar as the choice of a CAF price would necessitate deducting the costs of regasification and transportation, which are the important components.

In this precise case, the transportation cost would be a risky element that was not controlled by the producers, who would have the extremely wide fluctuations of this specialized freight market imposed upon them.

This point, then, must be the subject of a more profound discussion, to avoid damaging the interests of those who are sacrificing to supply the world economy with energy.

2. Readjustment

The word "evolution" was used to show that it is a question of gradually re-establishing parity of prices in the negotiated time periods on the basis of the calorific equivalent.

It is really a question of a readjustment made necessary by the disarrangement, evidenced since 1974, between the evolution of the prices of crude and natural gas.

This, then, is the clear, precise, consistent position defended by the producers who are demanding a fair price, established on controllable bases and intended to favor a rational utilization of energy.

Those who preferred to use as a basis for setting the price of natural gas, the price of fuel No 2 and fuel No 6 were thus agreeing to submit to the law of the Western countries which set the prices of refined products independently of any rationality.

The price of fuel No 2 is clearly lower than that of gas oil, even though its composition is identical to gas oil.

This arbitrary setting of the prices of refined products, moreover, is recognized by the governments of the industrialized countries, which today want to bring back order to their price system for domestic products, in order to better allocate resources.

Domestically, these governments were thus establishing the absence of logic in such artificial prices.

Eventually, this situation, which determines the importance of information in the energy sector, can only convince us further of the need to make up the accumulated time lost in this area by our press, by giving it consequential resources in such a way that it can fully assume its responsibilities.

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 29 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Omar Belhouchet: "Who Is Falsifying Reality"]

[Text] Three days into the fourth session of the Central Committee, which is to study in particular the energy dossier, an official structure of the administration of the United States--in this case the General Accounting Office of the American government--sends news from Washington that is at the very least significant. Figures are put forward by the office in question to make someone believe that our claims and demands on the subject of the price of gas are outrageous. The Algerian negotiators at any rate do not recognize themselves at all in what was put forward, and wonder "about the reference criteria that were used" to calculate these figures. Let there be no mistake, the positions of both partners are perfectly well known to each other. The negotiations, which have now been going for nearly a year, have made it possible to grasp each other's intentions in the most minute detail. "Algeria has never formulated such a request and...maintains its objective of gradual alignment of the price of liquefied natural gas (LNG) with the price of crude oil." Is not the report in question, published on the eve of the Central Committee meeting, attempting to discredit the Algerian negotiator? To get him in trouble by falsifying his position?

Today the alignment of the price of gas with that of oil is widely accepted. Recently even the financial bulletin of the Lambert Bank of Brussels affirmed that "a certainty is emerging: the future demand for natural gas can only be satisfied with significant price increases, the condition sine qua non for the development of international trade in that energy source. And farther on it notes that "the period of cheap abundant gas thus seems to be really over." We can multiply the precise examples in which it is much more a question of a revaluation of gas so it will occupy a larger place in the world economy. In our opinion the publication of this report also occurs on the heels of two major facts:

1. An interim agreement has just been concluded by SONATRACH and the British company, British Gas Corporation, concerning the price of liquefied natural gas. This agreement, which deals with a nine-month period, confirms that the Algerian position on the gradual alignment of the price of gas with that of oil is well founded. It has the advantage of somewhat unjamming an especially delicate situation. Unless the American negotiator hardly appreciates this agreement, thinking it strengthens the Algerian positions?
2. The conclusions of the National People's Assembly on the subject of the El Paso-SONATRACH contract are unequivocal. "The terms of exchange being degraded and the context having profoundly changed, the 1969 contract was outmoded from 1973 on. All the elements of assessment...confirm a real loss linked to the realization of the LNG exploitation operations purchased by the American company, El Paso, which, through an excess of cupidity, sacrificed cooperation with the intention of plundering our country's riches." The finding given in fact can only strengthen the Algerian position in its present moves to revalue the price of gas.

What then is one to think of such an attitude? Is this not at the very least a confused step and one that attempts to falsify the reality?

This is hardly anything new, the temptation to get the Algerian position withdrawn on that level is great. Because, rightly, the battle being waged by Algeria for better prices for raw materials lies within a dynamic perspective of struggle for the advent of a new international economic order.

If today someone uses confusion and falsification in broad daylight, it is because the gradual application of the parity principle is taking shape. All the rest is merely rear-guard combat, well known because of the Algerian people's rich tradition of fighting to reaffirm its sovereignty over its natural resources, especially hydrocarbons.

8946

CSO: 4400

STORM DAMAGE TO PORT FACILITIES REPORTED

Damage in Oran

Algiers LL MOUDJAHID in French 30 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Y.O.A.: "Oran: a Real Disaster"]

[Text] Oran (from our bureau): Unusually violent gusts of wind literally wrecked the port of Oran last Sunday. The wind, attaining speeds as high as 80 km an hour inside the harbor and 130 outside, caused significant material damage.

It was around 1800 when the storm threats started becoming clear; they were confirmed an hour later and did not cease until 0400. At 1900 the drama quickly took on catastrophic proportions after the break in the jetty which let go in the face of the fury of the waves and wind. The harbor was without protection after the breaks occurred in the Dakar and Hamburg piers. From that time on, patrolling was infernal for the two ONP [National Ports Office] tugs; it would go on like that for eight hours.

At 2000 came the first appeal to the coastal stations to help by sending large tugs. At 2000 the crew of the Algerian ship, the "Cherchell," disembarked; one of the tugs had previously signaled trouble with the engines. A half-hour later the "Finetracker" (Danish) began to list heavily. It would sink at 2100. The "Siviglia" (Italian), the "Constantinos" (Greek), the "Bastabales," the "Cherchell" were to meet the same fate. Their crews were rescued by civil defense elements, who distinguished themselves heroically during the rescue operations. The example should also be cited of the young Algerian captain of the "Tebessa," who by his courage made it possible to prevent the worst by managing to contain and rescue three vessels, even though his own had a ripped-open hull. Other damage occurred on several vessels.

Port structures and special installations suffered great damage. The SONAMA [National Freight Handling Company] warehouses were flooded and a great many products were totally lost. The pier that provided protection for the docks and wharves was 40-percent damaged. It is 475 meters long. In places it gave way entirely. Twelve of the port's 17 wharves are also seriously damaged.

The road for moving cranes, three of which are unusable, suffered serious damage, 2 launches and 4 dinghies are unusable, as well as a SONATRAM (National Maritime Transport Company) platform ("Mouna"), 2 floating cranes and the barge "Algeria" (sand).

The fishing harbor and fishing ground will not be usable for a long time. The fishing fleet was virtually decimated; several trawlers and a great many small craft were swallowed up by the water.

In the opinion of those in charge of the port, never in the past has a similar calamity caused so much damage. Reference is made here to the violent winds that blew in Oran during the winter of 1967, and their force was only equal to 50 percent of last Sunday's winds, which reached force 12 around 1915.

The port's officers are currently busy stabilizing the vessels and checking in order to prepare an exhaustive report on the damage.

We point out that before the agony took on the magnitude of a disaster they were able to release three ships, the "Dimitra," carrying 5,000 tons of fuel, the "Saint Marcel" with 16,500 tons of wheat and the "West Bay" with 1,852 cubic meters of timber.

Oran, Other Ports

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 30 Dec 80 p 3

[Text] The bad atmospheric conditions that prevailed in the last few hours over the Oranian ports have caused very significant damage at Oran, Arzew and Beni-Saf.

At Oran: 4 vessels sunk, including the "Cherchell," 4 vessels seriously damaged, including the "Oued Souf," the "Tehessa" and a grain tanker. Several training vessels and mooring boats sunk, 20 fishing trawlers sunk.

At Beni-Saf: 90 percent of this port's fishing fleet was seriously damaged, and the most recent report from the [words illegible] services shows 22 fishing boats sunk.

This heavy toll, which has seriously affected this sector, was caused by the swell that was created in the harbor, breaking the moorings of a freighter chartered by the CNAN [Algerian National Shipping Company] to transport cement in coastal waters.

This port's jetty was also seriously damaged (APS).

At Arzew: a Uruguayan tanker, the "Juan de Lavaleja," loaded with 77,640 cubic meters of condensate, ran aground at 1300 on the El Djedid jetty west of the port of Arzew, 30 minutes after it broke loose from its moorings.

According to a security engineer, 10 to 15 cubic meters of condensate from the two damaged tanks on the tanker are flowing into the sea every hour. The crew, who are still on the ship, have cleared the engine room, which is being invaded by water.

Another oil tanker, the "Capitain Marcos" of Greek nationality, which suffered a fire off the port of Annaba before being evacuated at Arzew, where its cargo had been pumped 15 days ago, also broke loose from its moorings last night.

The "Capitain Marcos," which had been berthed at Berth No 6, went aground in the new harbor, but is presenting no danger of pollution.

In the old harbor a large oil pipeline broke, causing the beginning of pollution. Stopping the pumping put an end to the danger of the pollution becoming extensive.

Among other damages, the Arzew harbor master's office points out damage caused by breakwaters and cracks in the small-craft harbor. According to a security engineer in the harbor master's office, protective measures taken on Sunday at 1400 will make it possible to limit the damage.

At Ghazaouet: 4 trawlers sunk.

On the other hand, the infrastructure of the port of Oran suffered enormous damage. Forty percent of one jetty was damaged and several piers gave way.

The storm's violence tore away cranes and swept away much of the merchandise that was in the harbor.

Salah Goudjhi, a member of the Central Committee and Transportation minister, accompanied by the governor of Oran and the director of the National Navy and several highly-placed officers of the ministries of Transportation and Public Works, went immediately to the sites to evaluate the magnitude of the damage and make the necessary provisions to meet this critical situation.

The preventive provisions were made at the ports of Algiers and the eastern part of the country.

8946

CSO: 4400

INCREASED PRODUCTION FORESEEN FOR PRIVATE SECTOR

Tehran TEHRAN TIMES in English 28 Jan 81 p 2

[Editorial]

[Excerpt]

THE FINANCIAL DAILY BOURSE in its leading article Monday commented on the lifting of the economic sanctions after the release of the American hostages: "Following the occupation of the former United States embassy in Tehran and taking hostage of a number of the embassy staff who were accused of being involved in espionage activities, the United States, its European allies as well as Japan imposed economic sanctions on Iran. The lifting of the sanctions, will eliminate the major problem of the factories, which was the shortage of raw materials experienced by the factories after the economic sanctions.

Now that sanctions are lifted factories and production units will be able to get the necessary raw materials and thus operate at full production capacity. In other words now the Iranian industries will be able to expand their activities and as the importance of this factor becomes clear once we realize that the only way to achieve the goal of self-sufficiency is the establishment of strong and well managed production system. A high level of production will cut our country's dependence on foreign countries and consequently all harmful ties of dependence will be eliminated.

"Unfortunately, at present a great deal of industrial goods must be purchased from abroad as well as foodstuff and agricultural items and this means that we depend on foreign countries and if we do not plan to expand our production, such dependence will increase further in future and this will pose severe threats to our country.

At present when the country depends on imports even for animal feed as well as agricultural items such as rice and wheat, it must be admitted that a proper production policy is missing and furthermore, it is not known what effects the nationalization of foreign trade will have on the establishment of a sound production system.

The private sector is waiting clarification on the limits of its scope of activities and elimination of the existing ambiguities. Once such ambiguities are eliminated the private sector will be encouraged to increase its activities and play an effective role in production. It is not right to expect the government to carry all the responsibilities. The people and the private sector should take on a part of the responsibilities and help the government to solve the problems".

The article concluded by saying that one of the framework of the activities of the private sector is well defined, grounds will be prepared for an increase in production and thus a decrease in country's dependence on foreign imports.

CONSTRUCTION, DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS MULTIPLY

Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL in English 21, 27-29, 31 Jan, 2 Feb 81 p 4

[21 Jan 81]

[Text] Activities of the Construction Jihad in Nahavand

HAMEDAN, Jan. 20 (Pars) — The Construction Jihad of Nahavand today announced its development projects during the current year; construction of 12 public baths, construction of 12 schools, vaccination of 64 thousand animals, supply of drinking water for 28 villages, cultivation of 1,600 hectares of land, distribution of one thousand tons of fertilizer, entrustment of 2,800 hectares of land to mostazaf people and construction of libraries in 150 villages.

[27 Jan 81]

[Text] Roads Constructed in Western Regions

YASOOJ, Jan. 25 (Pars) — The supervisor of the Roads and Transportation Department of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad (a western province) in a contact with Pars announced, "65 projects for constructing 1,300 kilometers of rural and side roads with a budget of rials 681,467,000 are under construction by this department in several districts of the province.

So far, 13 out of the 65 projects have been accomplished and put into operation and the other are under construction.

In addition, plans are being studied to build 29 bridges with a budget of rials 163,408,000 in the province, 11 of which have been completed and put into operation.

Schools Built in Jahrom

TEHRAN, Jan. 26 (Pars) — The Education Department of Jahrom (southern Iran) announced that 50 schools have been constructed in Jahrom and nearby villages since the victory of the Islamic Revolution. 24 schools are also nearing completion.

[28 Jan 81]

[Text] Roads Constructed in Kermanshahan

KERMANSHAH, Jan. 26 (Pars) — The Director of Roads and Transportation Department of Kermanshahan Province (western Iran) in a contact with a Pars correspondent announced that 148 kilometers of rural roads have been constructed in various parts of the province at the cost of rials 160,000,000 (\$2,200,000).

Activities of Construction Jihad in Brujen

ISFAHAN, Jan. 26 (Pars) — The Construction Jihad of Brujen (central Iran) announced the activities of this organization carried out in the past nine months as follows. The construction of four, six meter long bridges and fifty-seven, one meter long bridges; the construction of 6 public baths, 8 fourclassroom schools, and 5 mosques and the laying of pipes in 14 villages.

[29 Jan 81]

[Text] Road Constructing Activities in Central State of Arak

ARAK, Jan. 27 (Pars) — A reporter of Pars News Agency quoting the spokesman of General Public Office of Road and Transportation Department in Central Province (Tehran) reported that 180 kms. of rural roads have been constructed and are put into operation in the current year.

Operating 34 kms. of tributary roads, maintenance and principal repairs of 556 kms. of roads and its hot black-topping, 447 kms. of cold blacktopping, 417 kms. of sand-covering, 74 kms. of dirt road, surveying 430 kms. of rural road are the other activities of G.R. and T.D. This report states that at present 150 kms. of road are under construction around Khomoin, Arak and Tafresh. Also, 540 kms. rural roads are under construction in different parts of the mentioned state.

Torbat-e Heydarieh Construction--Jihad Development Activities

TORBAT-E HEYDARIEH, Jan. 27 (Pars) — Torbat-e Heydarieh Construction Jihad in a report in relation to its development activities in rural areas of this city announced the following achievements:

1. Construction of 20 public baths.
2. Reconstruction and repair of 4 primary schools.
3. Reconstructing and mending public baths for ten villages.
4. Building of 19 units of kerosene selling centers.
5. Construction and repair of 43 kms. of rural road.
6. Carrying out 21 water supply and 9 power plans to rural areas.
7. Formation of 120 village councils and 20 libraries. Also for the time being this Revolutionary Foundation is constructing a 35-kilometer road.

[31 Jan 81]

[Text] Developmental Activities in Central Province

ARAK, Jan. 28 (Pars) — The Governor-General of the Central Province announced the activities carried out in the province as follows:

1) So far, over 100,000 of the war-stricken sisters and brothers have been sheltered in this province.

2) A total sum of rials 1,000 million has been allocated to reconstruct 3,000 houses which were damaged (mostly in villages nearby Qom) in the recent earthquake. These reconstruction efforts are now under way. Another rials 20 million has been supplied to the Construction Jihad of Qom in this connection.

3) A large dam is under construction in Qom with a budget of 3 to 4 billion rials.

4) 3,000 factories are presently functioning in Arak Province, 270 of which are basic industries for which a credit of some 5 billion rials has been allocated to increase their production.

[2 Feb 81]

[Text] Development Activities in Broujen

BROUJEN, Feb. 1. (Pars) — The Imam's office for Development in Broujen announced that 140 million rials has been used for the construction of 2 mosques, 6 schools, 6 public baths, 7 slaughterhouses, construction of 40 kilometers of rural roads, 12 bridge arches and renovation of numerous streets, the budget was provided out of the allocated one day's oil revenue for Broujen.

Construction Activities in Najafabad

ISFAHAN, Jan. 31 (Pars) — The municipality of Najafabad announced its development activities since the victory of the Islamic Revolution as follows:

Pavement of 360 thousand square meters of roads, construction of 28 kilometers of roads, construction of reservoirs for water storage, terminals, cement warehouse and two slaughterhouses, 11 kilometers of pipes supplying drinking water and the purchase of machinery for construction purposes.

Utilization of 24 Development Projects in E. Azarbaijan

TABRIZ, Feb. 1 (Pars) — The work on the construction of 24 development projects, including the formation of cultural houses, rural roads, supply of drinking water, has been completed by the Agricultural Department of East Azarbaijan.

CSO: 4920

MINIMAL 16 PERCENT GROWTH RATE PROJECTED

Beirut THE ARAB WORLD WEEKLY in English 31 Jan 81 pp 15, 16

[Text] Iraq regards economic problems arising from its war with Iran as relatively minor and is aiming for an annual growth rate of at least 16% over the next five years, a senior Iraqi official has said.

Sabri al-Sa'adi, head of the economic planning commission, told newsmen last Tuesday that the Gulf war had created no acute financial difficulties and that officials of the planning ministry had been instructed to work on that assumption.

But he declined to discuss oil production. Before the war hit output this country was the world's second largest crude exporter behind Saudi Arabia.

Iraq, proclaiming business as usual despite the four-month-old conflict, has announced that it is increasing foreign imports this year by 26% to 18.4 billion dollars. It said its 1981 investment program was scheduled to rise by 29 per cent to a record (22.8 billion dollars).

Sa'adi said Iraq's 1981-85 five-year plan was now completed and had been presented to the political leadership for approval. He declined to give details of the plan, but said it aimed for a higher rate of growth than was set out in 1976-80 version.

The 1976-80 plan foresaw an average growth rate of 16.6 per cent annually in gross national product. Announcing budget figures earlier this month, first Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan said 1981 was the first year in a five year investment program that "will make Iraq leap forward from a developing country to an advanced one."

Ramadan, a leading member of the ruling Revolutionary Command Council said that during 1981 Iraq would give priority to repairing what had been destroyed in the Gulf war.

The new plan would concentrate on making the agricultural sector more efficient and developing heavy industries, Sa'adi said, adding: "We have passed the stage where we must concentrate on light industries. Now we are getting into heavy industry, by which I mean petrochemicals and steel plants."

He said Iraq was hoping to establish a car industry and a special commission had been set up to examine the idea. Since the start of the Gulf war in September, Iraq has been playing down the economic impact of the conflict.

CONSORTIUM WINS \$1.5 BILLION TIGRIS DAM CONTRACT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 2 Feb 81 pp 2,3

[Text]

A consortium of West German and Italian companies has won a \$1.5 billion contract to build a 3.6-kilometer dam on the river Tigris, near Mosul in northern Iraq. The project, which is to be started immediately, will provide irrigation and hydro-electric power to northern Iraq when completed in five years' time, consortium leader Hochtief A G, announced last week.

Hochtief is reported to be negotiating with the West German government to get state-backed export guarantees, following the easing of the ban on these guarantees after the start of the Iran-Iraq war last September (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, January 19). Other members of the consortium led by Hochtief are the West German companies Zueblin A G and Trapp A G, and the Italian firms Impriglio, Italstrade and Cofegar.

The dam, projected to be one of the largest in the Middle East, will include an artificial lake with a capacity of 11.3 billion cubic metres of water. Hydro-power generated by the project is expected to add 1,040 Megawatts to Iraq's present total electricity generating capacity of about 4,000 Megawatts. Irrigation water provided by the dam will supply some 250,000 hectares of agricultural land.

Commenting on the project, Iraq's First Deputy

Prime Minister Taha Yassin Ramadan said last week that a big boost to agricultural development was expected to result from the construction of the dam. Mr Ramadan went so far as to say that the project would "save Iraq from a future food crisis that will face the world in the next few years."

Iraq's agricultural investments and forecast production for the coming years have not yet been revealed, even though preliminary figures for some sectors have been published (*An-Nahar Arab Report & MEMO*, January 26). In the last five year plan (1976-80), investment in the agricultural sector was projected to represent 18.7 per cent of total investments of ID 13.63 billion (\$46.15 billion), while the rate of growth of agriculture production was estimated to reach an annual average of 7.1 per cent.

Estimated to form 5 per cent of GDP, agriculture still remains one of the weaker points of the Iraqi economy, as it is still unable to provide for the total food needs of the population. A major objective of the Iraqi government is to restore self-sufficiency in food to a country which was once not only self-reliant but also a major provider of grain to the rest of the Near East.

CSO: 4820

ANALYSIS OF SECRETARY HAIG'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ISRAEL

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Dec 80 p 13

[Article by Gideon Samet: "Haig's Secret"]

[Text] The members of the new American Cabinet lack only togas and laurels in order to be seen as a Roman elite. They are mostly silver-haired, wealthy patricians who speak virtually without moving their facial muscles. They include a military man with sharp, squared facial lines, who has returned to the corridors of power from commendable service overseas. The picture is marred only by the Hollywood past of the emperor.

Israeli observers have been studying it this week with perplexity. On paper, it is a personal composition which is bad for Israel. Heads of companies with "big business" interests who have never shown us kindness; one of the Wall Street leaders; lawyers from the upper level of American corporations; several recommended by the conservative wing of the party. These are people who are all virtually unknown to the Israeli leadership, both the present one and the incoming one. They are people who for the most part have never required the political give and take, in which Israel has succeeded at times in injecting its influence.

Only in the case of Alexander Haig was it possible to obtain in Israel the interviews which are known as the type with "I knew him 5 years ago when . . ." The newspapers and television have tried with great difficulty to see him as a latent friend of Israel. They have reported that he is "good for the Jews." A more vigorous search has revealed that he even has a Jewish friend.

Jerusalem has reacted to these findings with the sensitivity of a remote province. The signs of the "Israeli Connection" have appeared to it to be endangered. The Israeli Embassy has requested that overly optimistic descriptions of Mr Haig's attitude toward Israel not be encouraged. My efforts not to respond to the manifestations of this political neurosis and to find where Alexander Haig's Israeli secret is actually hidden were in vain.

It is true that when he was in Washington as Kissinger's assistant, he developed good relations with Ambassador Yitzhaq Rabin. At the time when Mr Haig fervently recommended the unfortunate bombings of North Vietnam and the invasion of Cambodia, he was able to find a man after his own heart in the one who had recommended the deep-penetration attacks in Egypt. In the Yom Kippur War, he, already the head of the White House team, stood at the center of the air shuttle project. As an excel-

lent implementer, he translated into action, with precision and without complaint, all the decisions of the President to whom he referred from time to time as "my supreme commander." Motta Gur can certainly contribute to this chapter with "friends tell about Haig."

Others tell about that period itself, October 1973--a chapter which Mr Haig today is trying to forget--how at the order of the President he removed the special prosecutor who was investigating the Watergate affair, after the latter refused to limit the scope of his investigation. The then attorney general, Elliot Richardson, refused to fire the prosecutor and resigned himself. Mr Haig invited the deputy attorney general and told him that he must heed the instructions of the President: "Your supreme commander is giving you an order."

Vaulting Ambition

With the continuing hope to discover the warm corner of his heart toward Israel, that which they are now trying to moderate until further notice, I also read the text of Mr Haig's talk at his only appearance in years, perhaps ever, before a Jewish audience. A week after he returned from 4 years of service in Europe, in the middle of last year, he began a campaign to explore the possibility of his obtaining the Republican presidential nomination. Only a person of "vaulting ambition," as Shakespeare said about Macbeth, could have entertained at all such an aspiration--a kind of integration of a contradictory Eisenhower image and the action of a returning Roman general--without any political and public backing. The dream quickly dissolved, however not before Mr Haig took the traditional route, including the Jewish group.

The essence of his talk at the convention of the Zionist Organization of America in October of that year is enlightening. It contained weak cliches about Israel's importance as a strong democracy in the region. As an orderly military man, he organized the topics into questions, the first of which was: "Is Israel a strategic burden on America's national interests and worthy of support only for moral reasons?" "No," said the general. "It is moral to support the right of the Jewish people to its own homeland. It is good and important that Israel is a living democracy, which shares our political values in a world which is hostile to democracy."

When he explained that the United States committed itself "in 1975 and repeated it in 1979" not to recognize the PLO and not to negotiate with it as long as it advocates positions "which are not in consonance with the peace process," Mr Haig added that a few of the American diplomats who assume that the maintenance of contact requires official recognition are making a mistake. "Communication is not the problem between the United States and the PLO."

"He advances by vagueness," wrote THE NEW YORK TIMES about him this week in a lead article. Haig and "vague" rhyme in English. "He is a high risk choice," added the newspaper. "He is a wellknown and well-stained figure in the Washington arena," the WASHINGTON POST, the hero of Watergate, bitingly commented. "A man with more ambition than talent."

A profile which was published after the appointment mentioned what he said on one of the White House tapes on 4 June 1973 when he advised the President to evade

questions directed to him and to say that "you simply cannot remember." It also mentioned how he was involved in the wiretapping of telephones of senior officials and reporters in order to block the wave of leaks which were uncomfortable for Kissinger and Nixon in 1969.

Even one who does not believe that it is desirable to keep removing the dust from the events of those traumatic days will find it difficult to avoid the uncomfortable feeling toward this stubborn, skillful, and cunning personality. Therefore, it is somewhat hasty to try to determine at such an early stage if Mr Alexander Haig, who served four presidents (he first entered an administration as an assistant of Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance in 1964) will be good for us or not. He arouses doubt and suspicion among many people. They see him as an undemocratic Machiavellian in his basic attitude, a man who with all his talents and achievements sees everything around him in terms of a game of power. He is a personality who will do everything for his superiors--the number of whom has dwindled with the years--in order to advance his aspiration to reach the top.

Therefore, among others, I expressed doubt this week if Mr Haig has an "Israeli secret" which has justified the attempt to conceal him for a certain time because of an evil eye. It is almost certain that in the next secretary of state, the Reagan administration will get a "net profit," as it will materialize beginning next month. Whoever expects anything more than this from Mr Haig, support on the Israeli issue in any opposition to that which is agreed to by the Cabinet hierarchy, on the contrary, should try to obtain this through his Jewish friend.

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CSO: 4805

REAGAN CABINET APPOINTEES, ADVISERS ANALYZED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Dec 80 p 9

[Article by Gideon Samet: "Reagan's Circles"]

[Text] From the Californian group which worries somewhat the President's friends, including the owner of a drug store chain, a founder of the Diners Club Company, and an automobile dealer, has once again recently come the saying that "America must be managed like General Motors." The timing of this paraphrase was especially unfortunate when all the automobile companies are deep in debt. However, the composition of the new Cabinet, most of whom were presented last week-end, indicates that some of it has materialized.

Most of the appointees are businessmen and lawyers. Most of them are conservative managers who led their companies to prosperity. They do not include anyone from the academic community although virtually all of them are graduates of elite universities. It is a group of "Wasps" without Kissingers or Brzezinskis. If anyone is inclined to think that the new secretary of defense is a Jew, his first name should indicate to him his mistake. Caspar Weinberger, one of the senior directors of Bechtel, a company which employs 30,000 people and is called a "state within a state," leaves no room for doubts. His official biographies always include his Episcopal smile.

The group is harmonious, at least at first glance. It will be interesting to see as time passes how authoritarian directors who are used to having the last word work together within the framework of a bureaucracy which requires concessions and political compromises. What needs no proof is the fact that the hierarchy of the administration lacks experience and pretension in international affairs. The only one who has an international background beyond the signing of fat contracts for multinational companies is Alexander Haig, whose appointment as secretary of state will almost certainly be announced in the coming days.

This deficiency is not irreparable. The administration hierarchy will rely on a broad group of experts who are now involved in the preparation of working papers in the areas of foreign affairs and defense and from whom will be selected many senior officials for the State Department and the Pentagon. However, the significance of this is that this administration will approach global issues without being headed by strong-minded people with past experience, whose contribution will go beyond a more or less successful translation of the generalities of the Reagan camp.

The Indispensable Deputy

This human color is not accidental. The group which surrounds Mr Reagan vigorously expelled from its midst every remnant of the "northeastern" intellectual establishment of which Dr Kissinger was the clearest embodiment. If the retired General Haig gets the position, it will be largely because of his renown as one who carries out the orders of the "supreme commander," as he described Nixon in the days in 1974 when he was left virtually alone to deal with the dirty wash of the sinking leader. Kissinger on his part described his assistant in the National Security Council as the "indispensable deputy." This characteristic helped in 1973, when the Pentagon requested his return from the White House and jumped him over 240 officers senior to him to the position of deputy chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Afterwards it paved his way back to the ruins of the White House as the President's chief of staff (replacing Bob Haldeman) to a chapter in his career which is now taking revenge on him.

He was the one who recommended to Nixon not to destroy the tape recordings, and perhaps with this he sealed the fate of the President. It was he who helped convince President Ford to pardon his predecessor, another action which has recently been brought up from the past. Those with a good memory will also not forget (even though, surprisingly enough, the story was not repeated in the communications media on the current occasion) that when he served as commander of the NATO forces in 1975, he was forced to return several tens of dollars to the national treasury because he transported bottles of liquor to Europe under the guise of glass, and he transported his dog after him in a NATO aircraft in Germany. These are unimportant trivial matters--less important, for example, than his role in the secret taping of administration officials and reporters on the orders of Nixon or his role in the decision on the secret bombings in Cambodia. These details are now again coming up in the gossip factory of Washington since Haig is likely to be, together with the secretary of defense, a key political personality in the administration which is focusing its attention primarily on the economy.

Mr Weinberger, like Haig, is an excellent implementer. "He is more Catholic than the Pope," they said about him when he rolled up his sleeves in 1968 to cut the California budget as the financial adviser of Governor Reagan. He earned the nickname "Cap the Knife," another reflection of his ability as an unhesitating implementer, in his position as budget director in the Nixon administration. He served in his position so convincingly that Nixon soon appointed him to be Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare in order to carry out what was later described as the elimination of the "Great Society," the social program of Lyndon Johnson.

The Academic Cadre

Even these characterizations are far from depicting the image of the hierarchy of the new administration. One can add that it is less conservative than the dark forecasts of recent months, and it is not superfluous to note that it comes largely from the east while Reagan's Kitchen Cabinet remains at home. However, the main elements that will characterize the future Reagan administration are found in broader circles. There can be found those from whom hundreds will be selected to fill key positions which will soon be vacated and tens of those who will fill key positions in the Department of State and Defense. There also is the academic cadre which has not yet found its expression in the appointments lists but which has now been assisting in the complex transition project. It is also that group which will continue to provide the administration with its views and working papers.

Among these can be mentioned the heads of the Institute for Strategic Studies of Georgetown University, Dr David Abshire and Robert Neumann (former ambassador to Afghanistan and Jordan) who are heading the transition teams in intelligence matters and foreign affairs; William Van Cleave of the University of Southern California and a former senior official in the Pentagon, who is directing the team in the Department of Defense; Professor Jeane Kirkpatrick (the only one who has been mentioned at this time as a possibility for the position of UN ambassador) who is disseminating her views among a large group of future decision makers. Along with her is a broad group of various lecturers and advisers such as the former sharp-tongued Israeli Edward Luttwak, one of the heads of the Pentagon team, some of whom are more central figures while others are in the category of "kibitzers" who are spread throughout the broad network of the transition apparatus.

There are the theoretical ideologues--Milton Friedman, Harvard Professor of Administration James Wilson, and the economist Miles Paul McCoury. Somewhere in the background are people such as Norman Podhoretz, the editor of COMMENTARY whose book "Present Danger" is the main text of the thinkers in the conservative camp on global issues. There is William Buckley, the editor of the NATIONAL REVIEW.

In addition to the one of Georgetown, there are several other research institutes; the Hoover Institution in California and the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, and above them all hovers the spirit of the guru of neo-conservatism, Irving Kristol.

Without knowing the views, writings, and proposals of the persons in these circles, one can ascribe virtually no significance to the series of appointments which have been announced in recent days. Around Mr Reagan is being rebuilt, perhaps for the first time since the Kennedy days, a complete foundation. It would be a mistake to refer to it only in the terms and phrases which the President-elect provides. It is this foundation which in the course of time will give them content or, in the event of its failure, will show them to be an empty vessel.

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CSO: 4805

COMMENTS ON MEMBERS OF SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 14 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Gideon Samet: "Jewish Senator — Chairman of Subcommittee on Middle East']

[Text] A Jewish senator, a survivor of the Holocaust, was appointed this weekend as the chairman of the Subcommittee on Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Rudy Boschwitz of Minnesota is an outstanding supporter of Israel, and the appointment is another example of the fact that the cries of dismay over the composition of the new Senate were exaggerated.

Senator Boschwitz who was born in Berlin was first elected to the Senate 2 years ago. Like the other committee chairmen, he is also a Republican. Other "comfortable" members of the Foreign Relations Committee are Christopher David of Connecticut and Alan Cranston of California, both Democrats, Majority Leader Howard Baker of Tennessee and Charles Mathias of Maryland (who will head the Subcommittee on International Economic Affairs).

Among the questionable members are Chairman Charles Percy and Jesse Helms of North Carolina, one of the heads of the extreme conservative camp in the Republican Party. In accordance with a request from two senior senators, the FBI will begin an investigation to discover who leaked the telegrams which contained reports to the American State Department on things which Mr Percy said in Moscow in favor of a Palestinian State.

There were newspaper reports of the suspicion that the person who is responsible for the leak is the aide of Senator Helms, John Carbo, one of the leaders of a conservative youth group in the party, called the Madison Group. Carbo is a member of the American transition team in the State Department, and there are those who connect his name also with the leaking of information which weakened the status of the American ambassadors in San Salvador and Nicaragua. It was stated in these leaks that the ambassadors who are considered moderates and opponents of rightist groups in those countries are candidates for replacement.

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DOUBTS ABOUT U.S. POSTURE, ATTITUDE IN PERSIAN GULF

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 11 Dec 80 p 5

[Article: "Doubt About the Capability and Readiness of the United States to Defend the Interests of the West"]

[Text] The protection of the oil supply from the Persian Gulf and the United States' intervention in the region were topics of a seminar which was conducted yesterday by Tel Aviv University on the campus in Ramat Aviv.

A Persian-born American expert, Ruhollah Ramizani, described the attitudes in the countries of the region. In his repeated visits he found doubts both in the willingness and in the ability of the United States to conduct a strong policy in defense of the interests of the West. Mr Moshe Beitán, the director-general of the Paz Company, cast doubt on the West's readiness to work with solidarity for the restraint of OPEC and the halting of the increases in the price of oil.

Another American participant, Prof Theodore Moran of Georgetown University in Washington, expressed the concern that the Reagan administration would concentrate more on nuclear arms and would not dedicate the necessary resources to meet the expected tests in the Persian Gulf, both those initiated by the Soviets and those initiated by revolutionaries or local "strongmen." Mr Nimrod Novick, a researcher at the Institute for Strategic Studies, analyzed the configuration of the political forces which will influence Reagan's policy in the region.

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CSO: 4805

POLL SHOWS PERES, DAYAN MOST POPULAR KNESSET MEMBERS

TA061450 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 3

[Mina Tzemah public opinion poll: "Peres, Dayan, Begin and Rabin--The Outstanding Knesset Personalities"]

[Excerpt] Knesset member Moshe Dayan is more popular with the public than Prime Minister Menahem Begin and is only slightly behind Labor Party Chairman Mk Shim'on Peres.

According to a public opinion poll conducted by Dr Mina Tzemah, the director of Dahaf Research Institute, in the eyes of the public the 15 most prominent Knesset members are as follows:

1. Shim'on Peres (42.9 percent); 2. Moshe Dayan (37.3 percent); 3. Menahem Begin (31.4 percent); 4. Yitzhaq Rabin (29.7 percent); 5. Yiga'el Hurvitz (24.6 percent); 6. Ge'ula Kohen (24 percent); 7. 'Ezer Weizman (23.7 percent); 8. David Levi (19 percent); 9. Ari'el Sharon (18.2 percent); 10. Zvulun Hammer (17.6 percent); 11. Yosef Burg (16.1 percent); 12. Aharon Abu-Hatzera (14.4 percent); 13. Yosi Sarid (13.4 percent); 14. Shulamit Aloni (13.1 percent); 15. Moshe Shahal (12.7 percent).

These findings show a special achievement for three Knesset members who have never served as ministers in the Alignment or the Likud governments, but managed to arrive at the top among the outstanding politicians. The three are: Ge'ula Kohen, Yosi Sarid and Moshe Shahal.

The poll was conducted in late January and was based on the responses of 1255 people constituting a representative sample of the Jewish population in Israel (with the exception of kibbutzim). The following are the remaining Knesset members that were mentioned in the poll. (Those that received less than 3 percent have not been listed):

Abba Eban (10.5 percent); Ehud Olmert (8.8 percent); Charlie Biton (8.3 percent); Yitzhaq Shamir (8.0 percent); Yehuda Ben-Me'ir (7.7 percent); Hayim Bar-lev (6.4 percent); Yoram Aridor (before he was appointed finance minister) (5.9 percent); Simha Ehrlich (5.1 percent); Gid'on Pat (5.0 percent); Amnon Rubinstein (4.9 percent); Shlomo Lorincz (4.7 percent); Pesah Grupper (4.6 percent); Hayim Corfu (4.6 percent); Shmu'el Tamir (4.4 percent); Se'adya Marciano (3.7 percent); Uri Avneri (3.4 percent); Moshe Shamir (3.4 percent); Gad Ya'aqobi (3.4 percent); Ora Namir (3.1 percent).

POLL ON CHANGES IN DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM

TA130942 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 13 Feb 81 p 1

["MONITIN" public opinion poll: "About Half of the Israeli Population Favors Change in the Democratic System"]

[Text] About half of the adult Jewish population in Israel believes that in order to overcome the problems the country is facing, the political system in Israel should be basically changed and a system with obvious authoritarian characteristics should be established. This is the striking finding of a special study, the results of which are published in the new issue of the MONITIN monthly.

The study was conducted by Eliyahu Hasin, on behalf of MONITIN, in cooperation with Dr Mina Tzemah, the director of the "Dahaf" Research Institute. The questions presented in it were selected by consulting with Prof Dan Horowitz of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. The poll upon which the study is based was conducted in late January and included 1255 respondents, who constitute a representative sample of the adult Jewish population in Israel, with the exclusion of kibbutz population.

The findings of the study show that within the accepted democratic framework, wide circles in the country entertain significantly undemocratic attitudes towards fundamental democratic values and institutions; this feeling is so strong that it leads to a willingness to basically change the democratic system.

The central question of the study was intended to determine the scope of support for voices calling, directly or indirectly, for replacing the existing democratic system with an authoritarian system of some sort. The question was formulated in an unambiguous, straightforward manner as follows: "There is a view that in order to overcome the difficult problems of the country the political regime in Israel should be fundamentally changed and a strong system should be established whose leaders would not be dependent on parties; do you agree with this view or not?" The distribution of the answers obtained to this question was as follows: 40.8 percent said this view is correct; 41.4 percent said this view is wrong; and 17.8 percent were either indifferent ("I have no opinion on this matter") or declined to answer the question.

Another question asked was: "Some people claim that the communications media (television, radio, press) are detrimental to the interests of the country, adversely affect the national morale and spread feelings of defeatism. Therefore

they should be restrained and their activity should be limited. What is your opinion about this argument?" It has emerged that 55.5 percent agree with the above statement, either partly or entirely, and only 32.9 percent reject it.

Other questions examined the attitude of the sample respondents toward other basic components of the democratic system, such as the Knesset, the political parties, the strata of Knesset members and political activists, the right to strike, and the like. The answers obtained did not fundamentally differ from the previously-mentioned attitudes. Some 14 percent of the respondents said they were willing to do without the Knesset or were willing to suspend its activity, 21 percent prefer an undemocratic government with whose attitudes they would agree. Some 30 percent said they were willing to do without the parties.

The results of the study indicate that people with anti-democratic opinions are not significantly concentrated in well-defined socio-demographic groups and the same is true, by definition, about the people with significantly democratic views. In all the groups studied, according to age, education level, country of origin, income level, and even by how they would vote, the proportion of the respondents with conflicting opinions only differed by several percent from the general average of the respondents. In other words, undemocratic attitudes are equally prevalent in all population groups.

On summing up the study its authors conclude that notwithstanding the obvious shortcomings of the study, stemming from its being the first of its kind and from the limited scope of the sample, its findings indicate that in Israel there is a feeling of "serious doubt about the ability of the democratic-parliamentary system to deal with Israel's difficult problems," and that "under the prevalent mood, a large portion of the public, consisting of all groups, has already crossed, or is about to cross the line delineating democracy."

CSO: 4805

ALIGNMENT ACCEPTING DAYAN PLAN

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 23 Dec 80 p 2

[Article by Yehoshua Bitzur: "Alignment To Support Dayan Proposal for Unilateral Autonomy"]

[Text] At a meeting of the Alignment faction yesterday, Knesset Member Shimon Peres succeeded in transferring, after many difficulties, his proposal to support the resolution of Knesset Member Moshe Dayan to implement autonomy in the territories unilaterally by abolishing the military government.

MK Moshe Dayan will introduce his resolution tomorrow in the Knesset as an agenda item.

The chairman of the Labor Party, MK Shimon Peres, who talked yesterday with MK Moshe Dayan in the Knesset cafeteria, offered to vote for Dayan's resolution despite the fact that the Alignment has not yet taken a position on the substance of the matter. MK Peres explained that the Alignment is not conducting the autonomy negotiations and thus it need not veto Mr Dayan's resolution. He even added that Egypt is expressing an interest in Dayan's resolution and they see in it an alternative to the labyrinth in which the autonomy talks have been thrust. In Peres' opinion the Alignment ought to keep this issue with all options open.

In the discussion which developed in the Alignment faction, Imri Ron, Ze'ev Katz, Avraham Katz-'Uz, Yosi Sarid, Meir 'Amit and Moshe Em'ar demanded a vote against Moshe Dayan's resolution. Shoshana Arbaly and al-Muzline and Abba Eban demanded a vote in favor of Dayan's resolution. Esther Herlitz, MK, suggested abstaining.

MK Shimon Peres thrust all the weight of his influence in favor of the vote for the Dayan resolution. Sixteen members of the faction supported Peres' position, 7 voted against it, and 9 abstained.

Now, the Coalition will have to mobilize all of its forces so that Prime Minister Menahem Begin can propose that the resolution of Moshe Dayan be deleted from the agenda. It is to be assumed that even the small opposition factions and those from SHINUY leftward will vote for the Dayan resolution. The leaders of the Coalition say that with the votes of two members of the TEHIYA faction, the required majority is assured for tabling the Dayan resolution. It is possible, also, that the HADASH faction will vote against the Dayan resolution, or will abstain, because it opposes the autonomy plan in principle and advocates the establishment of a Palestinian state.

DEMISE OF LIBERAL PARTY SEEN

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Dec 80 p 7

[Article by Daniel Bloch: "Post Mortem for the Liberals"]

[Text] The vote by Knesset members of the Liberal Party for the Agudat Yisrael amendment to the anatomy and pathology law seriously damaged what remains of this party's prestige among its traditional supporters. One of the veterans of the group, and a man who represented it for many years in the Knesset, Zalman Abramov, published a sharp attack in HA'ARETZ under the headline "Liberal Treachery."

Abramov is a part of the group of party veterans headed by former party president Dr Elimelech Rimalt who have in fact resigned from the party and have no intention of supporting it or the Likud further. One of the party veterans said a while ago that the name "liberals" is a fraud and ought to be changed to "conservatives."

These latest developments among the Liberals are very serious--Minister Modai's style of doing things, the statements of Minister Patt, the internal workings of the party--all of these are creating a very negative image for the party and many wonder that Deputy Prime Minister Simcha Ehrlich is able to reconcile himself to this state of affairs.

In the past the Liberals, as the heirs of the General Zionists, had an image of fairness. But even this image has dissolved. What is going on in the administrative council of the electric company, which is controlled by businessmen of Modai's faction, is far removed from the way in which a national public corporation is supposed to conduct itself. The system for appointments, not only for the party but for the factions as well, in corporations is subject to the control of Liberal ministers, has brought the national sector to a low level. The pressure in this area is particularly strong now. In advance of their fall from power, the Likud people are doing their utmost to fill every possible chair with their loyal supporters, before it is too late.

Against this background, the desire of Minister Modai to be free of some of his government duties in order to find time to devote himself to party matters is understandable. The majority that supports him is not at all solid. The atmosphere among Liberal businessmen is that one does not trust the other and they all stab each other in the back. In this situation, the Liberals are certain that in

the event of a "Likud consolidation," they would quickly be ground down and swallowed up without a trace within the Herut movement. Ezer Weizman's speed destroyed the Liberals' last hope of going into the elections as an independent list.

By the way, the Liberals are trying to claim in their defense that, in similar circumstances, the Labor party was also subservient to Agudat Yisrael. But there is no substance to this claim since, in the 25 years since Agudat Yisrael left the coalition in 1952 and until 1977, MAPAI and the Labor party refused to bow to their demands, as in the case of the drafting of women, autopsies and legal conversion. Today the Labor party is about to pledge that when it returns to power, it will abolish those religious laws that were accepted as a consequence of Agudat Yisrael extortion and the shameful submission of Liberals trying to hold onto their seats at any price.

Additional Factions in Likud

At Prime Minister Menahem Begin's behest, the heads of the Likud are making every effort to prevent the advancement of the date of elections. The feeling in Likud now is that early elections will work to the benefit of Ezer Weizman. In order to prevent the fall of the government, the heads of the Likud are prepared to accept the Democrats and the "Fraternity" faction as independent factions in the Likud so long as they do not try to do anything that would be likely to cause the fall of the government. Most recently the idea has also been raised of chaining the "Fraternity" faction to the coalition by entrusting the communications portfolio to MK Shlomo Eliahu.

Behind-the-Scenes Efforts by MAPAM

One of the heads of the Labor party said today that were it not for the existence of MAPAM as a part of the Alignment, it would have to be invented. For while the Labor party is busy struggling with itself, MAPAM has been conducting a quiet and effective information campaign on the really important matters--the campaign against the government. In the press it has been publishing reactions to political, social and economic matters. On Friday, for example, an announcement in simple language was published, without the condemnations and flamboyance of advertisers and graphic artists, with the following message: "The Government of Israel is the only government in the Western world in which a minister serves who has had an indictment for taking a bribe presented against him by the government's legal advisor." Under the signature: MAPAM. The following day MAPAM published an announcement, the message of which was that their struggle with the government and the Likud was one of ideology, a thinly veiled allusion to the struggle in the Labour party with which MAPAM was dissatisfied.

The majority of the members of MAPAM, both the leadership and the rank and file, who in the past strongly opposed Shimon Peres and even threatened to dismantle the Alignment if he should be chosen as candidate to head the party, changed their minds. In the last 4 years they have learned that he is closer to MAPAM than to the right and that he deals with them in a more friendly and cooperative manner than many of his predecessors. Even those in MAPAM who still attribute to Peres

the sins of Rafi, Ben Gurion and Dayan, have come to understand that an internal confrontation will imperil the real struggles. The hope in MAPAM now is that immediately after the convention the Labour party will unite for the external campaigns for the Histadrut and the Knesset.

Meanwhile there is no hiding MAPAM's satisfaction with the changes that have taken place in the Labour party's national platform, especially on the Palestinian question. MAPAM will certainly have reservations about certain paragraphs, but in general this is a platform that is much more acceptable to MAPAM than previous ones, one that she can live with.

There is satisfaction in MAPAM also at the attraction of new members, from groups which in the last elections had voted for Shelli and the DMC. Urban MAPAM members hope that the new people will also be represented in the list for the Knesset. The supposition is that among the new forces, Dr Gadi Yatziv will be worked into a realistic place on the list for the Knesset. Gad Yatziv today is responsible for information in MAPAM after joining this party more than 3 years ago and beginning his activity in the Jerusalem branch. Another new adherent, Yair Tzeven, who was among the heads of MAQUI in the period of Dr Sneh and afterwards was active in MOQED and SHELLI, has been mentioned as a candidate for membership in the central committee of the Histadrut. In the framework of the revolutions in MAPAM, for the first time in its history a city representative will be in the first place for MAPAM in the Alignment list for the Knesset--the General-Secretary Victor Shem-Tov.

On the Eve of the Labour Party Convention

The preparations for the Labour Party convention are in their final stages, and not just for the election contest. It seems that no great struggle is expected at the convention on the political question, but there will be more than a few debates on everything connected with party rules. A debate is expected on the rotation paragraph, and another on the way in which the party office is composed. The new proposal would give more weight to the branches and districts in the office, but it seems that this proposal would lead to an emptying of the office. Since government officers, members of the coordinating committee, the Zionist directorate and others, who would not be members of the office, would not take it seriously, the focuses of decision will be transferred to informal bodies of "our members" in the various bodies.

A difficult struggle is expected over the composition of the party's central committee. The fact that the election of the central committee is right before the elections will increase the pressures of the camps for an increase of their representation. Especially difficult will be the work of the organizing committee which is set to determine the central list of three of the members of the central committee. It has already been agreed that at the head of the committee will be MK Yehezkel Zakai of the Moshav movement. MK Micah Harish removed his candidacy for this position. It seems that most of the work will be done in a reduced organizing committee of eleven members, the presumed composition of which will be: Yehezkel Zakai, Micah Harish, Uzi Baram, Avraham Katz-Oz, Rina Dotan, Rafi Adari, the Tel Aviv district representative (apparently David Harnik), Haim Rimon, Danny Rosoleau, Uri Agami and Aharon Nehemias. The convention presidency chairman will be Moshe Baran.

The question which interests many people is what will happen the day after the convention. Will the polarization between the Peres and Rabin camps grow or will the camps gradually be dissolved and return to work in various circles in which personalities and activists can be absorbed without regard to their stance in this conflict? Various bodies are already at work now, under the surface, to remove the barriers immediately after the convention. It is already clear now that a settlements table will be set up in the party with the joint participation of the United Kibbutz Movement, with its institutions, and the Moshav movement. Perhaps this table will constitute a basis for the renewal of the Beth Berl circle in an expanded format that would include the settlements, the Jerusalem district, parts of the Haifa and other districts, activists in trade unions, Histadrut and the Workers' Society, together with a more varied representation of the original circle for communities, neighborhoods and development areas. This circle will operate to create a balance in the party vis-a-vis the "together" circle, with the Tel Aviv district and other municipal bodies at its center, in order to prevent the formation of a renewed "bloc" and the control by one circle over all power foci in the party.

The "together" circle itself, which arose in its day as an antithesis to the Beth Berl circle and as an organizational lever for the unreserved support of party chairman Shimon Peres, will certainly not sit idly by but will try to expand its grip and its makeup.

A third circle, the "for cooperation" circle, maintained a low profile last year but kept its stability and ties of friendship between most of its founders and activists. This circle, too, will surely play an important role after the convention. As soon as the camps are dismantled, the circles will flourish anew. After the conflict over leadership of the party and the composition of the central committee, struggles are expected over the lists for the Histadrut and the Knesset. It is to be hoped that the combatants will not neglect the primary campaign which is the replacement of the government.

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CSO: 4805

WEIZMAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE ANALYZED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Dan Edlist, guest correspondent]

[Text] Finally all of our schizophrenic political campaigns, which are incapable of deciding anything among themselves, have gotten together. Suddenly they speak in complete harmony, as one: they all agree that Ezer Weizman is not the right man. They all scoff that he has no chance, no program, no ideology, no power--and in general that he is not serious. So it is from Begin to Erlich, from Shem-Tov to Shostaq. It has been a long time since we have seen such ingenuous agreement as that which was heard from the heads of the political campaigns the day after Ezer's announcement. What the national, defense, moral and economic situation was unable to do--Ezer's announcement about his intention to set up a list did do.

When I see the seriousness that radiates from the faces of the majority of our politicians, I cannot but long for someone who will kick them in their backsides and awaken them from their warm foul muck to the cold thorny reality that this nation is confronted with. I do not mean, of course, a dictatorship of any kind whatever but rather to break up the existing party system which is like a millstone around the neck of the people of Israel. Yadin failed at this; maybe Ezer will succeed. And if he cannot do it all, maybe he will finally succeed in neutralizing the National Religious Party, which would be something.

I do not know if this is the "right" man: but when I look at the present choice, I really think that we could skip the question of rightness and go on to the relevant question for today: can he bring about an erosion in the votes that will bring us to the crossroads of national decision? In other words, is there any chance that we will give him the authorization to do so? I feel that nowadays the question of this prospect is the right question, because in times of anarchy, the scales will tip in the direction of the image of power that any candidate can create about himself and his program. Only afterwards will everyone have time to examine his personal capabilities, which, in any case, undergo both cosmetic overhaul and regular maintenance.

I really do not know if Ezer is the right person or not, and at times he does things which leave behind question marks and exclamation marks. But nowadays there are several points which make up for the rest.

First, there is in Weizman a dimension of steady personal development when he carries out a continuous course from the point at which he was rushing about the skies dropping bombs to the point where he knows more and more how to take into consideration the factors connected with that bomb. He has proven an awareness of the fact that dropping bombs has further implications, and that in order to hit the target it is not always a bomb that is needed. He does this all the while maintaining his ability to decide about whether to drop the bomb.

If this is not a yardstick of seriousness, I do not know what seriousness is. If being serious means crawling on your belly in the party corridors, and working only with your tongue--that is to say, whispering, licking and biting--and afterwards to reach the point at which you "control" the system which is not really controlled, then Michael Degel and Yig'al Hurvitz, Amos Hadar and Yoram 'Aridor are the Einsteins of Israeli politics. But if resigning from the Likud against the background of the need to implement the Camp David accords as they were signed, with a direct reference to a Palestinian entity and the initiation of autonomy on the entire West Bank as a signed obligation--if all this is not serious, then what is serious here? A pretense of signing and denying it afterwards? (Not denying, of course, but a different "interpretation" of the text when it all seems like the "fast-talking" of a recruit caught by his commander).

To get up in the Knesset and declare that Charlie Beaton is a legitimate representative of the depressed classes, and no less so than Misha Arens or Abba Eban--means that with clogs [sic] or without them, with the New Communists or without them--Ezer Weizman has, in fact, broken the hypocritical Ashkenazi patronage which covers up the true problem of the State of Israel. He has broken a social and political taboo whose time has come to be broken--if we want to live in Israel with internal and external peace.

I am only afraid that Ezer does not give himself a full report of his words and actions. The path that he is on is making him the central personality on the way to peace, and that will require cooperation from the third group--and it is difficult to know if he is up to that.

Of course, Dayan also exists as a "central personality." But Dayan of today is a man stunned by brutal meetings with bereaved parents, worn out by an endless journey of explanations and justifications, exhausted by praise and the lack of basic ability to function within the internal political system. It is true that in the marketplace there is still an active demand and nostalgic yearning for the magic of Dayan; it is also true that Dayan reads today's map correctly and knows how to make the jump from a former mentality to the now mentality--but this Dayan, who has tragically turned from the symbol of Israel against the whole world to the symbol of Israel submitting to reality against all those who have not yet been freed from the magic of the eyepatch--this Dayan is not capable today of leading the way.

I do not know what he is destined to do, because an old lion needs something warmer and more soothing than the bright prospect of a picturesque free trip ala Ezer. The very fact that he did not jump out of his skin after Zhurbin showed him all kinds of secret surveys should signal to Ezer--and to everyone--that a common

mentality and a vague half hint of identification are not enough. People want their candidate to prove a minimum ability for political manipulation. The bottom line is that in order to make a bold political step, you also need at least some manipulative ability--besides vision and native Hebrew; and if Ezer jumps and appoints Dayan to the head of the list, and the latter reacts with a gesture that sounds like the tinkling of ice cubes in a martini glass--then people are likely to claim (and rightly so) that this is not serious.

In short, lunches with Carter and with Dayan still do not lead to the secret services in the office of the prime minister.

Meanwhile, whether he succeeds or not, the very fact of Ezer's throwing down the gauntlet, the very fact of his challenge to the existing party system and the manner in which it was thought out and expressed--constitute an additional erosion in the wall of hawkish permanent features, and in the final analysis this is a point that will be reckoned to his account. Instead of a fanatic forcefulness Ezer demonstrates a new kind of dovish forcefulness.

In order that this shot of Ezer's not remain a kind of "draw" that will force him to run after the bullet with the target, I think that he must come up with several answers (and he needs to enunciate them now)--and of several sorts:

- A. Who is with him? It would be best if those who are with him were of front rank and at least ten.
- B. Are those who are with him, in agreement with his views on fundamental matters? It seems to me that the trauma of the Democrats for Change will not permit another illicit union of unnatural bedfellows.
- C. What are the popular vibes about his candidacy? But, please, no surveys! Be decent about it; go out and rent major halls in the three big cities and in some of the towns; go through them and gauge the popular reaction directly.
- D. It seems the Ezer elicits an identification reaction from non-parliamentary bodies such as "Peace Now."
- E. Be serious. Stop smiling optimistically when you speak about Israel. Cry. Like Geiula Cohen.

The author is a member of the "Hashomer Hatzair" kibbutz Ayn Shemer.

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CSO: 4805

WEIZMAN URGED TO ESTABLISH NEOCONSERVATIVE PARTY

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT 12 Dec 80 Weekend Supplement p 5

[Group urges neo-conservative platform and volunteers to serve as brain trust]

[Test] Ezer Weizman does not yet have a party and it is also not clear who will be his partners in the movement that he is about to establish. But there is already a "brain trust" of professors who have volunteered their services to him and have prepared a platform for him on their own initiative.

The initiator of the "brain trust" is professor Shlomo Aharonson, a lecturer in political science at the Hebrew University. Aharonson organized a group of about 15 professors and senior economic and administrative people who have been holding discussions for a year now to formulate a program for a reform of policy and economics in Israel.

The first contact between the group and Weizman was established immediately after his resignation from the government in July. About ten days ago the members of the group came to Weizman's house in Caesarea and presented him a memorandum suggesting the establishment of a new party and outlines for his positions on questions of policy and economy.

The group favors a policy which its members term "neo-conservative ala Reagan." The reference is to the formula which, according to the members of the group, led to Reagan's success in the U.S. elections. At this stage, the members of the group are not revealing their identity and only professor Aharonson speaks for it. The anonymity that the members of the group have decreed for themselves stems, according to Aharonson, from a desire "not to fall into one of the big traps that DMC fell into--not to support a man who has not yet decided to run and before they have come to an understanding with him on basic subjects."

The members of the group are of the opinion that a drastic cut is needed in Israel's defense budget and, at the same time, that it is necessary to delve more deeply into Israel's nuclear option. In the economic sphere, the members of the group believe that the welfare policy must be reduced and that the distribution of support payments and hard currency must be terminated. Real welfare, in their opinion, will be achieved through the integration of brains and brawn in Israel's sophisticated plants. The group members point to the example of France,

which achieved economic success after years of stagnation thanks to its release from the burden of Algeria and the liberalization of its economy.

The practical measures that the members of the group presented to Weizman include, first of all, the institution of emergency economic measures, and, somewhat later, the opening up of the economy to competition without favoritism through the granting of incentives to preferred objectives.

In a memorandum that was presented to Ezer it was stated that the new party, which they call the "centrist bloc," would be a new political creature "that would shake itself free of all the existing small parties and appeal to a wide public of uncommitted, especially to liberals and moderate Herut members in the Likud."

The centrist bloc would test itself at the ballot box, and only afterwards would it be able to consider contacts with the remnants of the liberals in the Likud and with small parties in order to expand its bargaining power with a view to establishing a coalition.

The members of the group left the impression that in the area of foreign policy they have no disagreements with Weizman, but in the social area Weizman wants to consider the entire proposal. The group does not claim for itself a position of power in the new party that would be established, but is modestly content to be a "brain trust" that is ready to help Weizman set up a party that would be a kind of Israeli version of the Republican Party in the U.S.

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CSO: 4805

PERES INTERVIEWED ON INTENDED POLICY

AU121831 Vienna ARBEITER-ZEITUNG in German 12 Feb 81 p 3

[Interview with Israel Labor Party Leader Shim'on Peres by Herbert Lackner on the Middle East policy expected to be adopted by a Labor Government--in Tel Aviv, no date given]

[Text] ARBEITER-ZEITUNG: On 30 June elections will be held, and unless public opinion polls are utterly wrong, the next Israeli prime minister will be Shim'on Peres. In Europe, great hopes are staked on this change in government, that it will help get the peace process going again in the Middle East. In the event of an election victory, how would your policy differ from that of Begin?

Peres: Well, first of all there will be a renewal of the dialogue between Israel and the United States, Europe and the Arab world. We will fully concentrate on this peace process. It is one thing to conclude peace treaties and quite a different thing to actually establish peace. I see three great dangers to the future of the Middle East: Soviet intervention threatening the independence and stability of many Arab countries, not just of Israel. Second, the danger of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of irresponsible governments. And, third, the dangers resulting from fanatic movements within the Islamic world.

These three dangers are actually threatening the Arab countries more than us, or at least not less than us. Thus, we believe that a favorable time has come for peace, because peace is a necessity--including for the Arab world, and not just for Israel. So we want to negotiate with the Arab countries, because a compromise is necessary for peace.

Now let me tell you concretely how a Labor government will continue the autonomy negotiations with Egypt: First, autonomy is to become effective in the Gaza Strip. Then we want to invite representatives of West Bank Palestinians to sit down and discuss with us the two problems that are at stake here: peace for Israel, and the solving of the Palestinian problem.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG: What will this initiative for talks with the Palestinians look like, in detail?

Peres: We are ready to tackle the problem in all kinds of different ways. For example, we are ready to negotiate first with the Jordanians about economic cooperation in the southern border region between our two countries, which would

apply to the entire region between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea. The economic activities in that area are closely connected with the strategic situation. Aqaba has become a highly important port; it is the most important supply port for Jordan and Iraq. A solid road has been built from Aqaba via Amman to Baghdad. And now a potash factory is being built there with Austria's aid.

We are ready to begin negotiations with the representatives of the Palestinians on the West Bank even if the Jordanians do not participate in the talks. And we are ready to talk with a joint negotiating committee of Jordanians and Palestinians. Thus we are approaching these negotiations very openmindedly.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG: It has always been a controversial issue who the representatives of the Palestinians on the West Bank are. With whom do you want to negotiate, actually?

Peres: They could either be the elected notables of the West Bank Palestinians, or there could be special elections. We should approach this question openmindedly, too. At first we should of course begin to negotiate with the already elected representatives. Later, perhaps, special elections should be held.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG: The joint declaration to the latest congress of the Socialist International, that was signed by you, Egyptian Foreign Minister Butrus Ghali, Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky, speaks of "confidence-building measures on the West Bank" that are to be taken. What, specifically, is your idea of such "confidence-building measures?"

Peres: I would not like to go into detail in this respect, but generally I could imagine that we would grant the locally elected Arab authorities more authority, that we would restrict the authority granted to the military administration to what is really necessary, and above all that we would pursue a different settlement policy.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG: It has been asserted that in the event of your winning the election you would return the densely populated Arab West Bank areas to Jordan but that you would continue to keep so-called "security bases." Is that correct?

Peres: We do not want to set up settlements in densely populated Arab areas, but naturally we must stay in security zones. But I would not start negotiations with the map. The start of such negotiations must be an agreement on peace. The basis of negotiations are the UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 that have been accepted both by Jordan and by us. And then both sides should approach the negotiations without preconditions, and should put their proposals on the table.

Thus I do not believe that one could draw lines on the map in advance--it is still too early for that.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG: In Begin's period of office Israel became increasingly isolated diplomatically in Europe. Austria has officially recognized the PLO as representative of the Palestinian people. 'Arafat has met with Kreisky, Brandt and Spanish Prime Minister Suarez. At the Venice EC Summit Conference in June last year Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, the right to self-determination

for the Palestinians, and the opening of negotiations between Israel and the PLO was demanded. Can a Peres government break through this isolation in Europe?

Peres: I believe that most people who have met with 'Arafat actually should be disappointed. 'Arafat promised them that he would change his declared position, and that has never happened. On the contrary. All that happened was further hardening of the PLO's position. It has returned to the most extreme position, calling for Israel's destruction. Thus all these meetings with 'Arafat were in vain.

However, I do believe that Europe can play a part. We cannot ignore Europe, and I can understand that the Europeans are interested in the developments in the Middle East. The Middle East is highly important for Europe because of its oil. But without stability in this region, there will not be any oil, and without Israel's participation there will be no stability.

To ignore Israel is equally as wrong as putting high stakes on 'Arafat. But, just as we cannot ignore Europe, we cannot ignore Jordan either. And Europe can win great merits by getting Israel and Jordan together to the conference table. If you take a look at the map, you will see four neighbor countries of Israel: Egypt, with which we have already made peace; Lebanon, where there are no territorial claims from either side; Syria, which because of various mistakes it made has been eliminated for the time being from the political play of forces in this region.

Syria's gravest mistake was undoubtedly its occupation of Lebanon and its close ties with the Soviet Union. The, al-Adad's power basis is rather small. Moreover, he has broken off relations with Iraq and Lebanon and even with Libya. And the latest development, the abduction of the Jordanian diplomat in Beirut, marks the low point in Jordanian-Syrian relations.

Our fourth neighbor, Jordan, is the country with which we have the longest border. Part of this border, between the Dead Sea and the Red Sea, is permanent. Jordan is also the legitimate partner for negotiations on the future of the West Bank, because all West Bank Arabs are Jordanian citizens, and also because most Jordanians are Palestinians.

Thus Jordan is the key to solving the Palestinian problem, and there can be no solution without Jordan. We are going to explain this situation to Europe, and I can well understand the PLO's nervousness: it has to realize that here an alternative to its own plans is being presented--a good alternative, in my opinion. The PLO's structure has been broken. And when the instrument is broken and the claim is exceedingly militant, the organization cannot be considered as a future partner that is to be taken seriously.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG: At the moment, the situation around Israel is more than tense. There is war between Iraq and Iran, tensions between Jordan and Syria are getting worse and worse, and there is still fighting in Lebanon. The Israel problem has almost moved into the background. On the other hand, Israel is now sitting in the middle of a powder keg....

Peres: The Middle East is at present in a state of complete disintegration. In addition to the conflicts you mentioned, there are the conflicts between North and South Yemen, between Libya and Chad, between Morocco and the Polisario. None of these conflicts has anything to do with Israel. And in none of these conflicts do the superpowers have much opportunity to exert influence. On the face of it, one could say that Israel could now gain time. But one should not seek opportunities to gain time but opportunities to make peace.

Many Arab leaders--contrary to their declarations--know that the Persian Gulf is more important than the Near East, that oil is more important than land, that their internal conflicts are more dangerous than the conflict with Israel. At the outset, one often makes declarations to make an impression, but later one often becomes a captive of one's own declarations. That is why we in the whole region should now talk reasonably with one another.

CSO: 4403

MILITARY GOVERNMENT ACTION ON WEST BANK STATE LAND

TA090903 Jerusalem POST in English 9 Feb 81 pp 1, 2

[Report by David Richardson: "New State Land Destined for Settlements on West Bank"]

[Text] The West Bank military government last week declared almost 15,000 dunam of land in the Nabulus area to be "state lands," part of which are intended for the expansion of the Jewish township of Ari'el.

On Thursday a military government officer from the Tularm district informed the mukhtars of the village of Salfit, southwest of Nabulus, that two large parcels of land in the area were state land, and instructed them to inform their villagers. People who claim title to the land have 21 days to register their objections.

Sources in the military government and those organizations involved in Jewish settlement in the territories said last night that the land in the Salfit area is destined for an industrial centre north of Ari'el.

Last week mukhtars in the town of Tubas were informed that 7,800 dunam in their area was also being declared as state land, but it is not clear what this is intended for. Settlement officials as well as some local sources said last night that it appeared that the land was intended for use by the army. A military official, however, thought that this tract was intended for a settlement called Tirza.

Settlement officials said, however, that the government has not yet decided whether to establish Tirza or not.

The lands affected were singled out several months ago as suitable for Jewish settlement by a special ministerial committee appointed to solve the acute land problems of six Jewish settlements in the West Bank.

Part of the restraint on their growth was the government decision, reinforced by the High Court of Justice's ruling in the Elon More case, not to expropriate private land for Jewish settlements.

The military government settlement officials and a senior Justice Ministry official, Pli'ah Albec, then began a detailed survey of land ownership in the area. Lands

where there is no record of ownership or where records are vague are considered "state lands" under the laws applicable in the area, and the military government as acting sovereign assumes title.

However, West Bankers claim that such state lands are by long established custom, recognized as pasture for the local villages and as areas where they can expand if necessary.

Since January the military government has allocated several thousand dunam of such state lands to Jewish settlements in the West Bank and has also published planning orders barring construction around all major roads in the area as well as around army camps and some settlements.

Settlers in Qiryat Arba' near Hebron and in the Gush Ezyon string of settlements south of Jerusalem have been encouraged to "realize ownership" of the land allocated to them by planting trees and erecting fences.

Yesterday the mukhtars of Salfit consulted with advocate Felicia Langer about the latest orders, and she intends challenging the orders in court.

Earlier in the day she filed a petition on behalf of two landowners from the village of Jib near Ramallah, who complained that about 40 dunams of their land has been seized, apparently for the planned settlement of Giv'at Ze'ev.

The two men complained that their land had been surveyed, and in one area settlers from a previously illegal settlement attempt have not removed a caravan and other building tools.

CSO: 4820

MODEL FOR JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS PROPOSED

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 19 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Qasim Zayd: "Don't Look Back"]

[Text] Many of us, Jews and Arabs, think that the system of Jewish-Arab relations has run aground. After the Arab Masses Convention initiative was banned by decree of the Defense Minister in accordance with emergency regulations, and after the proclamations of ministers Ariel Sharon and Gideon Patt, the country quivered and many were stupefied and dispirited. The question remains: Has an enormous gulf been created in the wake of what took place between the two peoples in the country which will be impossible to bridge and to prevent an additional upheaval that may change our lives to a hell?

As one for whom the Jewish-Arab system of relations stands at the top of the list of concerns and interests, I am hopeful that I can propose to the citizenry of the nation, Jews and Arabs alike, a new model. The point of departure by which I am guided is: We are destined to live together for always. Further, anyone who sees in extremism a way out of the entanglement into which Jewish-Arab relations have been cast, causes ill to his countrymen and not to the other side. The extremists on both sides, whether by intent or not, are in a mutual alliance. Whence flows, as well, the conclusion that the mentally stable of both sides must make common cause in order to prevent the tragedy that the extremists are apt to thrust upon us.

I am convinced that if we make an attempt to turn over a new page and forget the past, and to cease searching there for the culpable ones, because we are apt to find ourselves among them as well, and to face forward--then we shall be able to foster new norms.

I approached a number of Arab public figures and intellectuals who believe in co-existence as an elixir of life and sought from them an assessment of the situation and also to limn for us a new line of behavior that would constitute a new model for relations between the Jews and the Arabs in the State.

"Do Not Blame the Patient"

Violet Khoury, deputy to the head of the local council at Kfar Yassif, is deeply rooted in the development of the relations between the two peoples from

the behavior of the leaders who imprint their stamp upon the relations between us. I cannot see the relations between the two peoples over a period of 32 years were unhealthy and intolerable. But today the disease has begun to spread and to appear externally."

Khoury believes that it is easier today to find a solution than it was in the past, since: "After the disease has been diagnosed, it is easier to find the remedy." She is certain that "there is no disease for which a cure cannot be found. Even death in itself is a cure. The Jewish-Arab relations of today are an extension of the relations that existed at all times, and if at all times we found the proper remedy, so is it possible to do so today, despite the deterioration in relations, to find the redeeming remedy."

With respect to the Arab Masses Convention which had been scheduled for 6 December in Nazareth, Khoury says: "Had the initiative for the convention come from Jewish and Arab personages who seek peace and understanding, I would have been the first to give it my blessing, and I would have done everything within my power to achieve success for it. And yet, one cannot blame the patient (the Arab public--Q.Z.). The blame is with the physician, who is conducting experiments on the patient. And perhaps it is even possible to blame the medical specialists who did not rush to the aid of the patient. The enlightened Israeli public depends to an excessive degree upon its leadership and it is perhaps thereby making a mistake."

Party Framework as a Solution

"Um Abdallah (nickname of Violet Khoury) believes, that the socio-political structure of the State requires that all of us organize within a party framework. Withal, she does not exclude herself from the rule: "If you ask me, why, until now I have not been organized in a party framework? I will answer that I would have wanted to be a member of MAPAM whose positions are far better than the positions of the other parties in the country. And yet one might demand that MAPAM be more consistent. I would want to see a party at whose top interests lies the welfare of the homeland, which does not see the welfare of the Jewish citizen as a higher priority over the welfare of the Arab citizen. I admit that my being beyond the party framework deterred me from offering a sufficient contribution to healing the disease which is afflicting Jewish-Arab relations."

At the bottom line, "Um Abdallah sees MAPAM as a party to be reckoned with within a Jewish-Arab framework and its path able to improve the system of relations and to influence the flow of events. "If we can only assure a progressive framework which will enjoy a parliamentary majority, this will be a point of departure. Take, for example, Israeli-Egyptian relations. Who would have believed that a year-and-a-half after the visit of President Sadat to Jerusalem, Israelis would be able to visit Egypt without harm coming to them, if we consider that not all Egyptians support their president's initiative."

Mutual Fear

In 'Um Abdallah's view everything is mutual. The hostility, the fear and the distance between the two peoples are mutual. "I am not for a minute prepared to believe that the Jews are afraid of the Arabs any more than the Arabs are afraid of the Jews. And if you ask me to offer a new model for relations

between the Jews and the Arabs in the State, I will say to you that I have no proposal for the simple-minded among the people, who are comparable to a group of people in the midst of an ocean who cannot navigate their ship to a safe harbor. It is up to the captain to save the ship or to sink it.

"The fundamental solution to the totality of problems among us depends upon the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the advent of peace, the Israeli Arab will begin to see the flag of the State as his flag. With the establishment of peace it will perhaps be possible to change the Hatikvah anthem and the Israeli Arab will be able to sing a new anthem the same as the Jewish citizen. This does not mean that the Israeli Jew must forget Hatikvah. Were I a Jewess, I would even revere Hatikvah. Just as it is impossible to demand of the Jews to forget that they were persecuted, thus it is not possible to erase from the hearts of the Palestinians that they too have been persecuted. It is the duty and the mission of the Arabs of Israel, through understanding with the Jewish progressive forces, to aid the Palestinians to forget their suffering. If we do not do that, it is natural for the Palestinians to seek vengeance. This, to my mind, is a human attribute which will yield its place to forgiveness and to understanding when the causes for suffering have been eliminated.

Partners in Suffering

'Um Abdallah believes that the Jewish nation and the Palestinian nation are partners in suffering. "If the Jew has become a skeptic by reason of the suffering which overwhelmed him, so also the Palestinian. He began to suspect even good intentions. The degree of skepticism among Palestinians reached such a point that they began to suspect any initiative. Even if Begin were to say that he is prepared to meet with the leaders of the PLO, the Palestinians will suspect that this is a way of liquidating this organization. It seems to me that President Sadat gave us all a model and a sample of a strong personality, that can break skepticism. We should learn from the courage of President Sadat, who placed himself in danger and came to Jerusalem. I am convinced that President Sadat arrived at what he did arrive at not on the spur of the moment but after experience of many years."

Peace Is Made With Enemies

In 'Um Abdallah's opinion, the treatment must begin specifically with the extremists. "As a Arab woman, were I to meet Knesset Member Ge'ulah Cohen and Rabbi Kahane, I am sure that I could make friends of them. I would deal with their motivations for extremism and with the causes of their hostility toward Arabs, and would demonstrate to them in practice that I am no less loyal than they are to the State of Israel. I would say to them: Let us together look for the golden path. This is also the mission of the stable Jews whose obligation it is to bring closer to them the Arab extremists, and to attempt to determine the nature of their views and their motivations for hatred. From my daily life experience and from my contacts with Jewish citizens I would listen intently, particularly to the extremists among them. I would hear the extremists who are saying: We wish to drive the Arabs out of the country. I would oppose the balanced ones who are attempting to silent the extremists, and I would sit down with the latter and invite them to visit with me and attempt to determine what their burden is and what is distressing them. I would say to them: We must sow

together, build together, live together--not destroy together. After a round of discussions and mutual visits, the extremists would alter their view.

"I think it is Begin's duty to visit the Arabs and have coffee with them. It is his duty as a person who holds the scepter of power. If he does not do so, I propose this to the leaders of the Labor movement when they return to power.

"I am amazed at every Israeli Arab who adopts an ostrich policy and says: We want to replace the PLO. I believe that this justification is harmful. We were not asked who represented the Palestinian nation. After the Palestinian nation chose its leadership, it is the duty of every party in Israel who wishes to free the State from the atmosphere of hostility and enmity to meet with the representatives of the Palestinian organizations and to say to them: Come and let us free ourselves of the psychosis of blind hostility. In my view, a national hero will be the one who summons the courage to do this, not the one who attempts to ignore reality.

"It is a mistake to persist in saying that we are not prepared to set down with murderers. There is no person or group of persons who are murderers by nature. The murderer of today may become the national hero of tomorrow, since history proves that it is possible to forget and to wipe away hatred. If we do not make peace with those whom we consider to be murderers, with whom are we supposed to make peace? Isn't peace usually made with enemies--not with friends. History is full of examples of nations that were enemies and became friends. In sum, what does the Palestinian nation want? It wants us to recognize its right to self-determination. Just as this right was afforded the Jewish nation, so it should be given to the Palestinian nation. Only then will it be possible to arrive at mutual recognition between the two nations.

"This solution does not have the character of a myth, and it is known to all, any many are thinking about it. What we lack is an Israeli national hero who will put aside the hackneyed slogan "I am not prepared to sit with murderers."

"The Alignment is the Redeemer"

And while the national hero which 'Um Abdallah contemplates does not exist, what is she proposing for the Jews and the Arabs in the State?

"There are Arab personages who are losing sleep because of the current situation, but their hands are tied, since they have no assurances from any party in the country that they will be guaranteed living and maneuvering space. The vacuum which the Israeli parties have left among the Arab populace, including the Alignment, was filled by the RAKAH and the Arab extremists. I am sure that the Alignment can commit itself to extending full equality to the Arab citizens and also to propose a clear and enlightened policy toward the solution of the Palestinian problem." Khoury believes that there are Arab personages with vote getting power who, if only they were afforded freedom of action and maneuver, could contribute greatly to the solution of all of the problems besetting us. "If the Alignment were to be prepared to issue a proclamation of intent, I am convinced that there will be a group of Arab intellectuals who for its part could also give commitments in the name of the Arab citizenry.

The Alignment is obligated to establish contacts with dynamic Arab intellectuals, and to provide them with appropriate representation in all institutions of the State. I believe that the inclusion of 10 Arab candidates, for example, in the Alignment list for the Knesset, is worth all the verbiage and all the empty promises."

Who should begin to implement the plan proposed by 'Um Abdallah? "The Alignment should begin, because the Arabs of Israel have nothing to give. If the Alignment takes the Arab citizenry into account and redeems its promises, the citizenry will believe it and will go along with it."

'Um Abdallah does not have a specific, concrete proposal for soothing the spirits in the wake of what is passing over the system of Jewish-Arab relations. "We must not take any rash step whatever. We should begin at once with the consideration of a well formulated plan. The ball is, in my opinion, in the court of the Alignment, whose duty it is to propose a plan of substance. And if it does so, it must enter discussions with the stable Arab circles, of which there are many, and who will be prepared to implement this plan.

However, if the Alignment turns its back and disregards the dilemma in which we are immersed, I propose to the same Arab personages to swallow their tongues and decree silence upon themselves.

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ANALYSIS OF GUSH EMUNIM ACTIVITIES

Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 12 Dec 80 p 11

[Article by Aharon Meged: "The Gush Emunim Phenomenon"]

[Text] In "polite society" particularly in the society of intellectuals, Gush Emunim is a gross expression. It is untouchable by reason of loathing. If you are tripped up by your tongue and utter a word in their favor, Heaven forbid, you will encounter eyebrows raised in amazement ("What, you too?") or by a reflex of revulsion in a stiffening of the facial muscles at the mere sound of the name. Much more than by fascist, for example, which by now is a historical concept which no longer arouses passions; not to mention communist, which is a concept which arouses romantic associations. If your tongue tripped you up even more, and you express--may the Lord preserve us!--more than one sentence in their favor, you are relegating yourself to ostracism: Are you friend or foe? Yes, foe!

I must admit shamefacedly that with all of my rational opposition to the method of Gush Emunim, it is difficult for me to find in my heart (or to muster within myself) any animosity toward them. I mean animosity. That's a problem. I am aware that something is not quite in order with me, and I must do some soul searching.

Further, I can't find the courage to deride them, as many of my colleagues are doing. This is an easy target for arrows or derision, I know. But I think: maybe too easy. To deride their proclamations, yes. To mock them, no. But perhaps this is some sort of cursed legacy from the far-off days of the youth movement: Not to mock people who are performing with their bodies the good deed of settling the land even if their faith differs from yours. And faith itself is entitled to some measure of respect.

And so, I have already imposed upon myself the ultimate sentence: Yes, he is one of our foes!

Something, I know, is not right. (And the Fascists didn't believe? "And the Hitler Youth didn't believe? And the enemies of the blacks don't believe?")

Several days ago at a social gathering I was seated next to a young scientist from Jerusalem and the talk got around to the Gush Emunim. I expressed several doubts. He told me he knows two or three of them personally and can't tolerate

them. I asked what it is about them he can't tolerate. Said he: the blind fanaticism. I said, I can't tolerate blind fanaticism either, from whatever quarter, from this side or that. But not every one of them has been poured in the mold of Rabbi Levinger. I said that I know two or three of them personally, moderate people, very modest; and I hope I didn't say that in a tone of "some of my best friends...."

In my mailbox I receive--as many newspeople surely do--NEKUDAH, the newspaper of the settlements in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip. I read it with great interest, from beginning to end, an interest which is far more than the curiosity of "know your enemy." There is, in this newspaper of 24 pages which is edited with great talent, a vitality, a vigor, a pragmatic character and cerebral activity which is difficult to find these days in the papers of the Kibbutz Movement, and which is reminiscent of those publications of 30 and 40 years ago. One can find there, beyond the annoying--at times exceedingly annoying--political notes, reports and information on the cultivation of palm trees and vegetables in Vered Jericho, a contest on the designing of ornamental gardens in Har Gilah, on manufacturing enterprises and flower hothouses in Shavey Shomron, on methods of absorbing new families, on a shepherd in Yatir who is raising 300 ewes and 100 lambs and hopes to acquire a flock of 3,000 sheep; as well as on the planting of cabbage and cauliflower, onions and garlic, and the rotation of 3,000 dunams of field crops. One can read there about soccer competition between the team of Shavey Shomron and a team from the Arab village Nakurah. Also, the well-considered and moderate remarks of an Arab intellectual, who participated during the symposium on the topic "We and the Arabs at Rosh Tzurim."

In one of the editions I read an interesting and very original treatment of the Book of Jonah by David Nativ of Alon Shevut which dealt with the topic of "a person evading his mission," and which demonstrates--even graphically--how Jonah's meanderings fluctuated as an ellipse between "ascend" and "descend," a sort of descent for the need to ascend. An article worthy of being taught in schools.

The newspaper has theological-ideological discussions which are reminiscent--if we differentiate between the sanctified and the secular, of course--of the discussions in Hashomer Hatza'ir (Young Guard = a labor youth group) during its good days, including all of the dialectics. There, they were based on an interpretation of the writings of Plekhanov, Marx and Lenin. Here, they are based upon commentary of the Bible, the Talmud, and (the late chief rabbi) A. I. Cook. An example is the interesting discussions between Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, who argues that faith takes precedence over actions, that "we have built the body and neglected the spirit," that we must not "force the nation" into action and we must not rush the Redemption (all of these on the basis of a Talmudic midrash "Messiah the Son of Joseph [Jesus] and Messiah the Son of David" [the Redeemer, in Jewish tradition]) and between Rabbi Yisrael Ariel of Yamit, who argues that we must not be concerned with what our opponents, domestic or foreign, may say, that it is forbidden to slow down the process of Redemption, that no compromise will bring the distant closer to us and that the commandment for the settlement of the Eretz Yisrael is the alpha of the entire Bible. In this discussion several people took positions on one side or the other.

And, it turns out, that while we are writing articles in the newspapers and discussing and arguing and deriding and raging and protesting--already there have arisen 41 settlements in Judea and Samaria alone, kibbutzim and moshavim and community settlements containing some 20,000 souls; and, it turns also--to our even greater amazement--that despite our view, these are not "Crusader" holdings, to use a euphemism, of the Templars of the Total Eretz Yisrael Order, who guard their own homes on the Coastal Plain and in the city, but instead, little by little and at an increasing rate, these settlements are finding their livelihood locally, from manufacturing, from agriculture and educational enterprises, and their roots are spreading.

However, accomplishments and successes, as is known, are not proof of the righteousness of a way. And the way--which is my opinion, too--is surely strewn with hazards both for the political future of the State from the point of its relations with the Arabs, as well as for the soundness of its democratic regime. What's more, I am of the opinion that if a free hand is accorded the extremists in the Gush Emunim to do as they wish, it would bring a calamity on all of us.

Why, then, don't I "hate" them? There is here a specific contradiction requiring clarification.

For that reason, I read with much interest the book of Tzvi Ra'anan entitled "Gush Emunim" which appeared in the Workers' Library. This is a broad, deep and reasonable treatment of the topic. I emphasize "reasonable" because the author is a person from the Kibbutz Hatza'ir, member of MAPAM, whose attitude toward the issue would seem to be predisposed, and yet the book is written with respect for the opinions and the beliefs without rancor, and without derision, comments in detail and precision on the views of the Gush people, is far reaching in its fairness, to the extent that in its summary there are interviews--without comment--with four of them, as if to say: Let the reader judge for himself. When I read the book I thought, maybe it is not coincidence that a Hashomer Hatza'ir person is writing this way about the Gush Emunim. After all, there were times when the opponents of the Kibbutz Ha'artzi said about it (during its "Stalinist" period): These are good people whose acts are good, but their philosophy is perverted....

In one of the early chapters of the book dealing with the "image of the person" which took form in the process of the emergence of this movement, and which details in that image several sociological and public characterizations (among them: "sympathetic...photogenic on public media...") Tzvi Ra'anan asks whether this person excels in the characteristics of "inner truth" and "subjective candor," and he responds: "Intellectual honesty does not permit the ipso facto identification of an erroneous thought or of a mendacious belief with the person who carries it in his heart and in his soul.... There is no reason at all by which we are permitted to cast doubt upon the subjective honesty of the people of Gush Emunim." This is an important determination, as an opening for discussion. And yet, his conclusions on this topic are that the image of the Gush Emunim person is full of inner contradictions: practical purposefulness on the one hand, and mysticism on the other; realism with regard to practical politicians' machinations--contrast to detachment from political reality; a sense of a mission for the benefit of the nation--and an irresponsibility for its welfare; blind religious fanaticism--and an amiable approach in personal relations; the candor of

ingenuous faith--and "foxlike stratagems." It is difficult to deny these contradictions.

The most important section of the book is its theological-ideological part. Tzvi Ra'anan went to the sources, the Biblical, the Talmudic, and the more recent, from Maimonides up to the late Chief Rabbi A. I. Cook, and up to Rabbi Soloveitchik and others, in order to demonstrate that the Messianic concept of the Gush Emunim contradicts the traditional Messianic concept, both the "spirit of Judaism" in general, as well as its religious Zionist evolution. In his view the "Messianism" of this movement is popular and simplistic, parochial and historically narrow, nationalistic only and not universal, not utopian, with no intention of transforming the face of mankind and society, it is not conditioned upon religious and ethical penitence, and is restricted to a search for the welfare of the Jewish nation in its kingdom and in the territorial integrity of its country.

It is not possible to enter here into this serious controversy, but the attempt to contradict one religious concept by proof from within the religion itself--by a kind of comparison--on the part of an irreligious person, appears to be highly dubious. Judaism is so multifaceted that there is no concept within it for which you cannot find proofs--in Scriptural verse, or in homiletic interpretation of Scripture, or in the commentators--for any concept or its antithesis (for example, the matter of the "universality" or the "nationalism" of the Messianic idea and the vision of the millenium), and the sages who swim in the sea of the Talmud and its rabbinic authorities, who are expert in debate, do this far better. Ra'anan extended himself so much in his attempt to contradict the theory of Gush Emunim from within the Bible itself, that in several places it appeared to me that he is condoning the ahistorical and the anti-statehood concepts of Agudat Yisrael.

Similarly, the internal qualitative differences which Ra'anan points up between the old settlement and the settlement of Gush Emunim appear to be unconvincing. One of these differences he finds in that the Emunim settlements stand "in a total contradiction to the will of the countries of the world, opposed to the interests of the Great Powers, and lacking a Jewish national consensus." That is strange, coming from a settlement person! When ever did we consider, in the planning of settlement and its implementation, the will of the nations of the world, the interests of the Powers, and even a national consensus? Not only the Revisionists (as Ra'anan indeed notes), but even the "establishment Zionism" opposed a very great number of the settlements, whether for budgetary or for political reasons! And most of the act of settlement was accomplished in opposition to the "Great Power interests!"

Ra'anan speaks of a "narrow productive base" in the settlements, of the lack of a perspective, and of the absence of local sources of income. But those very things could have been said about many of the kibbutzim in their beginning, when they did not have sufficient land and when most of their members were in "outside labors!" Especially since today, the manufacturing components in the settlements is increasing and is no longer dependent on the land area (note the observation posts in the Galilee!).

Ra'anan points to the "absence of social principles or ethical values" in the Gush settlements, that most of them are "communal settlements" (in contrast to

what exists in the old settlement). That is his opinion. But Rabbi Eliezer Waldman, in the interview brought in the book, says otherwise. He sees the settlements which will "arouse all the good and the ethical idealism which is within us"! This issue still needs to be tested.

Much more convincing is the political perspective in his discussion, in which Ra'anana demonstrates how the path of Gush Emunim, which advocates the inalienable right of possession by the people of Israel over the total land of Israel by the force of the laws of the Bible. This denies the Arab national rights, and places the law of the Bible above the law of the State, and must inevitably lead to total isolation, to a dependence on military power, to extreme chauvinism, and to an undermining of the democratic bases of the State ("The issue of settlement stands outside of State authority," says Rabbi Yohanan Fried in an interview).

And with all that, they are worth listening to, without preconceptions, if for no other reason than that they are serious and deep (in contrast to the Revisionists, in contrast to the Fascists of various kinds). It is worth reading attentively the interviews with Rabbi Yohanan Fried and with Rabbi Eliezer Waldman (who speaks, among other things, against religious coercion as well). And they should not be taken lightly.

And it is well to remember that the Gush Emunim [Bloc of the Faithful] is not a single bloc, but there are in it various nuances of thought, some more extreme, some moderate, and that not all of them are "black forces," who are untouchable by reason of being loathesome.

It seems to me that I have said only little of what should be said on this issue.

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STATE FACING AUTONOMY DILEMMA

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 19 Dec 80 p 13

[Article by Poless: "No Escaping Camp David"]

[Text] The autonomy discussions could have reached a more advanced stage, were it not that the Egyptian side preferred, during the late summer months and the fall, to wait for the outcome of the elections to the presidency of the United States. The Egyptian leadership put its faith in a second term for Mr Jimmy Carter because it estimated that the Israeli side would be more compromising with an American president who would be free of the worry of reelection and would exert the full pressure of his influence on Israel.

This wager disappointed the wagers. Mr Ronald Reagan was elected in place of Mr Carter, and as far as is known to date it cannot be assumed that the new American administration will relate to Israel initially as a nuisance. Even if we discount something from the frequent proclamations of the Republican candidate and his aides, who stressed the importance of Israel as a security asset for the United States, and we attribute part of them to the need and the desire to move Jewish voters to deviate from their tradition and not vote for a democratic candidate, there is sufficient in what was said in the camp of the election victors to teach the Egyptians that official Washington in its new manifestation will take account of the wishes of Jerusalem out of good will, more than Mr Sol Linowitz was permitted to display.

This is not to say that our side bears none of the responsibility for the delays in the negotiations. Mr Linowitz, about whose honest desire to bring about a tripartite agreement which would not diminish Israeli interests there can be no doubt, recently expressed his regret that only during the last months of the negotiations did Israel enunciate things more clearly on the issue of the settlements, water and territory. "If such positions had been presented earlier, it is possible that it would have saved Israel a great deal of anguish, after it had given so much for peace" (YEDI'OT AHARONOT, 17 December).

We should add that those very concessions which Mr Linowitz indicated were denied by the interior minister as soon as they became known.

At the end of an extended recess, Egypt and Israel are at the same place where they were before. Cairo's hopes have been disappointed; and if anyone at the

extreme right of the spectrum of Israeli opinion toyed with the expectation that the American administration would shelve the Camp David agreements and attempt to develop a totally new approach to the Arab-Israeli problem, it would appear that this expectation will be disappointed as well. Mr Linowitz informed those with whom he spoke in Jerusalem that the president-elect is not proposing any changes whatsoever in the Camp David agreements, and that if any changes at all are to be introduced in the future, Israel and Egypt will have to agree upon them in advance.

This version can be interpreted as a hint that the new American leadership does not relate to the Camp David agreements with dogmatic devotion. But the precondition of agreement on the part of both the Mideast parties has been established as a limitation equivalent to the nullification of any qualitative change in the agreements.

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The Camp David agreements give Egypt the entire Sinai peninsula, "full" autonomy to the Arabs of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and a position in the negotiations on the "final status" of the occupied territories which is to begin no later than the third year after autonomy takes effect.

Likewise, Egypt achieved not an explicit agreement, but an unspoken acquiescence on the part of the United States through two letters from Anwar Sadat to President Carter, in which he details his demands with respect to East Jerusalem as an indivisible part of the West Bank, and of the position of Egypt as a representative of all Arabs in order to assure the implementation of autonomy. In the face of these attainments, it cannot be assumed that President Sadat or any Egyptian leader taking his place would agree to changes in the Camp David agreements.

For many Israelis it would be nice if a way could be found to skirt the responsibilities which the agreements place upon us, in particular on the issue of autonomy. But the agreements afford us an advantage as well which no one, surely, is prepared to waive. "All necessary steps will be taken, and means will be employed, in order to assure the security of Israel and its neighbors during the transition period and beyond." The most important achievement is embodied in the last two words; it is possible to interpret them as permission to leave the IDF forces on the West Bank and Gaza even after the 5-year transition period.

The alteration of any section at all of the Camp David agreements will certainly bring about an alteration of other sections. The agreements were accepted in toto and the smallest change is likely to collapse the entire edifice. The government which sees the central achievement in the Camp David agreements in that they leave in the hands of Israel the right to demand the exercise of its sovereignty over the occupied territories at the end of 5 years of autonomy, will have to consider carefully before demanding changes in the agreements. Any negotiation of that is apt to end with a disadvantage to our position.

Security Council Resolution 242 which appeared to us at first almost unacceptable, has in the course of years converted to an asset which even the LIKUD is not prepared to relinquish. We are battling in every capital of the world against attempts to modify it, either by a change of its content or by additions. Even the

LIKUD people have come to realize that resolution as the sole international document which concedes our right to secure and recognized borders.

Inasmuch as Egypt stands adamantly on the observance of the agreements as they exist, and Israel cannot hazard an initiative for change, it must be assumed that the new American leadership as well will attempt to act toward their full implementation, that is to say, to crack the hard nut of autonomy. It is well possible that it will not place this matter at the top of its ladder of priorities, but yet there must be no delusion in a prophecy that it will relate to it through an approach of "benign neglect."

The extended freeze in the autonomy talks as they were conducted by our side by a staff of ministers headed by Dr Yosef Burg, brought about the introduction of two ideas whose origin is in the criticism of the government's approach to these talks. Mr Moshe Dayan resigned from the government more than a year ago because of reservations with respect to this approach, and because of doubts whether it would be possible to achieve agreement with Egypt on autonomy.

Against this background, he has been proposing for a year that Israel implement autonomy unilaterally; and he judges that vigorous steps on the part of Israel, such as dismantling of the military government--while the Camp David agreements speak only of its "removal"--will motivate the Arab public figures in the occupied territories to take upon themselves the day-to-day dealings with the matters of the populace.

Mr Shimon Peres points up what he calls the Jordanian option.

While it appears that Mr Dayan does not believe that anything of substance will come forth from the negotiations with Egypt and the United States, and in any case he wishes to push Israel to undertake an independent initiative for the implementation of the Camp David agreements, one gets the impression that Mr Peres is requiring a continuation of the Israel-Egyptian-American negotiations, but wants Israel to demonstrate a readiness to shape the image of autonomy in a way that will make it easier for King Husayn to join the peace process. It will be difficult for the King of Jordan to do this, while Israel's conditions for the autonomy regime are such which are intended to prepare the ground for annexation after 5 years; while a readiness in principle for territorial concession toward a Jordanian-Palestinian state will make it easier for Husayn also to take part in the autonomy deliberations.

Clearly, the PLO opposes any process which is intended and capable of glorifying the dignity of the Hashemite ruler. But more important is the opposition of Anwar al-Sadat. The Egyptian leader is disregarding the Jordanian option of Mr Shimon Peres because he wants to insure, by means of an autonomy regime, influence for Egypt within the Jordanian kingdom as well in that the Palestinian entity (to the west of Jordan) will constitute a part of it within a federated framework. Sadat advocates the right of self-determination of the Palestinians; Husayn is obliged to respect it, especially since the decision of the Rabat Summit of 1974 is still in force.

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We do not know yet how the new American administration will relate to the ideas of Dayan and of Peres, but it must be assumed that it will take the Egyptian position into account. This does not mean that it will accept it as is; it is even thinkable that in Washington they will see a point in bringing Jordan closer to the autonomy talks, and a pro-Jordanian leaning was evident in a known remark of Mr Reagan during the election campaign. And if the American administration translates the remarks of the candidate to the language of presidential policy, it is possible that Egypt will find it proper to adapt to this line.

But all of this is still shrouded in murkiness. Irrespective of the decision in Washington, sooner or later we will be required—we and the Egyptians—to renew the autonomy talks. The Camp David agreements exist; it is possible to broaden their framework, but it is not possible to turn away from them.

Thus, there is no assurance that Messrs Sadat and Begin are prepared to continue the negotiations, even if there is still "much work" facing them, as Mr Sol Lino-witz announced before his departure from Jerusalem; both leaders are only affirming what was known in any case. There is no way except to approach the autonomy talks anew.

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ARAB PAPER REPORTS 'MA'ARIV' INTERVIEW WITH RAMALLAH GOVERNOR

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 11-17 Jan 81 pp 16, 15

[Interview with Shmuel Paneil, military governor of Ramallah, by Edna Pael, published in MA'ARIV 9 January; date and place not given]

[Text] AL-FAJR reprints below an unabridged translation of an interview with the Military Governor of Ramallah, Shmuel Paneil. The interview was conducted by Israeli journalist Edna Pael and was published in the Israeli paper MA'ARIV January 9. We think it offers a view of the occupation not seen in the Arab press. It was probably published in the Hebrew paper to show the "human side" of an Israeli officer--one who has come into much criticism of late for "irregularities" in the iron fist policy.

We are producing the interview in its entirety. It is a fascinating psychological study of an authority figure in the occupation force--any occupation force. It is also of obvious political interest especially for those familiar with recent events in the district for which the military governor is responsible.

"Ramallah," he complains, "is a hostile city." The most violent actions in the past year have been committed by Zionist extremists--who attempted to assassinate Ramallah's mayor Karim Khalaf in a car bomb--and by Israeli soldiers themselves who had orders to shoot at the legs of demonstrating high school students. While he does not want people to think of the occupation forces as "sadistic stormtroopers," he says he is quite willing to again call in the soldiers--with sticks--to break up a demonstration of schoolgirls.

He is also quite candid about the system of reward & punishment toward Palestinian municipalities to encourage docility and mute resistance. He describes the tactic of speeding development projects to "quiet" communities and forestalling aid to less cooperative areas.

The article as it appeared in MA'ARIV was entitled, 'The Other Side of the Barricade.' AL-FAJR thinks it is better dubbed...'Behind the Barbed Wire--A Fortress Mentality.'

"I would like people to know that the military government isn't a pile of sadistic stormtroopers."

[Question] Are you proud to be military governor?

[Answer] No, it's a job that was born because of the circumstances and must be filled. It is a hard and complicated job. In our nature we're not used to it... We were taught in the IDF (Israel Defence Force)--army to do other things. No one put us through a military governor school.

[Question] With the understanding that it is a necessary evil, what traits must a military governor have?

[Answer] First thing, he must know Arabic. And the customs of the place. He mustn't hate Arabs. He must know how to listen and mainly he must be a lover of mankind.

[Question] And you in your opinion have these traits?

[Answer] I hope so and I care, I care very much for my population.

[Question] How does that fit in with a military governor who levies curfew, conduct searches and orders soldiers to shoot at the legs of children?

[Answer] Here you are like everybody else. Do you think, I get up in the morning and say, 'Shoot these' and at 9 o'clock say, 'Arrest these.' It doesn't work that way.

First of all, you must understand that I don't decide on policy. I just carry it out. It's not simple to 'walk among raindrops.' I must worry about the current security situation and carry out government policy on the one hand, and worry about the population and represent it on the other. It has given me a rotten feeling more than once.

I have a demonstration of schoolboys and even schoolgirls--I have to disperse them. Here roads are blocked, here kids burn tires on roads or throw rocks. I must wipe it out. All that so that you and me and of course the local population will be able to move freely in the area.

[Question] Do you really have to put soldiers in front of kids?

[Answer] It definitely isn't a good feeling but I don't have anything else to put. In Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) soldiers are functional. Good or bad, whoever decided that the army holds the government, we have to carry out the orders.

It would be useful for you to know that in Ramallah the adults don't take risks. They send the kids to demonstrate, to throw rocks, to fly Palestinian flags, to close shops and paint slogans. It's easy to get kids to do those things. They're concentrated in schools. They have steering committees of students. They are ready.

The committees are given orders by outside forces whose aim it is to bring the army into confrontation against the kids. And that's how we look in your eyes and the eyes of the world. As if the army deals with and takes care only of children. When the situation worsens and there is danger to life, we have been forced to shoot. That definitely was an abnormal incident and without choice. I have standing orders as to when to open fire and they are very stringent.

I try to be as patient as possible with students. You saw that yourself when a delegation of parents of schoolgirls came and asked me to reopen the school I closed one month ago because it was so problematic. The parents say they want the girls to study. But I told them that I could open the school tomorrow but I know that the day after I will have to come there with soldiers and clubs to take care of those schoolgirls who start their disruptions again.

[Question] Why do you have to go with clubs against girls? Is there no other way? [as published]

[Answer] You say girls of 14 and 16 years old--that sounds very innocent--and that's misleading. I invite you to see, and to do that you should see from a distance, how 80, 100, 150, 200 nice girls like that stand and shower rocks from above. So what does it matter how old they are?

I want to open the school. I want them to study. I want my business in the school to be only social visits, to give if they need anything. If it's a net for volleyball, or football or basketball.

[Question] Yes, but why clubs?

[Answer] Because if young kids come into conflict with soldiers and a demonstration is violent, there is no other way but to use force. And that's how it's done the world over, not only in conquered territories. That's how it is done within the green line by our police to Jews, and you don't ask them that many questions.

(A group waiting to see the military governor is described by the interviewer as 'talking in the governor's favour.') It might be the way they speak, there are also flatterers among them. And I don't forget for one moment that in their eyes I am the governor.

Ramallah is a nationalist center. A hostile city. I don't believe that I have any true friends here. In Bethlehem where I served before the story is different. I had a good identification with the place and its problems, and to this very day people have remained in good contact with me. I have many friends there. They even offered that I get a Bethlehem identity card and run for mayor. (he laughs) At least they are sure I'll win.

[Question] Were there beatings during interrogations? We heard these complaints time and time again.

[Answer] It bothers me. The issue must be checked if there were beatings there, really. My orders are very specific. A student who is caught and put on the vehicle is my ward. No one is allowed to beat him.

[Question] Do you have problems restraining the soldiers?

[Answer] No, usually there is no need to restrain them. You should see the nerves of steel they have. Come and see how many insults they take, how many curses, how many derogatory songs. And many of them know Arabic and take it personally. I'm not talking only about the experience of a shower of stones that all of a sudden falls on them. Or a huge block that is thrown from the second storey onto the streets just as a soldier is passing by. It's easy to pass criticism, it's hard to live it.

[Question] The question shouldn't be put to you, whether what is gained is worth the price. Or the very fact that our soldiers are there. But did you ever consider what it does to them: to the soldiers?

[Answer] We take care to change them often. We don't want to get 'tenure.' With that kind of contact with the population, contact that is especially through dispersement of demonstrations, or searches--not for that are they educated in the IDF.

[Question] Are you satisfied with their behavior?

[Answer] Usually yes. Of course there are 'irregularities.' Like in other aspects of this nation, and of course I am very sorry about them.

[Question] You talked before about the job of governor as one who solves problems and helps citizens, and as the one who is responsible for current security, I assume you have ways of reward and punishment.

[Answer] Much reward I can't give. If there is a village in my area that is quiet, no disruptions, no blocking of roads, no throwing of stones, people working for their living--I encourage it.

[Question] For instance?

[Answer] If the village has agricultural problems, I push agricultural instructors quicker. I give them priorities in the budget, in development projects. Naturally I have more sympathy for those kind of people.

[Question] And the sanctions?

[Answer] Those are under my authority according to the general orders of the regional command. If a mayor causes problems, I slow down development projects, it makes his life a bit harder. And explain to him that he was mistaken--until he retracts.

[Question] Educational punishment? And I mean curfews, preventive arrests, expulsions, searches school closings, imposing heavy fines, etc.

[Answer] I don't call those sanctions. Those are things that are asked for by the very breaking of the law.

[Question] In roadblocks on the Ramallah Bir Zeit road (and I imagine that it happens on other roadblocks), people on their way to work are stopped for long hours. Sometimes students are taken off vehicles and left sitting for long periods of time sitting by the side of the road. And sometimes they are taken off public vehicles and told to carry on on foot. Why?

[Answer] The other side of the roadblock must be understood. It is there for security reasons. In intense searches, it takes time and people are delayed. You wouldn't imagine if we let a vehicle with a bomb go towards Jerusalem. With all of my sorrow I have to delay people.

[Question] I'm not disputing the necessity of the existence of the roadblocks. But the wrong behavior of our people there.

[Answer] The roadblock is briefed on how to behave towards people. If there are 'irregularities' that reach me, the soldier is tried and punished. Even sits in jail.

[Question] How do things reach your knowledge? Do the Arabs complain?

[Answer] The Arabs don't complain much. I assume that most of them are afraid... but there are those who are aware of our immense sensitivity to those kinds of incidents and they are not afraid to complain. For instance,--see Silwad.

[Question] In the Jalazoun refugee camp, after the kids threw rocks, you woke up all the inhabitants in the middle of the night, you took the men out of their houses, and sat them in the middle of the camp until the early morning--what is that? Collective punishment?

[Answer] That camp is very problematic and causes many problems, I admit that I don't like to take all the inhabitants and interrogate them at 2 or 3 o'clock at night, when I have a problem with four or five teenagers. But the system proves itself. Another case is that the residents themselves took the kids who threw the stones to the military governor themselves. You have to understand that most of the people are quiet and I believe then they only want to live, work, make their living and raise their kids quietly. They, like me, want to achieve quiet.

[Question] And you really think that's how you achieve quiet? Do things like that not strengthen feelings of bitterness, hate and pain?

[Answer] Maybe in your way of thinking, but the fact is that it works. It works so much that the inhabitants themselves organized 'civil defense' to guard that their kids wouldn't throw rocks. Seriously! They even came to ask me for

notes for the volunteers. The fact is that Jalazoun today is quiet. And when there were incidents in Ramallah, they didn't have any problems. People are starting to care. They are guarding the kids so that they won't cause problems. And there is quiet. It is good for me and good for them.

[Question] How do you cope with the confiscation of books in stores, raids on exhibitions, closures of art galleries, banning of plays, etc.?

[Answer] Again these are things that I don't like to do. I know that it is a bad bridge between me and the population. But what can I do? There is a law and I guard the law. And if the law doesn't allow distribution of this book or another I have to take it off the shelf.

[Question] In Ramallah I heard some locals call you a 'good governor' so I ask you, what does a good governor do when his conscience does not agree with the policy he is asked to implement?

[Answer] That is a problem. I do many things that I'm not 100 percent content with. But I have no choice. Even if it haunts me. I just do my best to operate in the least painful way. That helps me a bit. But even that I don't always succeed in doing. I definitely see myself in the eyes of the governed. Sometimes even in the way our parents looked on the British administrator. It causes me to be more gentle."

[Question] Ramallah isn't considered recently to be a city that is dealt with gently...

[Answer] That's from the publicity that you the newspaper people give the city. I'd like to invite the people to visit us more often, to see from close up and not to rely on what you report. But I've already surrendered to the fact that this job is thankless one.

[Question] Is this another military job that you fill on your way to advancement or does it have another meaning for you?

[Answer] To be a military governor was not one of my aspirations, I didn't dream about it when I was young. It's a certain job among others and also a national mission. The military government is the representative of the state of Israel in the eyes of the Arab population. I would with all the irony I see in it have to show them our positive side also.

[Question] Do you think you managed to do that?

[Answer] When I served in Bethlehem I did. In Ramallah, not yet...it takes time.

[Question] What do your friends say about your job?

[Answer] They do not envy me. There are those who even pity me...It's not good to be a conquerer...it's not good to be a governor.

[Question] What's your biggest failure to date in Ramallah?

[Answer] My biggest failure and my biggest sorrow is that I reached the point that soldiers shot at the legs of demonstrating students.

[Question] About successes, can you talk about it already?

[Answer] To lay a wider network in the Jalazoun refugee camp is for me a success. To open a maternity ward in a hospital, that's a success. To open a new school, to build a road, that's success. The things I build together with the population itself for its benefit--I am happy with that. When I finish my job I'll measure my success by how many villages are connected to the electrical network, etc.

[Question] What is your biggest dream?

[Answer] That we will reach collaboration and friendship between the two nations and a military government will not be needed, Enshallah.

CSO: 4820

'AL-FAJR' EDITORIAL COMPLAINS OF CENSORSHIP

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 4-10 Jan 81 p 8

[Editorial]

[Text] Last week the managing editor of AL-FAJR was called in by the military authorities and warned that all material for publication in the English edition must be subjected to the same vigorous censorship that is applicable to the Arabic daily AL-FAJR. Otherwise, the editor was warned, the license of the newspaper will be withdrawn.

The Arabic daily has been subjected to this censorship since it first began publication. Journalists and readers alike in the occupied territories have suffered from the frustration of not being able to have an unfettered press. The censors' scissors have excised what they term "offending" adjectives, "inappropriate" phrases, whole paragraphs and even, infrequently, entire articles--never of course giving any justification or accepting any appeal. Often the censors' actions appear arbitrary and meaningless. Other times his decisions distort the original text to convey a different message to the reader than what was originally intended. The censors' scissors spare nothing--from news articles to editorials, cartoons and even advertisements.

Despite odds, this newspaper will continue to serve and inform its readers, conscientiously and diligently. Unfortunately, where there is no freedom of the press, readers can never feel confident that they are being adequately informed and that the political statements published truly express the views and attitudes of their writers or those of the newspaper.

Freedom of the press is a basic guarantee of a free and democratic society. When a Jewish state limits such freedom to Jewish newspapers and Jewish individuals, the illusion of freedom of the press in Israel collapses. Its hands may be tied behind its back but AL-FAJR will keep publishing as much of the news as it can.

CSO: 4820

ORIENTAL JEWS CLAIM DISCRIMINATION IN FILMS, TEXTBOOKS

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 18-24 Jan 81 p 11

[Text]

During the last two weeks, a controversy between 'Sephardic' (of Afro-Asian descent) and 'Ashkenazi' (of European descent) Jews has occurred in the Israeli press. This latest outbreak of tension between the communities concerns a Zionist documentary film serial, "The Pillar of Fire," now being broadcast on Israeli television. The film reviews the history of the Zionist movement and its aim — settlement in Palestine and the establishment of a Jewish state.

A group called the "Movement for Zionism and Equality" petitioned the court with charges that the TV documentary disregards the contribution of Afro-Asian Jews to the Zionist cause. The group submitted the testimonies of two public figures at a hearing on the case, January 6.

Mordechai Ben Porat, former member of Knesset, resig-

nated his post in the broadcasting authority, in protest at what he considered to be inadequate handling of the case. Himself of Eastern origin, Ben Porat pointed out the importance of mentioning the contribution of the Sephardic Jews to the struggle for the 'Land of Israel' and the Zionist movement.

Yigal Losin, editor of the programme, has also reportedly admitted that 'Oriental Zionism' was not given adequate treatment in the film.

On January 7 the High Court rejected the charges levelled by the petitioners against "The Pillar of Fire." They had sought to ban the series.

Textbooks Also Unbalanced

Discrimination against and a general disregard for the problems of the Eastern Jews, like discrimination against Arabs inside Israel, is not on-

ly confined to TV programmes — school textbooks provide another medium for the spread of such ideas. On Friday January 9, several professors took part in a discussion broadcast on Israeli radio on the controversy surrounding the new documentary. Towards the end of the discussion, mainly dealing with the various trends within the early Zionist movement, a woman from Tel Aviv phoned in to say:

"I am an Oriental Jew. My sons at school learn nothing about Oriental Zionist immigration. There is no mention of the life of Sephardic Jews. There was a wave of immigration of Yemenites before 1948 and from other Arab countries after 1948. They have made a great contribution to the Zionist cause and state. I really feel oppressed and even shy in front of my sons. Our history is ignored."

IMPLICATIONS OF SETTLEMENT COURTS ANALYZED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 4-10 Jan 81 p 9

[Article by Raja Shehadeh: "Legal Analysis of 'Settlement Courts': Creeping Annexation Takes a Giant Step"]

[Text] The military commander of the West Bank has moved to establish municipal courts in the West Bank with a court of appeal in Jerusalem which will apply Israeli law to Jewish settlers. This is the latest significant step in a series of actions taken since the signing of the Camp David agreements to make the Jewish settlements in the West Bank separate autonomous units.

Reports such as that published in the *Jerusalem Post* (December 20) attempt to minimize the significance of the move by indicating that the purpose of these courts will be "to settle disputes arising between the settlers on such matters as sanitation, taxation and construction." A high-ranking member of the Defence Ministry who was queried on the matter offered the explanation that whereas the authority responsible for the settlers in the West Bank is the military government and the jurisdiction of the military courts does not extend beyond security matters, the settlers were

having difficulties settling their civil disputes. The military courts did not have jurisdiction over these issues, nor was the military government equipped to handle them. According to the Defence Ministry spokesman, it was necessary to establish civil courts to settle such civil disputes. This explanation, however, merely attempts to underplay the true significance of this new action.

Background

The importance of this measure extending Israeli law to settlers on the West Bank can only be appreciated when the background against which it comes is recalled. From time to time, the authorities have been announcing or recognizing the formation of Jewish regional and local councils in the occupied territories. In March 1979, for example, the military government announced the establishment of four new Jewish regional councils and one local council. It was declared then that the local authorities were designed to

function as autonomous units separate from the Arab autonomy scheme envisaged under the Camp David Accords. In May the establishment of the Hatah Binyamin Regional Council for the Jewish settlements from Ramallah to Latrun was declared. In June, of the same year the Military Commander and the Interior Ministry unveiled a new map of the Jordan Valley Regional territory that expands and links Jewish settlements in the valley into one territorially continuous strip.

At that time the settlers protested that they were still under the jurisdiction of the Military Command and demanded Israeli civilian administration of the regional councils.

A month later, a major portion of the Golan Heights was declared under Israeli civilian jurisdiction. The declaration united 24 agricultural settlements which comprised a major portion of the Heights into one re-

legal authority extended to the lands as well as the inhabitants of the territory. When the four regional councils were established in the West Bank earlier in March, it was announced that the Jewish settlements were expected "to continue to be subject to military administration for some years to come" — presumably as long as the question of sovereignty in the territories remains open.

The establishment in the West Bank of courts applying Israeli law is perhaps an indication that, to the Israeli government, this period is coming to an end.

Regional Councils

The declaration on March 1979, establishing the four regional councils, stated that the military government order establishing these councils was based on Jordanian law. However no Jordanian law for the establishment of regional councils exists. The law pertaining to villages and municipalities does not delegate to these local councils any significant legislative powers. The settlers have maintained that their courts will apply the by-laws passed by their regional councils but this claim is not consistent with the earlier announcement that these councils are established by a military order based on Jordanian law. Either the order establishing these councils is not based on Jordanian law, or the courts soon to be established will not be applying their own by-laws. One can only make conjectures based on pub-

lished reports as to what is the actual legal status of these settlements since the military orders establishing these regional councils are not available to the public.

Only two possibilities exist as to which law these courts will in fact be applying and the consequent status of these settlements. The first possibility is that laws will be passed by the regional councils in accordance with whatever legislative powers they have been granted. If this is in fact the case, it will mean that the settlements are gaining an autonomous status independent of the military authorities and linked in some way to the Israeli government. The statements made earlier by the settlers — that they consider themselves to be the proper administrators over the West Bank — gain added significance in this light.

The other possibility is that these courts will be applying Israeli law. If this is indeed the case, the only way that the establishment of these courts can be understood is that it is the final step towards actual annexation. The application of Israeli law over areas in which these regional and local councils have been established means that they fall under Israeli sovereignty.

Practical Implication

Whatever is the answer as to which law is going to be applied and the juridical consequences that ensue from this, the measure also raises many other practical

questions. Some earlier military orders that did not appear to be meaningful now seem to have been a preparation to this latest move. For example, the military order which establishes a special department for the execution of certain court judgements according to the discretion of the Military Commander.

The fact that regional councils extend over areas which include Arab-populated centres it becomes a very significant matter to know whether, when a

dispute arises between a Palestinian on the West Bank and a Jewish settler, the Arab civil court or the courts of the Jewish settlements will have jurisdiction. A court of law is linked to a whole system for the administration of a lawyers' association, court offices execution departments and so on. How are these to be managed by the settlers' courts and which executive body is to oversee the administration of these courts.

The answer to these questions is related to the same questions raised above. If the assumption is that these courts will be applying Israeli courts and that the Israeli government will treat the areas in which the councils are established as under its sovereignty, then no doubt it is going to be the Ministry of Justice in Israel which will be responsible for all these matters. If this is in fact the case it

will be another pointer toward de facto annexation.

Details With held

As in the past this new measure was first leaked to the press before the military order was issued. To minimize the impact, full explanation of the measure are withheld. When the issue ceases to be under the public gaze, the full details may perhaps be made public. But this will only be after the courts have been established and their existence has become a new fact of life for the inhabitants of the occupied territories.

The manner in which this new order was carried out follows suit with the way in which previous orders to encourage the Jewish settlements of the West Bank have in the past been made public. The slow crippling of the West Bank system of the courts and the negative image which Israeli authorities promote about the character of the West Bank courts and the Jordanian law, must also be viewed as another preparation by the military government of the West Bank to bring about the eventual control by the Jewish settlers of the administration of the West Bank.

Another brick is being laid in the careful structure the Israeli government is constructing for the annexation the West Bank.

CENSORSHIP OF ARAB PRESS DESCRIBED

Jerusalem AL-FAJR in English 11-17 Jan 81 p 16

[Article by Robert Friedman: "Political Censorship of the Arab Press"]

[Text]

Under an order published by the Israeli military government after the 1967 war, no Arab newspaper may be delivered to the occupied territories without a permit from the military government. Any article, picture or advertisement which is deemed to endanger security is censored.

Documents, on which this article is based support the claim that Arab press censorship is political, rather than military, and that this political censorship is kept secret in order to preserve the illusion that the Israeli authorities allow freedom of political expression in the occupied territories.

The documents show, for example, that on November 15, 1979 the Israeli military censored fifteen news items in *Al Fajr* about the arrest of Bassam Shaka'a, the Mayor of the West Bank town of Nablus. Thirteen of the censored articles dealt with local Palestinian reaction to Shaka'a's arrest. Two of the censored articles were about the international reaction. One item translated from Israeli

television simply announced that the Mayor of Hebron was calling a general municipal strike to protest against Shaka'a's deportation. The other fourteen articles were equally bland.

"Censorship such as this is designed to destroy our political solidarity and our sense of national consciousness," declared Mamoun al-Sayyed, *Al-Fajr's* 44-year-old editor. "We haven't any definite guidelines. We know that provocative, libellous and anti-security articles are strictly forbidden. But what is considered provocative? As far as the Israelis are concerned, it's anything that shows our displeasure with their rule. What am I to think when articles translated directly from the Hebrew press or taken from Israeli radio or television — even the official Arabic language broadcasts — are censored? I've come to the conclusion that there is no way to deal with censorship," he said angrily.

THIN LINE

Lt.-Col. Ami Gulska, the Israeli military spokesman in Jerusalem (his authority extends to the West Bank), admits that there is at times a thin line between military and political censorship. "You must understand that there is a very sensitive situation in the territories," Gulska said. "Sometimes you only need a match to make a big explosion. Censorship is necessary to prevent such explosions."

Even articles taken from the Israeli press can be very incendiary in his eyes. He admits, however, that censorship is sometimes arbitrary, though not, he says, as a matter of policy. But, he adds, "censorship is not mathematics. Different people sitting in the censor's office have different subjective attitudes. Some stories would pass one censor and not another. A man's mood, whether he slept well or had a fight with his wife, probably has something to do with it too."

The Israelis like to claim

they are running the most liberal occupation in history. They point with pride to the three Arabic papers published in East Jerusalem.

ARABIC PRESS

Of the three, *Al-Fajr* and *Al-Shaab* most clearly speak for the self-determination of the Palestinian people. As a result they are more heavily censored than *Al-Quds*, which is less nationalist in tone, proving the point that the thin line between political and military censorship carries over into the way the Arabic newspapers are censored.

Al-Fajr and *Al-Shaab* began publication in 1972. Unlike *Al-Quds*, both papers have been periodically shut down. In 1974 *Al-Fajr's* former editor, Yusuf Nasr, vanished on the way home from work. He was never found. In the same year the former editor of *Al-Shaab* Ali al-Khatib, was deported.

Both papers support the PLO, but are not allowed to say so. "We are allowed to write that we want an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, but when we write that the PLO is the sole representative of the Palestinians, this part is struck out," said al-Sayyed.

Al-Quds is East Jerusalem's largest newspaper with a circulation of around 15,000. Founded in 1966, it was closed after the Six Day War. It resumed publication in 1968, and for four years it was the only Arabic newspaper in East Jerusalem.

In the context of Palestinian politics, *Al-Quds* is by far

the most moderate newspaper. Although at first it opposed the Camp David peace accords, it cautiously endorsed them several months later. It is also the only Arab newspaper that is favourable to Jordan's King Hussein.

Al-Quds would not provide me with examples of censored material. According to Bassam Shoka and the editors of *Al-Fajr* and *Al-Shaab* as well as some Israeli leftists, this is because *Al-Quds* has much less to show. Critics of *Al-Quds* charge that the paper is being groomed by the Begin government for a post-autonomy role. Therefore, goes the argument, *Al-Quds* is allowed a wider range of editorial freedom, in the hope that it will keep its credibility with the Arabs while it tacitly supports Israeli policies.

Amnon Kapeliouk, an Israeli journalist for the Hebrew language daily, *Al Hamishmar*, who also writes from Jerusalem for *Le Monde* thinks that Israeli censorship of the Arab press is politically motivated, with *Al-Quds* coming out virtually unscathed by the censors' axe.

AWDA

"When I started to research the subject I was really astonished at what was censored," said Kapeliouk, who is a sabra, a former kibbutznik, and speaks and reads Arabic. He found that certain words were systematically censored. One, the Arabic word *Awda*, means return. It signifies the return of the Palestinian refugees to

their homeland and it is a word that terrifies many Israelis. General Y. Harkabi, former head of Israeli intelligence and now professor of political science at the Hebrew University, wrote in his massive study, "Arab Attitudes to Israel," that the word *awda* is synonymous with the destruction of the Jewish state and genocide.

Kapeliouk does not think the word threatens Israel's existence, but rather that it makes Israelis feel guilty.

Another Arabic word consistently censored is *sumud*, meaning steadfast. The word is used in the context of standing firm against the Israeli occupation and the proposed autonomy plan.

Kapeliouk also found numerous works of poetry and prose censored. When reminded that Moshe Dayan once said that one particular Palestinian poet was worth 10,000 fedayeen, he replied: "That's true. The Arab language is very rich and metaphorical. But I found simple love poems that were censored although they contained no reference to the national question. Perhaps our censors are anti-love. Probably the censor didn't understand the poem, so he cancelled it."

CATEGORIES OF CENSORSHIP

According to *Al-Fajr's* editor, Mamoun al-Sayyed, the Israelis have five categories of censorship.

Local news, he said, is the

most rigidly controlled. Forbidden topics include news about the local Palestinian reaction to the autonomy plan, as well as news on such subjects as the creation of new Jewish settlements in the territories, the seizure of Arab lands and the Palestinian legal actions to halt such expansion. "We weren't allowed to say a single word about Elon Moreh," he said.

Next on the censor's list come the activities and statements of the PLO: news of bombings, the arrest of suspected terrorists and the demolition of homes belonging to them or their families.

Then comes news about Palestinian resistance to the autonomy plan or to Israeli rule. News about the closing of schools, violent demonstrations, and the arrest and deportation of Palestinian intellectuals and political leaders is frequently censored.

Al-Sayyed said he has some latitude about what he can print from the Arab world, although the documentation reveals that Arab criticism of the Israeli government is usually censored.

Finally, he said, *Al-Fajr* can write almost anything

about the West. "They don't care what we say about Carter so long as he's not in town," al-Sayyed said. "Our criticism of Sadat, however, is rigidly censored."

There is a growing debate in Israeli military circles over the Arab press censorship issue. Some argue that censorship, unless the material deals clearly with matters affecting security, is not practical. They point out that the Palestinians in the occupied territories cannot be isolated from the outside world. West Bankers for example, can watch television broadcast from Amman and pick up radio stations from anywhere in the Arab world, which makes censorship not only nonsensical but also deeply frustrating for the Arabs, and frustration leads to violence.

But there are some in the military who feel that the Arab press incites the population to violence. In the aftermath of the killings of six Jewish settlers by Palestinians in Hebron last May, the military government suspended *Al-Fajr's* and *Al-Shaab's* licences to distribute on the West Bank and the Gaza

Strip for ten days. The military rescinded its order when the papers pressed their case in the High Court.

On 2 August, exactly three months after the Hebron killings and two months after the attempted assassination of three West Bank mayors, *Al-Fajr's* offices were bombed. Both *Al-Fajr* and *Al-Shaab* had received a letter in Hebrew signed by an unknown terrorist group called "Youth for Israel" demanding the closure of the papers. Several days after the bombing, the military government placed the editors of *Al-Fajr* and *Al-Shaab* under town arrest

"for the maintenance of security, public order and safety in the area." Since both editors reside in Ramallah, they were, in practice, removed from their jobs.

Lt-Col. Ami Gulska, the Israeli military spokesman in Jerusalem, fully supports his government's crackdown. "After the coastal road massacre in March 1978, the Arab press was jubilant. I wonder sometimes why Arabs should have a press in the first place," he said.

ARAB EDUCATIONAL NEEDS STUDIED

Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 14 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Qasim Zayd: "The Admission of Distress in the First Way to its Solution"]

[Text] When the National Committee of Heads of Local Councils decided several months ago to strike the educational system in the Arab schools as a protest of the severe shortage of classrooms, Minister of Education and Culture, Zevulun Hammer, said that the heads of the Arab Councils are charging into an open door. The minister argued at the time that his office is aware of the crisis in Arab education and that was what prompted his decision to allocate 26 percent of the budget of his office toward the solution of the problem of classrooms in the Arab educational system.

Representatives of the Arab authorities who demanded promulgation of a decade plan through which the Ministry of Education would commit itself to deal with the root problem did not remain adamant, but agreed to a proposal for the establishment of a joint commission which would place its findings on the desk of the minister.

The admission by the education ministry regarding the crisis in the Arab educational system is what afforded a sense of relief to the representatives of the Arab public who saw in that admission the half truth, at least, on the way to a solution. They responded to the proposal to establish a joint commission with the Ministry of Education and Culture and to a mobile staff sponsored by the center of the local administration and the representatives of the Arab local authorities.

To Determine the Reasons

In recent days, the commission has completed its work after conducting a series of consultations during which it attempted to delineate the problems and their scope, learn the reasons for their origin, and formulate a solution responsive to the needs, on the one hand, and taking account of the condition of the economy, on the other.

In the census of classrooms conducted by the official educational system in the Arab sector, the commission found that the system operates 4,575 classes, of which there are classrooms for 3,275. In the year 75/76 and 79/80 the erection of 862 standard classrooms was completed.

Most of the classrooms mentioned were erected in new schools which include also required kindergartens and auxiliary rooms, shops, laboratories and the like, in conformity with the official regulations of the Education Ministry. In its report the commission concedes that in the development budget of the Education Ministry for the year 79/80 a development plan was included to encompass 294 classrooms. However, the decision of the government on a general freeze of government construction did not skip this plan at the time.

In the description of the condition of the existing classrooms the report states that there are 2,750 standard classrooms of solid construction, and "tolerable" classrooms, that is, substandard classrooms, either regarding the area (less than 1 square meter on the average per pupil) or with respect to their defective physical condition.

In general there is a shortage of rooms for 39 percent of the classes (1,300 rooms). These grades, states the report, get their instruction for the most part in leased rooms in private residences. In the Arab sector there are virtually no public institutions which can be utilized, even as temporary solutions, for the housing of educational sites.

Immunity for the situation

In the view of members of the commission, the natural population growth together with the effect of a compulsory education law, the application of which has been expanded over the years, have brought about a monumental increase in the educational system for Arabs in Israel.

An investigation by the Ministry of Education and Culture has revealed that the increase resulting from the natural population growth coupled with the increase stemming from the greater demand for education, means an annual increment of 130 grades.

The commission concedes that although in previous years the allocation of resources for the Arab sector has risen, and during the most recent period 1,100 new classrooms were erected, and the construction of an additional 170 classrooms has been provided for, this rate of resource allocation has not kept pace with the needs and has not closed the gap.

In the report which discusses the difficulties of site establishment and allocation of land parcels it is said that "in a considerable number of settlements, where the need for establishing educational institutions has been recognized as a vital and priority need, it has not been possible to advance the plan and to implement the project because of difficulties in site determination and land-parcel allocation. These difficulties are attributable to a variety of causes."

Principles of Enlightened Policy

In practice, the institution and the maintenance of a second session under reasonable conditions is virtually impossible in the Arab sector, the report states in dealing with analysis of the causes.

The report indicates as vital the need to limit the number of leased rooms in residences because of the many shortcomings of this method.

"The leased rooms are not suited for the process of learning because they are undersized rooms, of 20-25 square meters and there is not attached to them any auxiliary rooms and play and sport grounds. Therefore, the utilization of modern instructional methods is precluded.

"The lighting and the fixtures are generally defective; lavatories with minimal sanitary conditions are lacking within the residential structures."

It is further stated: "The size of the rooms requires, in many cases, breakup of the classes into small groups of 2-25 students per grade, requiring an addition of teachers. A great deal of scattered locations makes work and the ongoing administration of the school difficult."

Proposals for Solutions

On the basis of policy principles accepted by all members of the commission and recommended for adoption by the minister of education and culture and the local governmental body, the operative proposals for a solution have been formulated.

Adoption of the complex of proposals as set forth in the report can lead gradually to a narrowing of the gap in educational structures in the Arab sector.

The report discusses emergency construction regulations, within the framework of which the erection of 490 rooms in the years 1981/82 is contemplated. The commission further recommends the establishment of "cities federated for education" and development of an organization of regional and inter-settlement educational systems.

These proposals are presented as temporary measures.

As a root measure, the commission recommends that the ministry of education and culture formulate a full decade plan, to be presented for government approval and also placed before the local governmental body. By this plan the gap in educational structures should be closed in the course of the next 10 years. At the same time, the annual anticipated increase in the system, an increase whose scope has, as has been stated, is 130 classrooms annually, will be provided for.

It was further recommended that within the framework of a subsidy from the Ministry of Education and the state lottery for financing and planning educational construction, that support be assured for financing the planning of every project whose need has been determined by the department of mapping in the development branch of the education ministry, and for which a detailed educational and physical program has been prepared.

The commission members are cognizant of the fact that even full adoption of the proposals of the commission will not make it possible to provide for all of the urgent needs of the educational system before the commencement of the next school year.

This information will be disseminated among all local authorities. Representatives of the authorities and members of the commission will exert every effort to have all the local authorities prepare for an orderly and quiet opening of the upcoming school year. In every authority all arrangements will be made in advance to assure accommodations for every student and for every grade.

I can testify that the conclusions of the commission are a precise diagnosis of the disease of the Arab educational system, and as the Arab adage goes:
"When the illness is known, it will be easy to provide the cure."

8090

CSO: 4805

LARGE WATER PROJECT IN WEST EGYPT DESERT

Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 24 Dec 80 p 17

[Article: "High Finance Costs Reduce TAHAL Profits"]

[Text] The company which conducts planning and development projects throughout the globe, has recently been invited to carry out a large development project in Egypt's western desert. Finance outlays of the TAHAL Company, which conducts technical-agricultural planning and development projects in this country and all over the globe, have increased by 250 percent over the past year and have hit its profit margin hard. This has become known from the financial reports of the company which are to be made public in a few days.

Sales of the TAHAL Company amounted last year to about 50 million shekel (500 million Israel pounds) while net profits after taxes came to about 6.3 million shekel, which make up about 12.6 percent of sales. This profit margin is only 84 percent above that of the previous year, and after taking inflation into account there is an actual drop of more than 20 percent in the company's profits.

It should be noted that the TAHAL Company has recently been invited to Egypt to participate in a tender on carrying out large agricultural development projects in the western desert region. A detailed project proposal was tendered to Egypt after the TAHAL experts spent several weeks in the western desert and conducted surveys and preliminary inspections there.

The project in Egypt was carried out in cooperation with businessman Sha'ul Eisenberg.

The general manager of TAHAL, Aryeh Gissin, reported in response by our correspondent that the steep rise in financing costs of the company stems from loans at high interest which it must commit itself to for the purpose of financing its ongoing operations.

According to him, there are today many delays in the company's accounts receivable in many countries of the world, and at times the company must wait 6 to 8 months for payment. The TAHAL Company gets no government support of any kind despite its being an exporter of expertise, and all of its applications for preferential credit terms have gone unheeded.

8090

CSO: 4805

BRIEFS

ENERGY PROJECTS--An agreement has been signed for the construction of a huge solar pool which would be able to produce up to 5 megawatt electricity. This has been reported by director general of the Energy and Infrastructure Ministry, David Hago'el. He added that in about a year an experimental project will begin to produce energy from shale oil in the 'Arad area. This project is being undertaken in cooperation with the FRG Government. The Energy Ministry has also recently signed an agreement with the Kibbutz industrial cooperative on establishing experimental plants where agricultural wastes will be recycled to produce energy. [TA101147 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 10 Feb 81 p 6]

IMPORTS, EXPORTS RATIO--A detailed report on the 1980 trade balance shows that the excess imports over exports of goods and services in the first 9 months of 1980 totaled \$4.1 billion. The major increase in this negative balance stems from the increase in military imports from \$855 million in the same period last year to \$1.13 billion in the first 9 months of 1980 as well as from the increased spending on foreign oil, which reached \$1.8 billion--an increase of 85 percent compared to the same period in 1979. Foreign debts also increased in the first 9 months of 1980 to \$1.6 billion. Some 71 percent of the import of goods and services during that period were covered by exports, compared with 67 percent in the same period in 1979. The rest of the deficit was paid for by income from unilateral transfers of money, which reached \$1.8 billion during the said period. [TA101147 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 10 Feb 81 p 7]

GAS DISCOVERED IN YAMIT STRIP--The day before yesterday, 6 February, gas started flowing from the "Sadot 5" well in the gas field near Sadot Moshav in the Yamit Strip. The experts hope that the fourth well will increase the field's output. The gas drill, which was begun about 1 month ago and involves an investment of 1/2 million dollars, is near the "Sadot 1" well in the center of the gas field. The drill was stopped at a depth of 1,107 meters to permit tests--during which gas broke out. Today pressure tests will be made to allow the experts to study the new well's flow. The new well was drilled in order to improve the field's output after the "Sadot 1" well's output began to drop and gas mixed with water in increasing quantities appeared in the pipeline. At present the field is producing about 29 million cubic feet a day. Investments in such equipment as compressors and larger diameter pipes were a part of the plan to increase output to about 40 million cubic feet. It was as a part of this plan that the drill was made. The gas field will be returned to Egypt as part of the IDF withdrawal from Sinai in 1 year. [Text] [TA081143 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 8 Feb 81 p 8]

MUKHTARS PROTEST EXPROPRIATION--A meeting of mukhtars was held today at Nabulus Mayor Bassam al-Shak'ah's office to protest the expropriation orders received from the military government. Our correspondent noted that thousands of dunams of land have been expropriated for establishing the industrial zone for the settlement of Haris and the city of Ari'el. The land is located between the villages of Salfit, Haris and Buruqin. Our correspondent added that the officer responsible for the villages in the military government had convened the mukhtars of these villages last Thursday and presented them with the expropriation orders. The mukhtars claim that the land is necessary for the villagers to make a living. Jewish elements have told our correspondent that the land is rocky and that any seizures of this land [by local Arabs] is illegal because the land has been proclaimed state land. [Text] [TA081536 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1500 GMT 8 Feb 81]

IDF TRAINING AREA EXPANDED--The military government in Judaea and Samaria has informed the mayor of Tubas that it has decided to close off an area of several hundred dunams of the town's land. The announcement says that the purpose of this move is to increase the IDF's training grounds in the area. [Text] [TA090811 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0800 GMT 9 Feb 81]

GROUNDWORK BEGUN ON NEW AIRFIELD--Yesterday groundwork was begun in Nevatim, in the Negev, for a new military airfield which, unlike the others in the Negev, will be established by purely Israeli contractors and workers. Our military correspondent Shmu'el Tal says that heavy equipment belonging to two groundwork companies has been brought to the site and the initial preparatory work, which will take about 2 weeks, will cost more than 1 billion Israeli pounds. [as heard] The entire field will be built in 3 years. The local bedouins have begun to leave the place and they will be transferred to a settlement to be built for them not far away. [Text] [TA090951 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 0900 GMT 9 Feb 81]

FRIENDSHIP ASSOCIATION--An Israeli-Egyptian Friendship Association has been set up in Cairo. A branch was also established in Alexandria, so far with only one member. The association was founded by Fu'ad (al-Asqandrani), the first unofficial Egyptian citizen to invite the Israeli ambassador to Cairo to his home. [TA092002 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 9 Feb 81 p 3]

UNEMPLOYMENT FIGURES--In the last quarter of 1980 the number of unemployed in Israel reached 75,000, exceeding the rate for the previous 3 months by some 7 percent and totaling 5.2 percent of the work force. The annual report for 1980 shows that the number of unemployed averaged 64,000, or 75 percent more than the 37,000 reported in 1979. The rate of unemployment increased from an average 2.9 percent in 1979 to an average 4.8 percent in 1980. These figures were disclosed yesterday by the Central Bureau of Statistics. [TA092002 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 9 Feb 81 p 10]

SOVIET IMMIGRATION--The number of Jews who left the Soviet Union for Vienna and continued on to Israel from there dropped last month to the lowest figure in 10 years. This was reported by the Intergovernmental Committee for Emigration Affairs, which meets in Geneva. Last month 850 Jews from the Soviet Union reached Vienna and only 187 of them opted to go to Israel. The rest went to Italy, with the intention of emigrating to the United States. [Text] [TA061647 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1400 GMT 6 Feb 81]

OIL SUPPLY--The Energy and Infrastructure Ministry plans to drill 30 oil wells in 1981 as compared with 18 in 1980. Israel procures 60 percent of its oil needs through long-term contracts while the rest is purchased on the international spot market. Israel's major oil suppliers are Egypt and Mexico. Egypt has fulfilled its 1980 commitment to Israel in this sphere, and it is expected that its supplies to Israel in 1981 will be identical to those in 1980. [TA061647 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 4]

R&D FUNDS--About \$450 million per year is devoted to research and development in all fields, including security, in Israel. Most of the research and development in Israel is in industry, especially that of the defense establishment. [TA061647 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 6 Feb 81 p 4]

JANUARY UNEMPLOYMENT DATA--The number of job seekers who sought employment through the employment service went up in January. More than 36,000 job seekers were registered. The number of job openings decreased to more than 15,000. These are the findings of the Employment Service's Statistics Division. The largest increase in the number of job seekers was in the Western Galilee and in the Yizre'el Valley. [Text] [TA052035 Jerusalem Domestic Television Service in Hebrew 1830 GMT 5 Feb 81]

SETTLEMENTS GET 2 BILLION SHEKELS--In a letter sent yesterday to the Knesset finance committee chairman Mk Shlomo Lorincz, the chairman of the Jewish Agency Settlement Department, Prof Ra'anan Weitz, warned about the government's intention to spend about 2 billion shekels on settlement activities in Judaea and Samaria. According to Weitz, the chairman of the joint Government-Zionist Federation Settlement Committee, Minister Ari'el Sharon, reported on work for the establishment of additional settlements in Judaea and Samaria and for vast expansion of existing settlements in recent meetings of the joint committee. Weitz wrote that since the budgetary situation was known, he feared the Finance Ministry would only include a small part of these plans in next year's budget whereas most of the plan will be provided for in the budget for 1982-1983. In his letter, Weitz cautioned that mortgaging the budget of subsequent years with such large sums was in no way justified--either economically or substantively and certainly not from the public interest point of view. [Text] [TA121130 Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 12 Feb 81 p 2]

TRADE DEFICIT--Israel's trade deficit in January 1981 reached \$200 million, compared to \$323 million in January 1980. Nevertheless, the deficit was 8 percent higher than the average rate during the last quarter of 1980. The import of goods in January 1981 totaled \$645 million compared to \$772 million in January 1980. There was no change in exports, which totaled \$445 million. This was reported yesterday by the Central Bureau of Statistics. [TA121416 Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 12 Feb 81 p 7]

HEALTH CARE IN TERRITORIES--To date, over 275,000 persons in Judaea and Samaria, out of a total population of 700,000 have joined the military government's health insurance plan. In the Gaza Strip, 349,000 persons out of about 450,000 are in the plan. The voluntary health insurance program enables those who are insured and their families to receive full medical treatment at lower rates than those prevailing in Israel. They also get free hospitalization in Israeli hospitals should the need arise. [TA121830 Tel Aviv ITIM in Hebrew 1630 GMT 12 Feb 81]

STOLEN IDF WEAPONS--The day before yesterday, civilian and military police conducted a widespread campaign to search for weapons stolen from the Israeli army, and 68 persons were arrested in this campaign. The search was conducted in the cities, Israeli outposts, and in Arab residential areas. A police spokesman said that the aim of this campaign is to prevent Israelis from owning stolen or unlicensed weapons. He added that three of those arrested are army deserters. One of the results of the campaign was the discovery of 15 units of weapons and large quantities of military equipment, gold contraband, drugs, hard currency, large quantities of ammunition, demolition supplies and war materiel. In Haifa the police uncovered a large stockpile of weapons in one of the homes, and it became clear that the owner of the home was stealing from the Israeli army. Among the stolen weapons discovered were a (Kalashnikov) machine gun, an M-1 rifle, explosives, a hand grenade, fuses, crates of ammunition, and magazine of machine guns, incendiary devices, fire bombs and military charts. [Text] [Jerusalem AL-QUDS in Arabic 3 Dec 80 pp 1, 7] 7587

EDITORS' RESTRICTION ORDERS EXTENDED--West Bank military commander Tat-Aluf Binyamin Ben-eli'Ezer yesterday informed three editors of East Jerusalem Arabic newspapers that he was extending for a further 6 months the restriction order issued against them last September. Akram Haniya, editor of ASH-SHA'B, Ma'mun As Sio, editor of AL-PAJR, and the editor of the communist weekly AT-TALI'AH, Bashir Barghuti, were restricted to their towns of residence--6 months ago. The orders were issued on the grounds that the three were active members of the now almost defunct National Guidance Committee, which the military government blamed for a wave of unrest in the administered territories last summer. Last week a special military advisory board heard an appeal on the editors' behalf by their lawyer, Felicia Langer. Yesterday Ben-eli'Ezer informed Langer and the three men that he had accepted the board's recommendation and was extending the orders for reasons of security. Langer has also petitioned the High Court of Justice to allow the three men to travel to their Jerusalem offices. A hearing originally set for tomorrow has been indefinitely postponed. [Text] [TA101203 Jerusalem POST in English 10 Feb 81 p 2]

THREE MUSLIM LEADERS DETAINED--The West Bank military government is currently holding three Muslim religious leaders from the Nabulus and Tulkarm area for questioning on suspicion of involvement in hostile activities, a senior officer said on Friday [6 February]. The three men, who are members of the Fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood Organization, were active as preachers in local mosques prior to allegedly joining one of the terrorist organizations. The military government is monitoring the activities of the Muslim brotherhood in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, but has not had reason to detain any of its members unless they were actively engaged in terrorism. Since 1967, 20 members of the organization have been held for questioning for various periods, but all have been released. Security forces recently detained several members of the organization in the Nabulus area on suspicion of having joined a terrorist movement, but apart from the three still being held, all the others have been released. The detention led to an angry protest on Thursday [5 February] from Jordan to UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. Ambassador Hazim Nusaybah alleged that the three men have been charged with "violating laws of Zionism in their own land." [Text] [Staff correspondent's report: "Three Muslim Sect Leaders Are Detained"] [TA080935 Jerusalem POST in English 8 Feb 81 p 3]

NEW COL BASKET--The Central Bureau of Statistics yesterday published its new "consumption basket," based on the family expenditures survey for 1979/80. As of 15 February, the consumer-price index will be based on this basket, replacing

the 1976 base used until now. According to the new basket, food other than vegetables and fruit accounts for 19.4 percent of total family expenditure, a decline from the 22 percent in the present basket. Vegetables and fruit account for 6.8 percent, housing 19.9 percent, household maintenance nearly 10 percent, furniture and other household equipment 7.9 percent, apparel and footwear 6.2 percent, health 4.4 percent, educational and cultural expenditure 8.6 percent, transportation and communications 12.9 percent, and 3.8 percent left for miscellaneous. The fall in the percentage for food may already be somewhat outdated as a result of the sharp rises in food prices since the end of 1979. The other major changes in the new basket are the increase in the cost of transportation and the rise in expenditure on household maintenance. [TA090954 Jerusalem POST in English 9 Feb 81 p 2]

ABSENCE OF DEFENSE MINISTER--Tel Aviv--Two-thirds of the population believes that the absence of a full-time defense minister diminishes Israel's military strength. This emerged from a Jerusalem POST poll conducted recently by the Modi'in Ezrahi Applied Research Centre among 1,273 adults. Those questioned were told "As you know, the prime minister is also a defense minister, and there is no special minister for the defense portfolio." The respondents were then asked to say whether this harmed the army, made no difference or strengthened it. Sixty-four percent felt it harmed the army strength; 29.9 percent thought it did not change anything; 4.1 percent held that it strengthened the army; 2.6 percent had no opinion. Another poll, conducted by the Israel Institute of Applied Research during January showed 71 percent of the public wants elections before July. To the question: "When should the election be held?"--48 percent said before May, 11 percent in May, 12 percent in June and 29 percent in July or after. The most prevalent reason given for forwarding the elections was wanting a change of government (47 percent). Another common reason was concern about the economic situation and the need to prevent an "election year economy" (16 percent). [Text] [Report by political correspondent Mark Segal: "64 Percent of Public Say Army Hurt by Lack of Defense Minister"] [TA061158 Jerusalem POST in English 6 Feb 81 p 3]

CSO: 4820

RAINMAKING ATTEMPTED TO AID AGRICULTURE

Tripoli AL-ARD in Arabic 25 Nov 80 pp 1, 2

[Article: "Leader Studies Rainmaking, Cloudseeding Project"]

[Text] Yesterday morning the leader of the revolution made an inspection tour of the rainmaking and cloudseeding project in the Sahl al-Gefarah region and listened to the Arab experts who are running this project explain the programs of observing the movement of clouds and classifying them accurately to determine which clouds bear rain and to seed others with chemicals to bring rain.

Al-Gadhdhafi also inspected the observation equipment and the computer connected to this equipment which determines the altitudes and locations of clouds in their various positions, whether in the middle of the Mediterranean or at great distances from the Libyan Arab coast in all other directions, to examine them and seed them to bring rain.

He also heard an explanation of the operation which was conducted on Wednesday in which the project observed the clouds that day, using the project's equipment, airplanes and scientific apparatus to study those clouds. The goal of the operation was then set: to seed those clouds using airplanes equipped for that purpose to bring rain in the area between Qasr al-Hajj to the west and Bani Walid to the east, covering the area north of the line connecting the two. The project's supervisors informed the leader of the positive results which they achieved from this operation. Rain fell within half an hour after the clouds were seeded, and the observation stations recorded downpours of abnormally large amounts of rain in the test areas, more than in the past 40 years. The Qal'ah observation station recorded 140 mm, the Gharyan station 116 mm, the al-'Aban station 118 mm, the al-'Aziziyah station 220 mm, and the Qasr al-Hajj station 45 mm. The workers explained that these were averages usually recorded for a whole year, while they were achieved this time in a single downpour after the success of the rainmaking experiment.

This project comes as a key to the recommendations of the Scientific Council, which met in al-Fatih University in the period from 18 to 20 February under the patronage of the leader.

Al-Gadhdhafi also inspected the system of sending observation apparatus into the upper atmosphere by using special balloons, and he inspected one of the airplanes used to seed clouds.

At the conclusion of the tour of the project, the workers brought to his attention the need to expand the project to cover all areas of the Jamahiriyah in which clouds could be seeded and subsequently to develop the project in order to subjugate nature, which God created to serve mankind for the general welfare of all.

7587

CSO: 4802

LIBYA

BRIEFS

RESPONSE TO TERRORISM CHARGE--Rome, 5 Feb (JANA)--Italian television broadcast yesterday the statement issued by the Italian premier in which he said that terrorists are trained in Czechoslovakia, Libya, Lebanon and South Yemen. On this statement JANA political editor commented saying "The Jamahiriya is a peace-loving country and working towards peace and security in the Mediterranean region. The alleged "training of terrorists" in Libya is groundless but the Libyans are being trained in the country, as "we believe that power, wealth and arms should be in the hands of the people." This will contribute in restoring peace and security all over the world, because peoples of the world hate war and have no interest in it. When people are trained to take up arms, they only do what to defend themselves against the hostile policies of the governments. [Text] [All quotation marks as received] [LD051652 Tripoli JANA in English 1541 GMT 5 Feb 81]

STEEL MILL--The Japanese Kawasaki Company for Heavy Industries announced yesterday that it and the Mexican (Hayl Co) Company had won a contract worth 428 million dollars to build a steel mill in Libya. The mill will produce 550,000 tons a year and will be built at Misratah, east of Tripoli. The mill, for which the (Hayl Company) developed the technology, will use natural gas. [Text] [Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 19 Dec 80 p 8] 7587

CSO: 4802

CAPTURE OF CUBAN 'SPY SHIP' REPORTED

Rabat L'OPINION in French 11 Dec 80 pp 1-2

[Article by Fatima Belarbi: "Cuba Caught Red-Handed"]

[Text] Cuba caught with its hands in the bag. The recent boarding of a Cuban ship off the Moroccan coast of the Sahara, has just provided proof, if there were still need for such proof, of Cuba's hostility towards Morocco and its people.

It is true that from the beginning of the war in northwest Africa, there have been several actions and signs of Cuban complicity with Algerian mercenaries that have come to our attention. In addition to Cuban presence, amongst other things, in the Tindouf--for the training and conditioning of mercenaries--their participation in the fighting has many times been confirmed.

Some time after this denunciation, Cuban "strategists"--or rather those who control them--fearful of seeing themselves caught red-handed but also desirous of inflicting injury upon Morocco, decided in favor of naval operations. Caught between land operations (harassment of the so-called "POLISARIO") and the kidnapping of foreign fishermen, particularly Portuguese, Spanish, and Korean, Morocco would be in a difficult situation, one might believe.

No one was unaware that the mercenaries from Algeria--who had neither the material means nor the technical knowledge and even less the intellectual ability to "think out" or mount such operations--were unable to venture by themselves on the high seas. There was not a shadow of a doubt that there was a collusion with foreign countries because it was a known fact that a ordinary rubber craft, no matter how well built it might be, could not remain at sea for a long time--in view of its weight and dimensions--but its self-sufficiency is quite limited. How then could it spend many hours on the high seas and who was supplying it with fuel oil? In other words, who owned the trawlers that carried rubber craft accommodated the mercenaries before and after operations involving kidnapping? Not being able to leave the Moroccan coast--because they were under close surveillance--their home port could only be Las Palmas. In this respect it is certain that there was a complicity between some Spaniards, Cubans, and the mercenaries from Algiers.

The case of the Cuban ship that was recently boarded off the Moroccan coast of the Sahara (not far from Dakhla) presented grave and serious problems. We do

say ship because it was not a trawler. Since it did not have either a drag net or a net, what was this Cuban ship doing in a restricted area? Equipped with sophisticated communications gear--although the Cubans maintained that the ship was carrying communications gear of a conventional nature--it remains for us to conclude that the Cuban ship was trying to come to the aid of two Soviet trawlers that had been stopped by a Moroccan patrol boat, who was asking them to surrender because they were fishing illegally.

According to the Cubans, their ship the "Tonkin Gulf" was on its way to Vigo (in Spain) for repairs. Their argument made us smile especially since before suddenly putting out to sea, this same ship was in Conakry. Why then did it not stay there to make its repairs?

It must be said that this incident was not the first one between Morocco and Cuba. On last 2 July, two Cuban ships had been spotted off the Moroccan coast of the Sahara, and yet they had not been granted permission to sail in that area.

Therefore, the presence of Cuban ships in the vicinity of the coast of northwest Africa can only be explained by the fact that their crews were spying in order to report to Algiers, Tripoli, and other capitals, on the movements of the Moroccan army on land as well as in the air.

Cuba's role in Africa is too well known to go into detail at this point. Her objectives are also too obvious for them to be enlarged upon here. But one thing is certain. If Cuba and her masters have succeeded in their game in some African countries, the situation is different in Morocco. Neither espionage, weapons, nor maneuvers can turn the Moroccan people from their primary cause: the territorial integrity of their country, which means their security and also their freedom.

9766

CSO: 4400

IMPORTANCE OF SUAREZ'S VISIT TO SEBTA, MELLILIA

Rabat L'OPINION in French 11 Dec 80 pp 1-2

[Article entitled: "The Real Reasons for a Visit"]

[Text] The lightning visit last weekend of Adolfo Suarez Gonzalez to Sebta and Mellilia continues to give rise to numerous comments in political quarters and amongst observers in Madrid as well as in administrative circles and the masses in the two cities.

The special correspondent of MAP [Maghreb-Arab Press Agency], who followed the head of the Spanish Government in his quick visit to Sebta and Mellilia, has been able to gather local impressions brought about by this visit.

To begin with, the real reasons behind this visit become more and more obvious. It is pointed out among the members of the UCD [Democratic Center Union] in both cities that Mr Suarez's "surprise" visit to Sebta and Mellilia had been requested more than a month earlier by the deputies, senators, and regional leaders of the party in power. Mr Suarez promised them that he would think about it. The problem for the head of government was to find a reason justifying the trip. His associates, however, advised him to respond favorably to the invitation.

It was a unanimous opinion in Mellilia as well as in Sebta, that Mr Suarez's decision was in response to two basic objectives. To begin with, because the UCD (the party in power), facing serious internal problems, will hold its second national congress in the beginning of next year. Mr Suarez's leadership as party chief and head of government has been strongly challenged.

The crisis within the party, which occurred at the end of last spring following the introduction of the vote of socialist censure and which Mr Suarez succeeded in overcoming with difficulty thanks to an agreement with the "barons" on the UCD and the subsequent inclusion of the latter in the government of 9 September, broke out again.

There are numerous reasons to explain the crisis. Some of them are: the opposition existing between Mr Suarez and the head of the Christian Democratic faction and President of the Congress of Deputies, Mr Landelino Lavilla; the weakening of the liberal faction--after the death of Joaquin Garrigues Walquer--the rumors concerning the formation of a coalition government with the

participation of the Socialist Party; the inability of the executive branch to bring an end to the wave of terrorism and to provide a solution to the economic crisis; the persistent threat of a military coup and, particularly, the planned divorce law opposed by the Church and the Christian Democrats.

This crisis was confirmed on Sunday, that is to say, the day after Mr Suarez returned from his trip to Sebta and Mellilla, by the expulsion of sixteen members from the Centrist Party, one of them was a deputy and former minister, Mr Enrique Sanchez de Leon.

"The unity of the Democratic Center Union," wrote the daily newspaper DIAIRO-16, "is gravely threatened. The objective of this disciplinary action is to put on their guard the leaders of the various ideological factions within the party."

UCD circles in Sebta and Mellilla characterized Mr Suarez's visit as "historic," but other circles are convinced that it is a propagandistic ploy implemented for "electoralistic" reasons.

Jose Lopez Franco, a correspondent for EL FARO DE CEUTA, has stated that Mr Suarez went to Sebta and Mellilla to obtain the support of the local UCD. A head of government does not visit a region just to greet the legionaries and to open a small thermal power station.

If it were necessary to find an explication for his presence in Sebta, it would be better to look for it in his meeting with Manolo Escobar's "cart." Escobar wrote the famous song "My Cart Has Been Stolen" and coincidentally was giving a recital the same day in Sebta.

Jose Lopez Franco, who states that he does not belong to any political party, wonders about what type of solutions the visit of the head of government will bring about to solve Sebta real problems and the inhuman situation of the "Prince Alfonso" ghettos where the Moroccans live.

The second reason is reportedly, according to the inhabitants of the two cities, the persistent threats of a military coup of the "Turkish" type. Mr Suarez, be it remembered, had immediately after arriving in Mellilla the idea of going to a legionaries' camp where he was received with the usual fuss and folk dancing presentations organized by the "Damned Soldiers" who are considered throughout the whole of Spain as an "affront to Spanish dignity."

During the "legionaries' weekend," Mr Suarez met with a military commission that included, among others, a captain general from the secondary military region, Pedro Merry Cardon, and the commanding general of Sebta and representative of the government, Gerardo Marivar.

Upon leaving this meeting, Mr Suarez indicated that he and the military representatives had broached the problems relating to the economic crisis, terrorism and the armed forces.

It appears that the meeting took place in a tension-filled atmosphere and that there was an argument between the head of government and the military who blamed

him for the "ineffectiveness of the executive branch." This was what Capt Gen Merry Gardon had begun to explain to a newspaper correspondent from Sebta before changing the subject. One of his junior officers had advised him that the correspondent did not support the Spanish character of the city.

The same thing happened in Mellilia where Mr Suarez was keen on recalling, many times, that he had served there under the colors 20 years before as an "Alferes" (from the Arabic 'Al Faris' meaning second lieutenant); the same ceremonies took place (visit to the legionaries' camp, meeting with military representatives, after which there were meetings with UCD leaders).

Sebta Is Governed by the Military

Sebta is a fortified city. This was its predominating feature. The security around the head of government and his entourage was the responsibility of the military police, from the time he arrived until he left. Two army vehicles, whose drivers and relief drivers were legionaries, were assigned to transport the journalists. The army conducted simulated gunnery exercises just before Mr Suarez left the city. The "La Muralla" hotel, where Mr Suarez stayed, swarmed with officers. It was seldom that one saw a place in the streets that there was not a group of soldiers. The weight of the military presence in Sebta could be felt by the Moroccans whom the legionaries had been ordered to terrorize and to intimidate constantly.

In Mellilia, on the other hand, the atmosphere was less tense in spite of the activities of some extreme rightists elements who claimed they wanted to play the role of "defender of the people." In this city it was the secret police who enforced the law. A Moroccan from Sebta, an itinerant merchant, said: "Our situation here is different from our brothers; in Mellilia. We live under a constant threat of being expelled arbitrarily and being attacked by the legionaries. We cannot demonstrate publicly. We are afraid. We wanted to organize a demonstration in front of the "La Muralla" hotel, but it was impossible for us to do it. We are not organized. Our compatriots in Mellilia are more active, even the legionaries do not dare to attack them."

Another Moroccan, also an itinerant merchant, stated: "The Spaniards want to compel us to accept Spanish nationality. We refuse this proposition from "Al Himaya" even if it would allow us to have economic advantages and stability. Only cowards would change religion..." It is obvious that for the poor the nation and religion are one.

A New Term: Cohabitation

The term "cohabitation" is on everyone's lips among the Moroccan and Spanish communities in Sebta and Mellilia. The concept is dearer at Sebta than at Mellilia. The Spanish communities in each of the two cities distrust the government's statements and Spanish political parties. They know that one day or the other the two cities will escape from Spanish rule. These communities have put forth as a solution: a "joint administration of the cities spread out over a number of years." The managing director of the weekly newspaper, EXTRA

CEUTA, points out that the business community is very enthusiastic over this idea that the newspaper supports. This is what explains the increasing interest of the advertisers in EXTRA CEUTA.

At Mellilia, the same subjects are discussed by a civil servant working for the publicity department of City Hall and a local radio station speaker "Here we have no problems with the Muslims (of Morocco), they have the same rights we have.....

Therefore our situation is different from Sebta's which is so near to the peninsula. We know that we need the Moroccans, and they in turn need us. We were born in this town, we do not want to lose our identity. Cohabitation is possible."

9766

CSO: 4400

MOROCCO

INCREASED PHOSPHATE PRODUCTION REPORTED

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 10 Dec 80 p 1

[Article: "The Youssoufia Mine Will Increase Its Output From 400,000 to 4 Million Tons of Processed or Converted Phosphate"]

[Text] The aid agreement signed in Paris will partially cover this important project.

The aid agreement for 170 million dollars was signed last Friday in Paris by the Moroccan Phosphates Office with an international consortium directed by the BCME [Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank] and made up of 23 banks from ten different countries. The agreement permits the initial financing of a project the cost of which is estimated to be \$300 million.

This project involves the increase of the output in processed and converted phosphate from the new mine located on the Youssoufia phosphate deposits.

According to the project's estimates, the output from this mine is to increase from 400,000 to 4 million tons of processed and converted phosphate. The project also estimates that 2,600 jobs will be created of which 300 jobs will be for engineers and technicians.

The ceremony for the signing of the agreement granting credit to the OCP [Moroccan Phosphates Office] took place in the presence of, among others, Messrs Karim Lamrani, general manager of the OCP; Hadj Abdelmajid Bengelloun, chairman and general manager of the BCME (Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank); Ben Mansour, in charge of foreign relations at the directorate of the Treasury; Ali Amor, director of the Exchange Office, and His Majesty's Ambassador in Paris, Dr Youssef Ben Abbes, who, upon the conclusion of the ceremony, was to emphasize in a short speech "the important role played by the Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank in the country's international financial relations.

9766
CSO: 4400

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

TROOPS, ARMS SENT TO ETHIOPIA--Aden, 17 Feb (MENA)—The PDRY has sent forces to Ethiopia to help it against the Somali and Eritrean fronts. These forces consist of 1,000 troops plus a number of helicopters, field artillery pieces and a squadron of MIG fighter planes with their pilots. [Text] [NC171809 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1548 GMT 17 Feb 81]

PDRY EMBASSY BOMBING CONDEMNED--Early this morning the PDRY Embassy in Paris suffered a wicked terrorist attack, that is, the embassy was blasted by two rockets which inflicted material damage on the embassy building. The PDRY Foreign Ministry has summoned the French ambassador in Aden and handed him an official memorandum, asking the French authorities to investigate the incident, pursue its perpetrators and arrest them. The PDRY Government also asked for an investigation of this dastardly act. A Foreign Ministry spokesman confirmed that the PDRY condemns premeditated terrorism and provocation by imperialist and Zionist agents and affirmed that the perpetrators of that act will not escape retribution. [Text] [LD161432 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1400 GMT 16 Feb 81 EA]

CSO: 4802

NUMAYRI APPOINTS REGIONAL OFFICIALS

Deputy Governors Named

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 22 Jan 81 pp 1-2

[Text] Khartoum, Jan. 22 (SUNA)--President Nimeri yesterday issued Republican decrees Nos. 46, 47 and 48 for 1981 appointing the Deputy Governors and the Regional Ministers of the Northern Region, the Eastern Region and Korodofan Region respectively.

(A) Republican decree No. 46

For the appointment of the Deputy Governor and the Regional Ministers of the Northern region:

1. Sayed/Mohamed El Hassan Awad El Kareem ... Deputy Governor of the Northern Region.
2. Sayed/Abd Ellatif Abd El Rahman ... Regional Minister of Public Services.
3. Dr. Abd El Wahab Osman ... Regional Minister of Finance and Economy.
4. Sayed/Gaafar El Hassan El Hussein ... Regional Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
5. Sayed/Abdulla Ali Jadulla ... Regional Minister of Housing and Public Utilities.
6. Dr. El Tayeb Ali Abu Sinn ... Regional Minister of Administration and the Region's Affairs.

(B) Republican decree No. 47

For the appointment of the Deputy Governor and the Regional Ministers of the Eastern Region:

1. Sayed/Suleiman Ali Fageeri ... Deputy Governor of the Eastern Region.
2. Dr. Hassan Ahmed Habish ... Regional Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources.

3. Sayed/Abdulla Ahmed El Hardulio ... Regional Minister for Administration and the Region's Affairs.
4. Sayed/Mohamed El Amin Hamad ... Regional Minister of Public Services.
5. Sayed/Ahmed Mohamed El Amin Tirik ... Regional Minister of Finance and Economy.
6. Sayed/Ohaj Ibrahim Musa ... Regional Minister of Housing and Public Utilities.

(C) Republican decree No. 48

For the appointment of the Deputy Governor and Regional Ministers of Kordofan Region:

1. Sayed/Fadl Alla Hammad ... Deputy Governor of Kordofan Region.
2. Dr. El Fatih Mohamed El Tigani ... Regional Minister of Finance and Economy.
3. Dr. El Taj Fadl Alla ... Regional Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
4. Sayed/Mohamed Ahmed Hassan Jiha ... Regional Minister of Public Service.
5. Sayed/Duldoom El Khateem Ashgar ... Regional Minister of Housing, Water and Public Utilities.
6. Sayed/Hamad Ali El Tom ... Regional Minister of the Region's Affairs and Administration.

The President also issued Republican decree No. 49 for 1981 annulling the establishing orders of the People's Executive Councils in all provinces and the delegation of their powers to the Commissioners of the provinces.

He also issued Republican decree No. 50 for 1981 by the effect of which Regional Governors have been delegated the powers of the President of the Republic, subject to the People's Local Government Act, to supervise over Provincial Commissioners together with the withholding and annulling the resolutions of People's executive councils and the supervision over the work of these councils.

New Darfur Governor

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 23 Jan 81 p 1

[Text] Khartoum, Jan. 23 (SUNA)--President Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri yesterday decreed the appointment of Sayed/Ahmed Ibrahim Draig as Governor of Darfur Region.

The President received yesterday morning at his office in the Friendship Hall Sayed/Draig in the presence of the Chief of State Security Major-General (P.S.C) Omer Mohamed El Tayeb.

On the other hand, the President is expected to decree, next week, the appointment of the Deputy Governors of the Central and Darfur Regions as well as their Regional Ministers.

Central, Darfur Regional Officials

Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 1 Feb 81 p 3

[Text] Khartoum, Feb. 1 (SUNA)--The President of the Republic, Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri, yesterday decreed the following appointments:

Central Region

1. Sayed/Malik Amin Nabri, as Deputy Governor of the Region.
2. Sayed/Saad Awad--as Regional Minister for the Region's Affairs and Administration.
3. Dr. Osman Kalifa Mohamed--as Regional Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources.
4. Dr. Moatamad Ahemd [sic] Amin--as Regional Minister for Health and Social Welfare.
5. Sayed/Abdulla Imam Omer--as Regional Minister for Finance and Economy.
6. Sayed/Mohamed Abdel Karim Asakir--as Regional Minister for Construction and Housing.
7. Sayed/Yacoub Eisa Gifoun--as Regional Minister for Education and Guidance.

Darfur Region

1. Sayed/Mohamed Beshir Gamma--as Deputy Governor for the Region.
2. Dr. Abdel Hamid El Tigani--as Regional Minister for Finance and Economy.
3. Dr. Ali El Haj Mohamed as Regional Minister for Public Services.
4. Sayed/Mohamed Abdulla Shareef--as Regional Minister for the Region's Affairs and Administration.
5. Sayed/Ahmed Abdel Gadir Arbab--as Regional Minister for Housing and Public Utilities.
6. Sayed/Yousif Suleiman Tekina--as Regional Minister for Agriculture and Natural Resources.

CSO: 4820

BRIEFS

AID TO UGANDAN REFUGEES--Khartoum, Jan. 7 (SUNA)--The Director of the World Food Programme (W.F.P.) here announced that he had received, yesterday, the acceptance of the W.F.P. to provide a \$2.6 million aid to Ugandan refugees in the country. He told SUNA that he also received a \$1.1 million aid for assisting the draught stricken people of Eastern Equatoria Province. The aid will soon be delivered to the Kenyan port of Mombasa and hence to the Southern Region. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 7 Jan 81 p 2]

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT LOANS, PROJECTS--Khartoum, Jan. 19 (SUNA)--The President of the World Fund for Agricultural Development arrives here early next February in a week-long visit that would take him to the Southern Region. The visit comes in connection to the Fund's contribution in the financing of a \$58 million agricultural development project. It contributes \$15.9 million. The Fund will finance another project designed for the development of New Halfa area the total cost of which amounts to \$15.9 million. The Fund's President will also discuss the issue of approving \$40 million to rejuvenate the Gash Delta area and the National Project of Agricultural Technicians' Training. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 19 Jan 81 pp 2-3]

ANIMAL PRODUCTION PROJECTS--Khartoum, Jan. 19 (SUNA)--The Public Corporation for Animal Production has signed contracts in the current fiscal year with French, British and Dutch companies to provide necessary equipment for the construction of a fodder factory in Jebel Awlia, Khartoum and a milk project, in the northern area of the Gezira Province. The African Development Bank contributes \$5.5 million in the financing of the two projects on a loan basis. The Dutch company will undertake the construction of the \$5.5 million fodder factory. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 19 Jan 81 p 3]

INFLATION DECLINE--Khartoum, Jan. 25 (SUNA)--The percentage of inflation in the Sudan had declined to 20.4% in 1980/81 compared with 32.7% in the year 1978/79, said a report prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on the country's economic and financial policy. The announcement came during the meeting of the Finance and National Economy Minister with the President and members of the Sudanese Industries Association yesterday morning. The meeting also reviewed the progress of the Sudanese economy and the role of the public sector in this respect. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 25 Jan 81 pp 3, 4]

EASY-TERM LOANS--Khartoum, Jan. 25 (SUNA)--The Sudanese Industries Association has demanded the right of taking part in the utilization of the easy-term loans provided by friendly countries. The demand was communicated to the Finance and National Economy Minister yesterday. The Minister agreed to the Association's request and promised to present it before the Ministerial Committee for the Economic Sector. The easy-term loans are currently utilized by the public sector only. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 25 Jan 81 p 4]

LATEST REFUGEES REPORT--Khartoum, Feb. 1 (SUNA)--The latest report of the Refugees Administration office here said that the country hosted 506,000 refugees from a number of neighbouring countries. The report added that large numbers of refugees poured into the Sudan last year particularly following the events in Abeche, Chad, and that of Arua, Uganda. The report further said that 4,000 refugees had left the country with official travel documents but they were soon replaced by 8,000 refugees from Chad during late last year. An official source at the Refugees Administration said that the UNHCR had responded to the proposals of the Sudan government and endorsed the sum of one million dollars for the relief of the Chadian refugees besides other material assistance. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA DAILY BULLETIN in English 1 Feb 81 p 2]

CSO: 4820

SULTANATE OF OMAN

OMAN DIVERSIFYING SOURCES OF INCOME

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 27 Dec 80 p 48

[Article by AL-MUSTAQBAL's correspondent in Muscat: "The Sultanate of Oman Is Gradually Liberating Itself from Dependence on Oil As a Basic Source of Income"]

[Text] Oil Revenues Currently Constitute 50 Percent of Oman's GNP.

Current estimates of oil production in the Sultanate of Oman indicate that the sultanate's oil production will level off at about 350,000 barrels a day until the middle of the eighties.

At present seven groups of international firms are drilling for oil on land and offshore. During 1979 these drilling operations resulted in the discovery of a number of oil fields in the southern area of the country which had considerable reserves of petroleum, with its petroleum being of the lightweight variety.

The fact that this represents relatively limited oil production, and the fact that it is produced from reserves which are likely to dry up within a few years, has led the Sultanate of Oman to explore the possibility of utilizing all of its human and natural resources in order to provide Oman's inhabitants with a bright future. Oman's population is about 1.5 million, and its inhabitants are spread out over a large area of land totalling 300,000 square kilometers. In terms of area, Oman is considered to be the second-largest country in the Arabian Peninsula, the largest one being Saudi Arabia.

Right now the sultanate is endeavoring to exploit its natural gas resources, the proven reserves of which have been estimated at about 4.129 trillion cubic feet, in addition to 746 billion cubic feet of associated gas.

In 1978 the government completed the laying of a pipeline, 20 inches in diameter and 325 kilometers long, which goes from the Yibal gas field to the al-Ghabarah water desalinization and electric power plant. Its current production capacity is 130 million cubic feet per day, and it is possible to raise this production capacity to 200 million cubic feet per day.

The Oman Petroleum Development Co. has been given the job of building a plant for processing associated gas, and it is expected that its production of liquefied gas will total 3,500 barrels per day.

In October of 1979 the Omani government gave its written approval to a project for transporting gas by means of a pipeline 250 kilometers long running from the Yibal field to the Suhar region. The purpose of this pipeline is to supply gas to the copper mining enterprise there.

Mineral exploration operations in the sultanate have discovered that economically profitable quantities of copper ore exist in Wadi al-Jizi in the northern area of the country, and 2.13 percent of the copper ore, in terms of its total weight, consists of pure copper. Of the estimated 12 million tons which have been discovered, about 350,000 tons of pure copper can be extracted.

There is copper also in the Suhar region in the al-Asil mine as well as in the 'Arja and al-Bayda mines where production has been developed to the point where the daily output is 100 tons per day.

At the present time the government is implementing a comprehensive geological survey program for exploring for various minerals. In the southern area of the country deposits of gypsum and coal have been discovered. In the Ra's al-Hadd region deposits of manganese ore have been discovered. In the country's eastern region quantities of coal have been discovered in Wadi Sawi. And in the area of the capital city of Muscat large quantities of marble have been discovered.

In addition to copper ore, chromite has been discovered, and at the present time this discovery is being evaluated from the point of view of commercial profitability.

A Japanese exploration team is currently searching for minerals in bedrock, and searches and exploration operations are under way to find sources of fresh ground water underneath the limestone which is usually so prevalent in areas where petroleum is found.

Until the Omanis learn the actual, practical results of these water exploration operations, they are endeavoring not to be prematurely optimistic about the tremendous possibilities which would be available to them if fresh water were discovered in these rock layers. Water has already gushed out in copious quantities during some of the experimental drilling operations which were carried out for this purpose.

All of these activities, which are part of the country's search for alternate sources of national income, are the result of working toward fulfilling the objectives of Oman's second five-year development plan. They have led to a decrease in the relative importance of petroleum resources--from constituting 67 percent of the GNP in 1975 to representing 56 percent of the GNP in 1978. It is expected that the other economic sectors, by the end of 1981, will account for as much as 50 percent of the GNP--in contrast to the 33 percent of the GNP which they constituted in 1975.

Oman's development plan brought the number of banks in the country from being 1 in 1970 to being 22 commercial banks in 1980. The number of commercial and industrial enterprises increased from less than 100 in the early seventies to about

12,000 such enterprises in 1980. Their total amount of invested capital is about 371 Omani riyals, and the total in investments in the industrial sector alone is about 113 million Omani riyals, of which the state has contributed approximately 40 million riyals.

This commercial and industrial growth has been accompanied by a great deal of development in agriculture. The total area under cultivation increased from about 36,000 hectares in the early seventies to about 70,000 hectares by 1980. The government provides numerous forms of aid to farmers. It pays part of the cost of the fertilizers which it distributes to them. It provides a subsidy to the farmers amounting to 20 Omani riyals per feddan which is planted with crops which the government is encouraging farmers to plant, such as, for example, wheat. Also, seed is provided free of charge and pesticides and other means of extermination are sold to the farmers at only nominal prices. The government also encourages farmers to utilize modern machinery by selling the machinery to them at cost price and through a plan of installment payments. In addition to all of this, the government is working together with the International Food and Agriculture Organization to implement several irrigation projects and to set up model farms--of which there are now 1,450 in the various agricultural regions of the sultanate.

The government has also taken on 21 projects which aim at improving the status of the fishing industry. These include the distribution of fishing boats to the fisherman at nominal prices and the construction of cold-storage warehouses for fish in various areas of the country. At the end of 1979 the government signed a contract with a Korean firm concerning the exploitation of fish resources and the training of Omanis in fishing operations as well as in modern methods of packaging and refrigerating fish. The Omani National Fishing Co. has also been established. Twenty percent of its shares are owned by fishermen, 60 percent are owned by the private sector, and the remaining shares are owned by the government.

Such rapid economic growth had to be accompanied by a development of service utilities and an infrastructure consisting of transportation, communications, health, and community services. Special emphasis was placed on the development of human resources and improving the capabilities and qualifications of Oman's people by implementing an intensive program designed to provide education to Oman's young generation. The number of schools in Oman has increased from 3 schools in the early seventies to 370 schools and institutes [today] which are attended by 95,453 pupils and students of both sexes. At the present time a study is being prepared concerning the establishment of a national Omani university so that Omanis can be educated there in addition to being educated at universities in foreign countries.

9468
CSO: 4802

BUILDING CONTRACTORS SUFFER LOSSES DUE TO GOVERNMENT RED TAPE

Abu Dhabi AL-ITTIHAD in Arabic 23 Dec 80 p 3

[Article by Sulayman al-Mahi: "A Crisis in Confidence Between the Contractors and the Ministry of Public Works"]

[Text] The Contractors Say: "The Ministry Is Late in Making Payments and in Delivering Plans, and Then Holds Us to Account for the Delay."

The Undersecretary of Public Works in Ra's al-Khaymah Says: "We Cannot Help It; and the Solution Is for the Ministry to Have More Authority in the Administration of Its Finances."

The problem concerning the federal projects which have not been completed is revolving around in a vicious circle. The contractors are accusing the Ministry of Public Works and Housing of being the principal cause in the delay in completing the construction of these projects. They say that this is because the ministry does not pay out to them the amounts which it previously agreed to pay when projects are completed. They also say that any given contractor or contracting company has contracts concerning more than one project, and that the other projects cannot be implemented when there is a delay in payment for a particular project which has been completed. In fact, some of our UAE contractors are complaining bitterly that they are headed for bankruptcy if things continue to go on as they are now.

The Ministry of Public Works and Housing is forgiven because it is generously putting up with all of this reproach. But it is passing the buck to the Government Accounting Office and is of the opinion that it is necessary that the ministry be given the freedom to make payments concerning projects without waiting for approval from the Accounting Office. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Public Works is responsible to a large degree for the delay in making payments to the contractors because the procedures engaged in by the ministry are nothing but red tape.

In any case, the important thing is that as a result of the fact that many factors are intertwined with each other, work on dozens of projects stops for a year, 2 years, or more either because of a delay in making payments or due to the fact that some contractors neglect to complete their projects by the

deadlines which have been set, and for reasons which have nothing to do with the ministry. This problem has become especially noticeable in Ra's al-Khaymah, and it is there that we conducted this interview with some of the contractors.

One contractor, 'Abdallah al-Salumi, says: "Contractors in the UAE are forced, against their will, to spend money from their own accounts on many of the projects which they have committed themselves to implement. They do this primarily out of patriotic fervor and out of a desire to always maintain their reputation. Patriotic fervor always impels them to complete projects as quickly as possible so that the state does not suffer any losses. And their reputation impels them, now and then, not to cause any problems, and it impels them not to delay the completion of the projects which have been entrusted to them. But there are cases where some companies cannot complete the projects which have been entrusted to them by the deadlines which have been set because the companies lack the material means to do so and because the Ministry of Public Works has not honored its commitment of making payments to the contracting companies. I will give you an example. My company completed the construction of a mosque in al-Rams 4 months ago. We still have not received our payment from the ministry. This type of delay causes a contractor to suffer various types of losses. His debts accumulate, the interest which he owes to the bank is compounded, and when faced with all of this it is difficult for him to provide for even the most basic necessities of his family. It is necessary to deal with this problem in a responsible way, with the basic aim being to take people's circumstances into consideration rather than inflicting an unjust punishment on them."

The Ministry Is Late in Delivering Plans

'Abdallah Yusuf 'Abdallah, the director-general of a contracting company which operates in different principalities of the UAE, is of the opinion that red tape is the usual reason for delays in the projects. He says that correspondence between the contractors and the ministry takes a very long time. He also says that since these letters concern payment of the contractors' fees, then we can realize to what degree people's interests are being hampered and to what degree public projects are being delayed.

He says: "When work stops on a project, the delay is charged to the contractor in spite of the fact that the only reason for stopping work on the project is the delay in payment of the contractor's fees. This delay harms not only the project. It harms us primarily because the prices of building materials go up from time to time."

Then he brings up another important point which is the fact that the ministry does not commit itself to deliver project plans by the deadline which has been set. He says: "This delay in time is charged solely to the contractor. Why is it that we assign a contractor a project in 1978, for example, and then we do not deliver the project's plans to him until 6 months or a year later?! Who pays the price for such a delay? Does the ministry pay the price for it? Not at all. The one who has to suffer from the delay, and who has to pay the material price for it in view of the fact that prices are continually rising, is the contractor and no one else. In addition to this, the ministry sometimes

undertakes actions which involve the stopping or delay of payment of fees, and this causes all of us to suffer losses. Unfortunately, when the ministry settles accounts with a contractor, it does not take into consideration the period of time in which there was a delay in delivering plans or in making particular payments which were a part of the total cost of the project."

He quotes an example of the ministry failing to deliver project plans by the deadline which had been set. He says: "In 1978 my company got the contract to complete the third stage of the construction of the Umm al-Qaywayn Hospital. This involved making certain expansions without which it was impossible to open the hospital. After urging and tirelessly petitioning the ministry's officials, the ministry finally handed the site over to me in 1979. Naturally, during the long time interval between the time when we had gotten the contract and the time when the site was handed over to us, there had been large increases in the prices of the materials which we had stated that we were going to use. This increase in costs was borne by the contractor. The ministry of course does not care at all about changes in supply and demand in the marketplace. It simply wants to have its projects completed by a certain deadline.

When the third stage of the hospital project was finished, the ministry did not accept and approve it. The ministry also had not begun to set the design for the fourth stage which my company was also going to implement. And my company had long since gotten the contract to do that work, too. To all of this you have to add the fact that the ministry delayed paying our January, February, and March 1980 fees which amounted to a total of 4 million dirhams. These were fee for the Umm al-Qaywayn Hospital project. Of course, such a delay in payments to contractors puts them in an embarrassing financial situation with their banks, workers, and employees. This also causes a company to incur huge debts and losses."

Why Are the Bids Invited All At One Time?

He goes on to say: "We notice that the Ministry of Public Works announces its projects all at one time. This action leads to a rise in prices because the companies all rush to obtain building materials. The thing that should be done here is to distribute the projects at wide time intervals so that the merchants are not so aware of them and thus do not raise their prices."

He adds: "The contractors, who are citizens of the UAE, have the interests of their country uppermost in their minds. They are more concerned with doing a good job with their construction work than they are with making a financial profit from this construction work." He then suggested that the Ministry of Public Works be given broader authority to manage its construction affairs. He said that in order for the ministry to regain the confidence of the contractors it is necessary for the ministry to be prompt and pay them their fees by the deadlines which have been set. Also, he demanded that contracting companies be given moral support instead of being threatened with fines and with having projects being taken away from them--due to reasons beyond the control of the companies.

The Contractors' Complaints Are Genuine

What do officials in the Ministry of Public Works say?

Engineer 'Abd al-Rahman al-Bnay, the deputy director of the Office of Public Works in Ra's al-Khaymah, says: "It is true that most of the contracting companies do not meet the deadlines which have been set for them to hand over the installations which they have committed themselves to finish. This is because the companies are suffering from material losses, since the rise in prices of building materials exhausts their finances. And we find that the Ministry of Public Works, at the same time, delays in making the payments to the contractors which have to be made in order that they complete their projects in accordance with the time frames which have been stipulated in the contracts. If we delve further into the matter, we find that the delay in payments by the Ministry of Public Works is due to reasons beyond its control."

"The authority of the Ministry of Public Works does not go beyond implementation. When dealing with financial matters the ministry has to go through numerous and strict channels. For example, if a contractor submits a request to us in which he requires some urgent action to be taken in order for him to proceed with the implementation, we in the Ministry of Public Works have to refer the matter to the Permanent Project Committee. If this committee gives its approval, then it has to refer the matter to the Government Accounting Office. This process requires quite a bit of time, and since it takes so long it has the negative effect of causing losses to the project and to the contractor. For this reason it is necessary to give the Ministry of Public Works the authority to spend money on projects without the ministry having to refer matters to other government bodies--even within a limited framework."

He mentions furthermore that there is another matter which delays the payment of fees to contractors: "In the months of November and December the government is embarking upon a new fiscal year. Because of this, the process of making payments to contractors comes to a halt. Often projects stop at this time, and we are compelled to penalize the contractors by deducting [payments normally made to them] and by taking projects away from them. This happened during the last few weeks when one company in Umm al-Qaywayn was unable to finish the construction of two mosques. The result was that we took this project away from them."

"In another case something else happened which made the Ministry of Public Works unable to make payments to contractors who were working on the construction of low-cost housing. What happened was that the money in the budget for low-cost housing had already been spent on housing projects which had begun during previous years. Thus it became quite difficult to honor commitments to contractors who are implementing low-cost housing projects that were started this year. Such contractors have been waiting since last October to receive their payments."

The deputy director of public works added: "We are perhaps aware of the dimensions of the suffering which contractors are having to bear. But we are unable to do anything about it. We have a contract before us, and our job consists of seeing to the implementation of certain facets which cannot easily be disregarded. I feel that the solution to, or settlement of, the problem is in "liberalizing" the fiscal policies which are followed. The Ministry of Public Works should be given more authority because it is the government body which undertakes the projects and which keeps track of them. Since this is true, it is the Ministry of Public Works which is most familiar with the circumstances under which the contractors are operating and which concern the particular projects which are to be implemented. If this were done, we would be able to avoid the mistakes from which the projects are suffering and the negligence in honoring the commitments of the contracts which have been ratified with the companies."

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BACKGROUND OF ISLAND DISPUTE WITH IRAN

Kuwait AL-HADAF in Arabic 18 Dec 80 p 5

[Article by Hafix al-Burghuthi: "The UAE Demands Its Islands"]

[Text] Is the UAE Demanding Its Islands In Order to Make Its Position Known Just for the Record, or Is It Doing So In Order to Open Up a Front with Iran?

At the end of last week the UAE officially called upon Iran to begin negotiations concerning the return of the three Arab islands occupied by Iran in 1971 during the reign of the shah.

The appeal was made by the UAE in an official message which the UAE's ambassador to the UN, Fahim Sultan al-Qasini, handed to Kurt Waldheim, the UN secretary-general. He requested that the message be included in the agenda of the UN General Assembly during its current session. In the message the UAE insists on recovering full sovereignty over the three islands Lesser Tunb, Greater Tunb, and Abu Musa. The UAE had already submitted a similar document to the UN Security Council and General Assembly in August of 1980, that is, before the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian war.

The question which suggests itself here is: "Why has the UAE chosen this particular time to bring up the issue of these three islands in the international arena?"

The answer to this can be found in the latest developments which have accompanied the Iraqi-Iranian war. Already at the beginning of the armed clash between Iraq and Iran news reports were mentioning that Iraq had offered to use force to regain the UAE's three islands for it. Official Iraqi statements have confirmed that this offer was made. However the UAE--which, due to its particular circumstances, followed the policy of avoiding an open clash with Iran during the reign of the shah and continued this policy after the fall of the shah--publicly rejected this Iraqi offer.

The UAE indicated that it would use diplomatic channels to deal with the issue of recovering the three islands. In addition to all of the above-mentioned, Iranian officials recently made some statements which put the UAE in an embarrassing position. The reason for this is that if the UAE did not respond to these statements it would give the impression that they were true.

The Iranian president, Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, said, in an interview which he gave to LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR on 13 October 1980, that the former shah had paid off some of the UAE shaykhs so that they would not speak out against Iran's occupation of these three islands. He mentioned that they had been paid a total of 15 million dollars. Then the UAE responded by demanding that Iran produce documents to prove that this was true, but the Iranian president did not reply to this.

Before continuing this account of current developments concerning the subject and concerning the possibility of Iran going along with the UAE's request, it is necessary to clarify the circumstances under which the three islands were occupied.

British Evacuation of the Gulf

Ever since Britain, under growing pressure by the Arabs, began talking in the sixties about withdrawing from areas east of the Suez Canal and liquidating its military presence in the Gulf areas of Qatar, the Trucial Coast Emirates, and Bahrain, the shah of Iran, who was allied with the West and whose military strength was on the upswing, had been talking both publicly and privately about his expansionist aims in the Persian Gulf area, especially as they pertained to Bahrain which was still under British domination. Britain's withdrawal meant that new independent nations would be born, and that would make it difficult for Iran to occupy their territories.

The annexation by Iran of any Arab territory under British domination would have meant a British violation of the charters and treaties which had been signed decades before with the rulers of the Gulf emirates, and would have provided an impetus to the Arab liberation movement which was calling for the liberation, by force, of the Gulf from Britain's presence there. For this reason, Britain delayed evacuating the Gulf until the situation in the Arab world was such that it permitted an official British evacuation which could coincide with Britain in fact continuing to maintain a presence there and then allow the shah to achieve his aims--since the shah had taken it upon himself to fill the power vacuum in the area left by the West and to play the role of Gulf policeman in order to protect the various interests which the West had in the region.

In 1971 conditions in the Arab world were such that they permitted the implementation of the British-Iranian plan just as Britain had carried out a similar plan in Palestine. The plan was for Britain to withdraw from the area, grant independence to the Trucial Coast Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain, and then hand over Arab territory to the shah--the policeman of the Gulf.

In Egypt, which had been the leader of the Arab world's liberation movement, more than a year had gone by since Nasser's death and Sadat had already undertaken action to do away with the symbols of Nasser's regime. The wise saying "the lion is dead, so now the shah is acting brave like a lion," which AL-HADAF chose to print in its issue which came out on the day following Iran's occupation of the Arab islands, was a reference to the fact that Nasser was gone and therefore the shah of Iran felt brave enough to occupy part of Arab territory. The Arab liberation movement was being held in check and was unable to act, especially after the Palestinian resistance movement in Jordan had been crushed. Also, Iraq was suffering from domestic conditions and relations with foreign countries which were so bad that its ability to take action was limited.

So the situation was ripe to carry out the British-Iranian plan. The decision to choose the three islands as the target of this plan was not a random choice. It was the natural approach for the Shah to continue to achieve his ambitions after Britain's evacuation from the area. Lesser and Greater Tunb are the key to the Strait of Hormuz, and controlling them means complete control over the strait. Also, the island of Abu Musa is in a location which is very strategic with regard to the emirates and furthermore possesses important petroleum and mineral resources.

Occupation of these islands could be considered to be the first stage toward more extensive occupation of other territory in the Gulf area. The Arabs' reaction to the occupation of the islands demonstrated how much the situation in the Arab world had deteriorated at that time.

The Celebrations Continued

On 2 December 1971 the emirates were celebrating their independence and the formation of the six-member federation.

"Ra's al-Khaymah, which exercised sovereignty over the Tunb islands, still had not joined the federation." In fact, a concert scheduled to be given by Umm Kalthum, on the day following the day the islands were occupied, was not even cancelled.

The ruler of Sharjah held a press conference in which he explained that he was perfectly content to hand over half of Abu Musa to Iran, saying that this was better than losing all of it, as had been the fate of Palestine! But the ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah, who had taken a hard-line position with regard to the occupation of the Tunb islands, said: "No. This is a crucial mistake because it means recognizing, in writing, Iran's right to the islands, and I have not recognized any legal document which says that these islands are not Arab islands."

The ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah mentioned that a British envoy had offered him the sum of 18 million Iranian riyals per year in return for renouncing his rights to Lesser and Greater Tunb, but said that he had rejected the offer. The ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah—who is still its ruler—went even further and made it a condition for his joining the UAE that relations with Iran be broken off. This, however, was rejected by the UAE since it was thought to be an action which would be a barrier to the establishment of the UAE as a federation.

In addition to Iranian money, Britain offered the rulers of Ra's al-Khaymah and Sharjah an Iranian document to sign which stated that Iran would recognize the islands as Arab islands in return for recognition by the rulers of the two emirates of Iranian sovereignty over the islands! This, of course, is a document which contradicts itself. This idea was rejected by the ruler of Ra's al-Khaymah, but was accepted by the former ruler of Sharjah!

What Does History Say!

Iranian forces occupied Lesser and Greater Tunb toward the end of November and at the beginning of December of 1971 and clashed with local security forces

there. They occupied Abu Musa without resistance after they had reached a previous agreement with Sharjah's ruler Shaykh Khalid al-Qasimi, "who later on was killed during an attempt to dethrone him which was undertaken by Sharjah's previous ruler, Shaykh Saqr al-Qasimi, who was then arrested by the UAE's security forces."

Iranian forces then passed out pamphlets which prepared the few inhabitants of the islands for the idea of once again being part of "the motherland, under the imperial crown." This Iranian claim made at that time is historically inaccurate since the islands are Arab and have never been ruled by Iran. Even the island of Abu Musa, which had "about 500 inhabitants," was populated completely by Arabs and had only one Iranian inhabitant who was working there as a contractor and was not a native of the island. History indeed tells us significant facts concerning this matter.

The Danish traveller, who visited the Gulf area in the 18th century, wondered at the time: "Why do we call this gulf the Persian Gulf when the rulers and inhabitants of the territories on both of its shores are Arabs?" The Danish traveller pointed out that Arabs of the Qasimi tribe and other tribes lived on the eastern shore of the Gulf in Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, [Bandar-e] Lengeh, and al-Muhammarah [the Arabic name for Khorramshahr] at the northern end of the Shatt al-'Arab, and that these areas were under Arab control--inhabited by Arabs and either ruled by [local] Arabs or under the rule of the Sultanate of Oman. This was how the situation had been for hundreds of years until Arab control over the area gradually diminished as the British imposed their protectorate over the region. But Arabs continued--and still continue--to be in the area.

The Revolution and the Islands

After the victory of the Iranian revolution and the fall of the shah, Iranian positions regarding the occupation of the three islands have varied between recognizing that the islands are Arab islands, hinting at the possibility of returning them to the Arabs, and--with no historical justifications--refusing to recognize that they are Arab islands.

One position taken says that withdrawing from the islands means handing them over to the U.S., which is still in a state of war with Iran, and that this would be true as long as the Arab nations involved are hostile to Iran and supporters of America. Another position states that Iran is an Islamic nation and that the UAE is also an Islamic nation, and that there is therefore no harm in letting the islands remain under Iranian rule since this would mean that they would still be under Islamic rule. Both of these positions are negative ones. Right now Iran is concentrating on its war with Iraq in order to emphasize the credibility of its position and continue its occupation of the islands since it considers that these islands, with their strategic location, are an important card to be played in its dispute with the Arabs. Iran is overlooking the fact that the reason for its war with Iraq is the fact that it has not righted this wrong which was committed by the former shah.

The final question to be asked is: "Will Iran respond to the UAE's appeal and enter into negotiations concerning the islands?" The answer to this is supplied by the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, Mr Rashid 'Abdallah ['Ali al-Nu'aymi], whom the latest issue of the magazine AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI quoted as saying: "If my country, under present circumstances, demanded the return of the islands, this might create a commotion which would cause us to lose more than we would gain."

Then what does the UAE have in mind? Will it continue to demand the return of the islands? This would mean once again extending the specter of war to the whole Gulf area and bringing the Strait of Hormuz into a dangerous situation again--and this is what both the Arabs and the West are trying to avoid. Or is the UAE putting forth this position just for the record or in order to apply political pressure at a time when the war between Iran and Iraq is still going on?

Only time will tell.

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UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

AL-SHARIQAH TO EARN \$1 BILLION YEARLY FROM OIL SALES

GF130505 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 12 Feb 81 p 1

[Article by staff reporter]

[Excerpts] Al-Shariqah oil revenue will touch \$1 billion annually by 1986, rising from a level of \$250 million next year when first exports from the new onshore wells begin.

This was revealed by his highness Shaykh Sultan ibn Muhammad al-Qasimi, member of the Supreme Council and ruler of al-Shariqah, to the visiting delegation from the Franco-Arab Chamber of Commerce.

President of the chamber Mr Michel Habib Deboncle, speaking to newsmen after the meeting, said the ruler had invited French investments and technology in the petrochemical industry to be set up in the Emirate utilizing the newly found hydrocarbon reserves.

The visiting group was presented with several proposals for investment opportunities in al-Shariqah when it had talks with the al-Shariqah Chamber of Commerce. Its president was present at the talks.

The areas of interest to the French, Mr Deboncle said, were gas development projects and steel and sponge iron plants. "We take with us some concrete proposals," he added, which would have to be studied in detail to assess their feasibility. An essential element in such a study would be the possibility of marketing the product in the region, he added.

In regard to steel, the Franco-Arab chamber chief said, the prospects for a joint venture seemed good as France was faced with a serious shortage of the metal. The shortage could be overcome by establishing a plant in countries where energy was cheap.

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